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  • 2011

  • Andrighetto, Giulia; Villatoro, Daniel (2011): Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model. In: European Conference on Cognitive Science

    Abstract: As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, by punishment we refer to a practice that works only by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than mere punishment.

    Keywords: Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation, Axelrod, normative agent, normative Agenten, Normen, norms, Punishment, Realtechnik, sanctions, Sanktion, Selbstorganisation, self-organization, Semira, simulation, Spieltheorie, strafen
  • Villatoro, Daniel; Andrighetto, Giulia; Sabater-Mir, Jordi; Conte, Rosaria (2011): Dynamic Sanctioning for Robust and Cost-Efficient Norm Compliance. Conference: IJCAI 2011. In: Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Barcelona, Spain, S. 414-419

    Abstract: As explained by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to impose social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms. i.e. punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favor the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The key research question is to find more stable and cheaper mechanisms for norm compliance in hybrid social environments (populated by humans and computational agents). To achieve this task, we have developed a normative agent able to punish and sanction defectors and to dynamically choose the right amount of punishment and sanction to impose on them (Dynamic Adaptation Heuristic). The results obtained through agent-based simulation show us that sanction is more effective and less costly than punishment in the achievement and maintenance of cooperation and it makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than if it were enforced only by mere punishment.

    Keywords: Semira, Social Norms
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