Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Explanatory Unification. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4), S. 488-506. DOI: 10.1177/004839310103100402
Abstract: Explanatory unification-the urge to "explain much by little"-serves as an ideal of theorizing not only in natural sciences but also in the social sciences, most notably in economics. The ideal is occasionally challenged by appealing to the complexity and diversity of social systems and processes in space and time. This article proposes to accommodate such doubts by making a distinction between two kinds of unification and suggesting that while such doubts may be justified in regard to mere derivational unification (which serves as a formal constraint on theories), it is less justified in the case of ontological unification (which is a result of factual discovery of the actual degree of underlying unity in the world).
2004
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(2004): A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives. Solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages. In: Journal of personality and social psychology 86 (2), S. 356-366. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.356
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14769090 Abstract: Standard psycholexical studies of personality structure have produced a similar 6-factor solution in 7 languages (Dutch, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Korean, Polish). The authors report the content of these personality dimensions and interpret them as follows: (a) a variant of Extraversion, defined by sociability and liveliness (though not by bravery and toughness); (b) a variant of Agreeableness, defined by gentleness, patience, and agreeableness (but also including anger and ill temper at its negative pole); (c) Conscientiousness (emphasizing organization and discipline rather than moral conscience); (d) Emotionality (containing anxiety, vulnerability, sentimentality, lack of bravery, and lack of toughness, but not anger or ill temper); (e) Honesty-Humility; (f) Intellect/Imagination/Unconventionality. A potential reorganization of the Big Five factor structure is discussed.
2002
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(2002): Psychology and ethics. Interactions and conflicts. In: Philosophical Psychology 15 (4), S. 489-508. DOI: 10.1080/0951508021000042030
Abstract: The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. If the former, then psychology is incapable of identifying universal moral imperatives because of the fact/value dichotomy that rejects the possibility of logically deriving moral principles or social policies from factual statements. In addition, the inevitability of moral pluralism raises the question as to how natural science methodology can select moral truths or social policies from a variety of presumed alternatives. In contrast, human science psychology, which emphasizes phenomenological experience as a source of psychological truths, has attempted to bridge the fact/value gap. Upon close examination, this approach has failed to suggest a rule as to how the "correct" set of values can be identified. The conclusion is that facts cannot dictate moral principles or social policies but they can help illuminate their consequences. Policy decisions become the responsibility of a democratic society, not of psychology.
1995
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(1995): Emotion as a natural kind. Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. In: Philosophical Psychology 8 (1), S. 59-84. DOI: 10.1080/09515089508573145
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation‐governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers. The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework.
1983
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(1983): Moral Arguments and Social Contexts. In: The Journal of Philosophy 80 (10). DOI: 10.2307/2026154
Abstract: Virginia Held believes it possible for intellectuals to speak from a point of view independet of existing social arrangements and interests, from which as purely external critics they should articulate for society the standards that genuine moral and aesthetiv worth decree. The issue between her and Richard Rorty turns on whether a necessary precondition of this possibility can be satisfied. Held's thesis requires that conclusions concerning genuine moral worth can be devised and justified, independently of any appeal to de facto beliefs, conventions, and institutions. This is what Rorty denies. Held's thesis also requires that everyone else, plain persons who are not intellectuals, have good reason to attend to declarations by intellectuals. This I deny for reasons which undermine Rorty's argument as well as Held's. What precludes modern intellectuals from being justly accorded the role and the responsibilities assigned to them by Held is the extent of intellectual and social dissensus. On every substantive social and moral issue intellectuals appear on opposing sides: Sowell versus Thorow, Scholem versus Arendt, Bethe versus Teller. If Held's thesis is that plain persons should attend only to intellectuals whose arguments are sound, then the intellectual task of identifying sound arguments devolves on the plain person, and any clear distinction between intellectuals and nonintellectuals is obliterated.
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