Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Contemporary morality. Moral judgments in digital contexts. In: Computers in Human Behavior 75, S. 184-193. DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2017.05.020
Abstract: Nowadays, several of the situations in which we have to make decisions are in digital form. In a first experiment (N = 1010) we showed that people's moral judgments depend on the Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC) in which a dilemma is presented, becoming more utilitarian (vs. deontological) when using Smartphones in high conflict moral dilemmas. To provide additional evidence, we ran a second (N = 250) and a third experiment (N = 300), where we introduced time constraints and we manipulated time instructions. Our results provide an extended perspective on Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment, as we showed that the use of smartphones, often assumed to be hurried which would be consistent with gut-feeling decision-making, increased the likelihood of utilitarian responses and decreased deontological ones. We suggest that the increase in utilitarian judgments is a result of inducing high construal, increasing psychological distance and giving rise to an abstract representation of actions. A fourth experiment (N = 1211), where we measured psychological distance, provided some first evidence for our hypotheses. This is one of the first studies to look at the impact of the digital age on moral judgments and the results presented have consequences for understanding moral choice in our increasingly virtualized world.
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(2017): Moral Learning. Conceptual foundations and normative relevance. In: Cognition 167, S. 172-190. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.015
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27601269 Abstract: What is distinctive about a bringing a learning perspective to moral psychology? Part of the answer lies in the remarkable transformations that have taken place in learning theory over the past two decades, which have revealed how powerful experience-based learning can be in the acquisition of abstract causal and evaluative representations, including generative models capable of attuning perception, cognition, affect, and action to the physical and social environment. When conjoined with developments in neuroscience, these advances in learning theory permit a rethinking of fundamental questions about the acquisition of moral understanding and its role in the guidance of behavior. For example, recent research indicates that spatial learning and navigation involve the formation of non-perspectival as well as ego-centric models of the physical environment, and that spatial representations are combined with learned information about risk and reward to guide choice and potentiate further learning. Research on infants provides evidence that they form non-perspectival expected-value representations of agents and actions as well, which help them to navigate the human environment. Such representations can be formed by highly-general mental processes such as causal and empathic simulation, and thus afford a foundation for spontaneous moral learning and action that requires no innate moral faculty and can exhibit substantial autonomy with respect to community norms. If moral learning is indeed integral with the acquisition and updating of casual and evaluative models, this affords a new way of understanding well-known but seemingly puzzling patterns in intuitive moral judgment-including the notorious "trolley problems."
2015
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(2015): How foreign language shapes moral judgment. In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 59, S. 8-17. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.02.001
Abstract: We investigated whether and how processing information in a foreign language as opposed to the native language affects moral judgments. Participants judged the moral wrongness of several private actions, such as consensual incest, that were depicted as harmless and presented in either the native or a foreign language. The use of a foreign language promoted less severe moral judgments and less confidence in them. Harmful and harmless social norm violations, such as saying a white lie to get a reduced fare, were also judged more leniently. The results do not support explanations based on facilitated deliberation, misunderstanding, or the adoption of a universalistic stance. We propose that the influence of foreign language is best explained by a reduced activation of social and moral norms when making moral judgments. zitiert von: 50
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(2015) : A model of empathy to shape trolley problem moral judgements: 2015 International Conference on Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction (ACII): Xian, China: IEEE, S. 112-118
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ACII.2015.7344559 Abstract: Moral judgements are a complex phenomenon that have gained a renewed interest in the research community. Many have proposed explanations for moral judgements, including utilitarian accounts and the Principle of Double Effect. Some also advocate for the critical role of emotional processes like empathy. However, developing a computational model of moral judgements is rare perhaps due in part to the numerous influences on it. We present here a computational model of moral judgements based on moral expectation and the Principle of Double Effect. We then extend this model to provide a plausible explanation for the effect of empathy on these judgements. We evaluate these models using results from recent studies with human participants.
Keywords: Cognition, Complexity theory, computational model, Computational modeling, Decision Making, Decision theory, double effect principle, Empathy, empathy model, Ethics, ieee xplore, Moral & Ethik, moral expectation, Moral judgment, PSYCHOLOGY, shape trolley problem moral judgements, Trajectory, utility 2014
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(2014): Moral expertise. In: New Ideas in Psychology 34, S. 1-11. DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.02.001
Abstract: We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.
2013
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(2013): The effects of cleanliness and disgust on moral judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (4), S. 556-568. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.877386
Abstract: Recent experimental studies in cognitive science report the influence of “disgust” and “cleanliness” manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust- and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views, I argue, are those that posit causal effects from a single common cognitive mechanism for both disgust and cleanliness.
Keywords: Beeinflussung der Bewertung moralischer Urteile, Bewertung von sozialem Verhalten (/sozialer Angemessenheit), Cleanliness and disgust, Disgust, Ekel, Emotionaler Zustand, Models of causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment, Moral, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Philosophical Psychology 2009
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(2009): Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1), S. 77-96. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-008-9136-4
Abstract: The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814-834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt's research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no 'real' moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
Keywords: ASPERGER-SYNDROME, ATTITUDES, Automatic processing, AUTOMATICITY, BEHAVIOR, Empathy, Ethik, IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST, INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES, Meta-ethics, Moral, Moral agency, Moral intuitions, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Motivation, PREJUDICE, Psychologie, Reason-responding, Reason-tracking, STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION 2007
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(2007): A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding. Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (6), S. 731-748. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701694110
Abstract: Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call ‘moral dumbfounding’. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms of his ‘Rawlsian creature’ model of moral judgment. I show that Haidt and Hauser assume that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of features of a.) moral judgment that are b.) construed in terms of the intrinsic features of individuals. By contrast, I hypothesize that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of moral reasoning, more specifically in terms of the social dynamics of such reasoning. Finally, I argue that this hypothesis points towards an externalistic account of both moral reasoning and moral judgment.
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