Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Collective intentionality and socially extended minds. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 251-268. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295629
Abstract: There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.
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(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen 2016
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
2013
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(2013): Why we do things together. The social motivation for joint action. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (4), S. 588-603. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905
Abstract: Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Keywords: Herkunft von Sozialität, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Joint Action, Joint Intentions, Social Bonds, Social Emotions, Social Motivation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, Neuropsychologie, Philosophical Psychology, Soziale Motivation, Spezifika von Menschen 2009
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(2009): The We-Mode Approach. A Response to John Wettersten’s Review of The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3), S. 513-517. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109352830
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109352830 Abstract: The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.
Keywords: explanation, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, philosophy of the social sciences, social action, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), we-mode, We-Mode Approach 2007
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(2007): A Concept of Social Integration. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 579-593. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701549314
Abstract: Clear definitions of alienation and solidarity are needed as a step toward an explicit theory of social integration. The idea of alienation has played a key role in the development of sociology, but it's meaning has never been clear. Both theories and empirical studies confound relational-dispositional, cognitive-emotional and/or interpersonal-societal components. This essay proposes definitions that follow from the work of Erving Goffman and others. Goffman's idea of "co-presence'' implies a model of solidarity as mutual awareness to the point of merging consciousness. It appears that this concept of solidarity could be the main component of shared context, consensus, genuine love and social facts. Two empirical approaches are described, one with moment by moment analysis of dialogue, the other using sample surveys. With the use of mathematical notation, the survey method might be used to analyze social facts. The model could also form the basis for an explicit and testable theory of social integration.
Keywords: alienation, Entfremdung, Erving Goffman, Gegenseitigkeit, Gemeinsamkeit, Goffman, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, INTEGRATION, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Modelle/Theorien, mutual awareness, social integration, Solidarität, solidarity, Soziale Integration, Soziologische Entfremdungstheorien, Theory of interaction (Goffman) 1998
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(1998): Test of the emergent norm theory of collective behavior. In: Sociological Forum 13 (2), S. 301-320. DOI: 10.1023/A:1022145900928
Abstract: Objective: The paper uses the timing of evacuation behavior of occupants of the World Trade Center at the time of the explosion of February 26, 1993, to test predictions from Emergent Norm Theory. Method: Tf uses ordinary least square multiple regression analysis to examine data from a survey done in the first week in May 1993 of 415 people who worked at the World Trade Center. Results: The theory's predictions regarding the additive effects of size of group and preexisting social relationships on the timing of evacuation are supported. However the findings document important and unexpected interaction effects of these two variables on the effects of perceived threat, resources, and cooperativeness on the timing of evacuation. Conclusion: The results augment the theory by showing the continued importance of enduring social relationships as determinants of collective behavior: Enduring social relationships are not only useful to differentiate collective behavior from institutionalized behavior but also specify the dynamics attending the occurrence of collective behavior.
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