Alle Publikationen
2017
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(2017): Beyond Dominance and Competence. A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. In: Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 21 (3), S. 203-227. DOI: 10.1177/1088868316649297
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27225037 Abstract: Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 5
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(2017): Implicit moral evaluations. A multinomial modeling approach. In: Cognition 158, S. 224-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27865113 Abstract: Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional Judgment was associated with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for moral psychology are discussed.
Keywords: Adult, Cerebral Cortex/physiology, Cognition/physiology, Electroencephalography, Evoked Potentials, Female, Guilt, Humans, Individuality, Intention, Judgment/physiology, Kognitionswissenschaften, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Psychological, Moral, Morals, Neuropsychological Tests, Personality, Personality Assessment, science direct, Shame, Social Perception -
(2017): Learning from moral inconsistency. In: Cognition 167, S. 46-57. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.006
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28522269 Abstract: Moral inconsistency is an understudied phenomenon in cognitive moral psychology and deserves in depth empirical study. Moral inconsistency, as understood here, is not formal inconsistency but inconsistency in moral emotion and belief in response to particular cases. It occurs when persons treat cases as morally different that are really morally the same, even from their moral perspective. Learning to recognize and avoid such moral inconsistency in non-trivial but is a form of moral learning that complements and enhances other psychological and social mechanisms through which persons learn how to apply shared moral norms when their applications are uncertain and threaten to lapse into moral inconsistency. The same psychological process also can function to revise current moral norms when their straightforward applications are morally inconsistent with more basic moral commitments. Through this moral learning and related kinds, people can learn how to identify issues of moral priority when moral norms conflict and, when necessary, how to revise their moral norms. The recent revolution in dominant moral norms around gay sex and gay marriage in Europe and North America provides a possible illustration. When coupled with other modes of moral learning in the context of ambiguous but deeply rooted moral norms, such as those of sanctity and authority, reflection on moral inconsistency can help to justify this large-scale moral change, even among those who find gay sex, by its nature, morally repugnant. zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Emotions, Humans, Kognitionswissenschaften, Learning, Lerntheorien, Moral, Morals, science direct, Social Norms -
(2017): Moral learning. Psychological and philosophical perspectives. In: Cognition 167, S. 1-10. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.008
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28629599 Abstract: The past 15years occasioned an extraordinary blossoming of research into the cognitive and affective mechanisms that support moral judgment and behavior. This growth in our understanding of moral mechanisms overshadowed a crucial and complementary question, however: How are they learned? As this special issue of the journal Cognition attests, a new crop of research into moral learning has now firmly taken root. This new literature draws on recent advances in formal methods developed in other domains, such as Bayesian inference, reinforcement learning and other machine learning techniques. Meanwhile, it also demonstrates how learning and deciding in a social domain-and especially in the moral domain-sometimes involves specialized cognitive systems. We review the contributions to this special issue and situate them within the broader contemporary literature. Our review focuses on how we learn moral values and moral rules, how we learn about personal moral character and relationships, and the philosophical implications of these emerging models.
Keywords: Cognition, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Lerntheorien, Moral, Morals, Philosophy, PSYCHOLOGY, science direct -
(2017): Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the moral circle. Competing constraints on moral learning. In: Cognition 167, S. 58-65. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.001
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28007293 Abstract: The idea of the moral circle pictures the self in the center, surrounded by concentric circles encompassing increasingly distant possible targets of moral concern, including family, local community, nation, all humans, all mammals, all living things including plants, and all things including inanimate objects. The authors develop the idea of two opposing forces in people's moral circles, with centripetal forces pulling inward, urging greater concern for close others than for distant others, and centrifugal forces pushing outward, resisting "drawing the line" anywhere as a form of prejudice and urging egalitarian concern for all regardless of social distance. Review of the developmental literature shows very early emergence of both moral forces, suggesting at least partly intuitive bases for each. Moral education approaches favoring one force over the other are compared, to show how these forces can provide constraints on moral learning. Finally, the centripetal/centrifugal forces view is applied to current moral debates about empathy and about politics. The authors argue that this view helps us see how intercultural and interpersonal disagreements about morality are based in intrapersonal conflicts shared by all people. zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Empathy, Gesellschaft, Gruppenverhalten, Humans, Learning, Lerntheorien, Models, Psychological, Moral, Morals, science direct -
(2017): Narratives and Online Decorum. The Rhetoric of Mark Zuckerberg's Personal Storytelling on Facebook. In: STYLE 51 (3), S. 374-390. DOI: 10.1353/sty.2017.0031
Abstract: The article ties in with and attempts to further interests in the - rhetorical aspects of personal storytelling by examining what is taken to be a pervasive yet understudied form of purposeful storytelling. The overall aim is to investigate how the narration of intimate biographical events may be used to influence or mold matters of decorum or appropriate behavior. Through close reading of the use of narratives in a Facebook post by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, the article argues for the potential meta-decorous nature of such posts; in addition to their private content, they are about what posting is or should be, and therefore also about what it may be, or should mean, to be someone posting on Facebook. Consequently, these personal stories are read as peculiar amalgamations of the personal, the strategic, and the moral.
