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2018
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Ludwig, Kirk; Janković, Marija (Hg.) (2018): The Routledge handbook of collective intentionality. London; New York: Routledge (Routledge handbooks in philosophy)
2017
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(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2016
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(2016): Retributive Responses. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (4), S. 453-469. DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045004003
Abstract: Retributive responses play a role in human behavior. Are they triggered primarily by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions? Experimental studies were conducted of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending to and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are nonretributive altogether, in that they focus on end-state distributions independently of who brought them about.
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(2016): Editorial: Understanding Social Signals: How Do We Recognize the Intentions of Others?. In: Frontiers in psychology 7. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00281
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00281 Abstract: Humans interact with each other seamlessly, smoothly, and without obvious effort. Social signals are the basis of this highly effective communication. These signals are speech utterances, body movements such as gestures, manipulations of objects, and combinations thereof. For example, interlocutors typically position themselves in an F-formation (Goffman, 1963; Ciolek and Kendon, 1980; Kendon, 1990) and thereby signal to each other that they are part of that interaction. If another participant joins that interaction, the interlocutors integrate her in a new F-formation. The movements of each individual were comparably inconspicuous, but the intention for producing them was easily recognizable to the recipient. Humans use these signals intuitively and without conscious awareness. But in order to enable a robot to understand and respond appropriately to social signals, their form and function have to be made explicit. This research topic presents methods for identifying, understanding, and applying social signals in human–machine interaction.
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2013
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(2013): Why we do things together. The social motivation for joint action. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (4), S. 588-603. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905
Abstract: Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Keywords: Herkunft von Sozialität, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Joint Action, Joint Intentions, Social Bonds, Social Emotions, Social Motivation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, Neuropsychologie, Philosophical Psychology, Soziale Motivation, Spezifika von Menschen 2012
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(2012): A TYPOLOGY OF VERBAL IMPOLITENESS BEHAVIOUR FOR THE ENGLISH AND SPANISH CULTURES. In: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE LINGUISTICA APLICADA (25), S. 69-92
Abstract: The present study takes as its point of departure Kaul de Marlangeon's (2008a) typology of verbal impoliteness in the Spanish-speaking cultures, and, using a corpus of English, attempts to test its validity and/or application to the English-speaking cultures. In that typology, the different types of impolite acts in the Spanish-speaking culture share in common either the intention to be impolite or the absence thereof. This common intention or lack of it is thought to be reflected and regulated by the culture in question. The main aim of such a typology was to find a taxonomy that would focus on the differences regarding impolite attitudes and behaviour within and along an impoliteness continuum. The results obtained make us feel inclined to argue in favour of the existence of more similarities than differences between the two macrocultures under scrutiny with respect to the types of impoliteness found in them.
2010
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(2010): Avoiding twisted pixels. Ethical guidelines for the appropriate use and manipulation of scientific digital images. In: Science and engineering ethics 16 (4), S. 639-667. DOI: 10.1007/s11948-010-9201-y
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20567932 Abstract: Digital imaging has provided scientists with new opportunities to acquire and manipulate data using techniques that were difficult or impossible to employ in the past. Because digital images are easier to manipulate than film images, new problems have emerged. One growing concern in the scientific community is that digital images are not being handled with sufficient care. The problem is twofold: (1) the very small, yet troubling, number of intentional falsifications that have been identified, and (2) the more common unintentional, inappropriate manipulation of images for publication. Journals and professional societies have begun to address the issue with specific digital imaging guidelines. Unfortunately, the guidelines provided often do not come with instructions to explain their importance. Thus they deal with what should or should not be done, but not the associated 'why' that is required for understanding the rules. This article proposes 12 guidelines for scientific digital image manipulation and discusses the technical reasons behind these guidelines. These guidelines can be incorporated into lab meetings and graduate student training in order to provoke discussion and begin to bring an end to the culture of "data beautification".
