Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen 2014
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(2014): In Defense of Shame. The Faces of an Emotion. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (7), S. 1083-1086. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.926439
Abstract: [book review] Reviewed publication: This is the first monograph on shame to take the results of many different disciplines into account. In it the authors present an original theory of shame centering on a distinctive form of self-evaluation involving the subject's feeling incapable to be and to behave in ways compatible with the values to which she is attached. It includes an extended critical examination of the most recent and older theories of shame (in particular those of M. Scheler, J. Rawls, G. Taylor, J. Deigh, D. Velleman, J. P. Tangney, R. Benedict, R. Wollheim, and H. B. Lewis) The authors clarify many common claims and misconceptions about shame (e.g. that shame is a social emotion, that shame is morally bad, etc.) and explain how shame is distinguished from other self-reflexive negative emotions such as guilt, embarrassment and humiliation. The book sheds light on the relations between shame episodes and the sense of shame (dignity, integrity, pudeur, decency) It hinges on several controversial theses: shame is not a social emotion, shame has to do with the subject's experiencing her own incapacity, shame is morally relevant and can be morally good.
2013
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(2013): Why we do things together. The social motivation for joint action. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (4), S. 588-603. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905
Abstract: Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Keywords: Herkunft von Sozialität, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Joint Action, Joint Intentions, Social Bonds, Social Emotions, Social Motivation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, Neuropsychologie, Philosophical Psychology, Soziale Motivation, Spezifika von Menschen 2012
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(2012): Using Goffman's theories of social interaction to reflect first-time mothers' experiences with the social norms of infant feeding. In: Qualitative health research 22 (10), S. 1345-1354. DOI: 10.1177/1049732312451873
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22785628 Abstract: Infant feeding, particularly breastfeeding, is an important public health issue because early feeding methods have been shown to influence health throughout childhood. We investigated how social norms influence first-time mothers' decisions around feeding methods. We conducted two in-depth interviews with 11 first-time mothers, the first 3 weeks after birth and the second 3 months following birth. We analyzed interview data using a third-level, thematic analysis, using Goffman's theories of social interaction to guide our analysis. Our results highlighted several issues surrounding breastfeeding in modern society. We propose that nursing mothers are conscious of adhering to social norms of being a good mother, but must also cope with societal views about presenting normal appearances when they need to feed their babies in public.
Keywords: Adult, Australia, Breast Feeding/psychology, Female, Goffman, Gruppennorm, Humans, Infant, Infant Food, Interpersonal Relations, Mothers/psychology, Normenwandel, Psychological Theory, Qualitative research, Social Control, Informal, Social Identification, Soziale Normen, Spezifika von Menschen, Stereotyping, Theory of interaction (Goffman), Young Adult 2010
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(2010): The Causal Power of Social Structures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: This book offers a solution to the problem of structure and agency: a new solution, but one that draws on a number of existing traditions of thought, most significantly philosophical theories of emergence and causality, and the sociological debates around structuration theory. This introductory chapter sets the context by explaining the problem of structure and agency and its significance for sociology, and outlines some of the key points of my argument. It also offers the reader some hints on different ways to read the rest of the book and briefly locates it with respect to critical realism, the main philosophical tradition on which I draw. The problem of structure and agency Sociology is founded on the belief that our behaviour is causally influenced and in particular that there are social factors that influence our behaviour. Karl Marx, for example, famously wrote ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx 1978 [1859]: 4). Émile Durkheim, similarly, argued that ‘the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely, collective reality’ (Durkheim 1952 [1897]: 38). Conventionally, the social factors that are held to influence our behaviour are known as social structure, a concept that even today remains implicit in, and indeed essential to, much of the work done in the social sciences. Yet there is also widespread disagreement about what social structure really is and how it could affect us.
1999
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(1999): On becoming a person. In: Philosophical Psychology 12 (1), S. 79-98. DOI: 10.1080/095150899105945
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person.
1993
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(1993): The emotional origins of social understanding. In: Philosophical Psychology 6 (3), S. 227-249. DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573090
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co‐ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of ‘persons’ who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism.
Keywords: Autismus, Entwicklungspsychologie, Evolutionsbiologie, Herkunft von Sozialität, Interpersonale Wahrnehmung, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Pathologie, Person Sein, Philosophical Psychology, Soziales Miteinander, soziales Verhalten, Sozialphilosophie, Spezifika von Menschen, Verstehen
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