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  • 1998

  • Bringsjord, Selmer (1998): Computationalism is dead; now what?. In: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4), S. 393-402. DOI: 10.1080/095281398146662

    Abstract: In this paper I put Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of ‘zombie’), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. Firstly, persons process information at a ‘super’-Turing level; secondly, people enjoy certain properties (e.g. intentionality) beyond the reach of any mere information-processing object. Accordingly, computationalism ought to be supplanted with the engineering of ‘subperson’ artifacts and the irreducibly philosophical investigation of personhood. I end with nascent appraisal of Fetzer's interesting semiotic/connectionist replacement for computationalism.

    Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, p-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie, turing-test passing zombies
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