Keywords: Absichtslosigkeit (Fehler), Codes of Ethics, Data Compression/ethics, Elektronische Bildverarbeitung, Ethics, Research, Ethik, Guidelines as Topic, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted/ethics, Intentionalität, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Nachvollziehbarkeit des Sinns von Regeln/Anweisungen etc., Photography/ethics, Realtechnik, Science/ethics, Scientific Misconduct, Technik 2009
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Schmid, Hans Bernhard; Schweikard, David P. (Hg.) (2009): Kollektive Intentionalität. Eine Debatte über die Grundlagen des Sozialen. 1. Aufl.. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft)
2008
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(2008): Social Ontology as Convention. In: Topoi 27 (1-2), S. 139-149. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9036-1
Abstract: I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue( s): (1) a shift to an intentional model - among other reasons, in order to account for normativity - and (2) moving away from the belief- desire, propositional attitude, framework for understanding the intentional realm toward an interactive, pragmatic model of intentionality. These shifts provide natural approaches to: (1) understanding the normativities of social realities; (2) the sense in which social ontology is often constituted in implicit relations among the participants rather than elaborated and iterated explicit beliefs and desires; (3) and language.
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(2008) : Reflections on impoliteness, relational work and power In: Bousfield, Derek; Locher, Miriam A. (Hg.): Impoliteness in language: Studies on its interplay with power in theory and practice: Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter (Language, power and social process), S. 17-44
Abstract: Conclusion: This paper had the minimal aim of raising pertinent issues for future research. I shall briefly conclude this chapter with a list of those issues: One's understanding of the role of the speaker and hearer in communication is crucial. I would argue against privileging either of them. Metalinguistic labels such as "over-politeness" need full investigation, deploying, for example, the corpus linguistic techniques that characterise modern lexicography. Intentionality is a site of controversy in (im)politeness studies, as elsewhere in linguistics, though it is often poorly understood. My view is that it is an important part of communication, and a crucial part of impoliteness. An understanding of norms, in all their complexity, is a key to understanding much of (im)politeness. I think the distinction between experiential norms and social norms is particularly useful. Power connects with impoliteness in a number of different ways, including both the performance/perception of impoliteness in language and the broader context within which it is performed/perception. Researching impoliteness constitutes a considerable methodological challenge. This paper gives a glimpse of one corpus-related methodology.
Keywords: Disziplin, Favoriten, Frame, Höflichkeit, Höflichkeitsforschung, Höflichkeitsforschung der zweiten Welle, (Im)Politeness Research, Intentionalität, Linguistik, Macht, Modelle/Theorien, Politeness Theory and Relational Work, Rolle von Sprecher und Hörer, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Sprachgebrauch, Zweite Welle 2007
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(2007): A Concept of Social Integration. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 579-593. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701549314
Abstract: Clear definitions of alienation and solidarity are needed as a step toward an explicit theory of social integration. The idea of alienation has played a key role in the development of sociology, but it's meaning has never been clear. Both theories and empirical studies confound relational-dispositional, cognitive-emotional and/or interpersonal-societal components. This essay proposes definitions that follow from the work of Erving Goffman and others. Goffman's idea of "co-presence'' implies a model of solidarity as mutual awareness to the point of merging consciousness. It appears that this concept of solidarity could be the main component of shared context, consensus, genuine love and social facts. Two empirical approaches are described, one with moment by moment analysis of dialogue, the other using sample surveys. With the use of mathematical notation, the survey method might be used to analyze social facts. The model could also form the basis for an explicit and testable theory of social integration.
Keywords: alienation, Entfremdung, Erving Goffman, Gegenseitigkeit, Gemeinsamkeit, Goffman, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, INTEGRATION, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Modelle/Theorien, mutual awareness, social integration, Solidarität, solidarity, Soziale Integration, Soziologische Entfremdungstheorien, Theory of interaction (Goffman) 1998
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(1998): Der Einfluß personaler und interaktiver Kontextinformationen auf die Diagnose und Bewertung argumentativer (Un-)Integrität. In: Sprache & Kognition 17 (3), S. 107-124
Abstract: Starting with the empirically well established assumption that the evaluation of an argument as unfair requires the presence of an argumentational rule violation as well as some degree of intentionality (two basic components of the unfairness verdict), we tested in two quasi-experimental designs, if and how selected context variables modify the weight of an (un-)fairness evaluation (attribution of intentionality and guilt). Our results show that the conditions "excuses" and "no excuses", "good intents" and "bad intents" "high competence (of the speaker)" and "low competence" proved to be most effective. On a more general level our study gives evidence that the evaluation of argumentational (un-)fairness depends on the two basic components as long as no further context variables are present. If, however, context variables become salient, the (un-)fairness evaluations are modified in a guilt-increasing or guilt-decreasing manner.
1991
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(1991): Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. In: The Philosophical Review 100 (2). DOI: 10.2307/2185304
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2185304 Abstract: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
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