Alle Publikationen
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2012
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(2012): Feeling robots and human zombies. Mind perception and the uncanny valley. In: Cognition 125 (1), S. 125-130. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22784682 Abstract: The uncanny valley-the unnerving nature of humanlike robots-is an intriguing idea, but both its existence and its underlying cause are debated. We propose that humanlike robots are not only unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, we suggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience (the capacity to feel and sense), rather than agency (the capacity to act and do). Experiment 1 examined whether a machine's humanlike appearance prompts both ascriptions of experience and feelings of unease. Experiment 2 tested whether a machine capable of experience remains unnerving, even without a humanlike appearance. Experiment 3 investigated whether the perceived lack of experience can also help explain the creepiness of unfeeling humans and philosophical zombies. These experiments demonstrate that feelings of uncanniness are tied to perceptions of experience, and also suggest that experience-but not agency-is seen as fundamental to humans, and fundamentally lacking in machines.
Keywords: Emotions, Favoriten, Female, humanlike, humanlike robots, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intellectual Disability/psychology, Male, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), nervende Roboter, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, Reflexionen über MTR, Robotics, Simulation von Menschlichkeit, theory of mind 2010
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(2010): Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness. Does anyone care about functional zombies?. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1), S. 133-155. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6
Abstract: It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.
Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mental states, mentale Zustände, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, phenomenal consciousness, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, qualia, Reflexionen über MTR, Zur Frage: Schreiben wir Assistenzsystemen mentale Zustände zu? Bzw.: durch simulierte Menschlichkeit/soziale Angemessenheit neige wir eher dazu, mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben 2008
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2005
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(2005): Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game. In: Minds and Machines 15 (3-4), S. 415-444. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-005-9005-z
Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?”.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Dretske, Favoriten, human versus robots, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, knowledge game, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2004
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(2004): On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other ?. Behaviourally Indistinguishable?Creatures. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1), S. 173-186. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00389.x
Abstract: Zombies are presently generating much discussion in the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.2 For if a creature could be physically, functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from humans (in the rich sense implied) yet lack conscious experience, then the theories of mind that tie the nature of the mental too closely to physical, functional, or behavioural conditions will seem to have left something crucially mental out of their theories. If having conscious experiences is necessary for being conscious – as these discussions assume – then the theories that cannot accommodate it will fail as theories of mind.
1998
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(1998): Computationalism is dead; now what?. In: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4), S. 393-402. DOI: 10.1080/095281398146662
Abstract: In this paper I put Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of ‘zombie’), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. Firstly, persons process information at a ‘super’-Turing level; secondly, people enjoy certain properties (e.g. intentionality) beyond the reach of any mere information-processing object. Accordingly, computationalism ought to be supplanted with the engineering of ‘subperson’ artifacts and the irreducibly philosophical investigation of personhood. I end with nascent appraisal of Fetzer's interesting semiotic/connectionist replacement for computationalism.
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