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  • 2016

  • Ienca, Marcello; Jotterand, Fabrice; Vică, Constantin; Elger, Bernice (2016): Social and assistive robotics in dementia care: Ethical recommendations for research and practice. In: International Journal of Social Robotics 8 (4), S. 565-573. DOI: 10.1007/s12369-016-0366-7

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12369-016-0366-7 

    Abstract: The steadily growing number of older adults with dementia worldwide poses a major challenge for global public health. The integration of robotics into both formal and informal dementia care opens up new possibilities for improving the life of patients and alleviating the burden on caregivers and the healthcare services. However, ethical, legal and social implications should be considered early in the development of assistive and social robots for dementia to prevent slow adoption, incorrect implementation and inappropriate use. This paper delineates the ethical landscape and provides recommendations for design and use aimed at protecting users and maximizing the benefit in assisting such vulnerable population. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

  • 2011

  • Barilan, Y. M. (2011): Respect for personal autonomy, human dignity, and the problems of self-directedness and botched autonomy. In: The Journal of medicine and philosophy 36 (5), S. 496-515. DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhr035

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22021657 

    Abstract: This paper explores the value of respect for personal autonomy in relation to clearly immoral and irrational acts committed freely and intentionally by competent people. Following Berlin's distinction between two kinds of liberty and Darwall's two kinds of respect, it is argued that coercive suppression of nonautonomous, irrational, and self-harming acts of competent persons is offensive to their human dignity, but not disrespectful of personal autonomy. Irrational and immoral choices made by competent people may claim only the negative liberty to be left alone. Lives disposed to autonomy are worthy of solidarity and active support in addition to the right of free choice and action. Autonomous premeditated desires (distinguished from mere consent) may embody transcendental choices, which transcend consideration of physical and psychological well-being. Choices made by incompetent persons (e.g., children and the mentally disabled) are not related to autonomy, but to self-directedness. The value of human dignity confers protection to self-directedness, but not at the expense of other vital interests.

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