Keywords: Appropriateness, Art des Kommunikationsmediums, das Persönliche, decorum, doppelter Treffer, Facebook, Identität, Identitätsstiftung, Intimität, Kommunikation, Kommunikationsstrategie, Mensch-Maschine-Releation, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Moral, Morals, Öffentlicher vs. privater Raum, Rhetorik, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Social Network, Social Network Einfluss, Soziale Angemessenheit, Storytelling, Strategien zur Erlangung von Sympathie, Wissen um Normen -
(2017): Learning a commonsense moral theory. In: Cognition 167, S. 107-123. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28351662 Abstract: We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one's own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly. zitiert von: 7
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(2017): Moral vindications. In: Cognition 167, S. 124-134. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.005
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28545629 Abstract: Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions.
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(2017): Moral alchemy. How love changes norms. In: Cognition 167, S. 135-150. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.003
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28404207 Abstract: We discuss a process by which non-moral concerns (that is concerns agreed to be non-moral within a particular cultural context) can take on moral content. We refer to this phenomenon as moral alchemy and suggest that it arises because moral obligations of care entail recursively valuing loved ones' values, thus allowing propositions with no moral weight in themselves to become morally charged. Within this framework, we predict that when people believe a loved one cares about a behavior more than they do themselves, the moral imperative to care about the loved one's interests will raise the value of that behavior, such that people will be more likely to infer that third parties will see the behavior as wrong (Experiment 1) and the behavior itself as more morally important (Experiment 2) than when the same behaviors are considered outside the context of a caring relationship. The current study confirmed these predictions. zitiert von: 2
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(2017): Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures. In: Cognition 164, S. 22-30. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.012
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28364713 Abstract: Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or sideeffect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 2
Keywords: 80 and over, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Costa Rica, Cross-Cultural Comparison, cross-cultural psychology, Culture, Honduras, Humans, Intention, Intentional action, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Kulturelle Unterschiede, Kulturforschung, Mexico, Middle Aged, Moral, Moral cognition, Moral evaluation, Morals, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Side-effect effect, Social Perception, United States, Vanuatu, Young Adult -
(2017): A lesion model of envy and Schadenfreude. Legal, deservingness and moral dimensions as revealed by neurodegeneration. In: Brain : a journal of neurology 140 (12), S. 3357-3377. DOI: 10.1093/brain/awx269
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29112719 Abstract: The study of moral emotions (i.e. Schadenfreude and envy) is critical to understand the ecological complexity of everyday interactions between cognitive, affective, and social cognition processes. Most previous studies in this area have used correlational imaging techniques and framed Schadenfreude and envy as unified and monolithic emotional domains. Here, we profit from a relevant neurodegeneration model to disentangle the brain regions engaged in three dimensions of Schadenfreude and envy: deservingness, morality, and legality. We tested a group of patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), patients with Alzheimer's disease, as a contrastive neurodegeneration model, and healthy controls on a novel task highlighting each of these dimensions in scenarios eliciting Schadenfreude and envy. Compared with the Alzheimer's disease and control groups, patients with bvFTD obtained significantly higher scores on all dimensions for both emotions. Correlational analyses revealed an association between envy and Schadenfreude scores and greater deficits in social cognition, inhibitory control, and behaviour disturbances in bvFTD patients. Brain anatomy findings (restricted to bvFTD and controls) confirmed the partially dissociable nature of the moral emotions' experiences and highlighted the importance of socio-moral brain areas in processing those emotions. In all subjects, an association emerged between Schadenfreude and the ventral striatum, and between envy and the anterior cingulate cortex. In addition, the results supported an association between scores for moral and legal transgression and the morphology of areas implicated in emotional appraisal, including the amygdala and the parahippocampus. By contrast, bvFTD patients exhibited a negative association between increased Schadenfreude and envy across dimensions and critical regions supporting social-value rewards and social-moral processes (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus and precuneus). Together, this study provides lesion-based evidence for the multidimensional nature of the emotional experiences of envy and Schadenfreude. Our results offer new insights into the mechanisms subsuming complex emotions and moral cognition in neurodegeneration. Moreover, this study presents the exacerbation of envy and Schadenfreude as a new potential hallmark of bvFTD that could impact in diagnosis and progression. zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Aged, Alzheimer’s Disease, Amygdala, BRAIN, Case-Control Studies, Diagnostic Imaging, Emotions, Emotionsforschung, Female, Gyrus Cinguli, Hippocampus, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Moral, Morals, Neurowissenschaften, Parietal Lobe, Physiopathology, Prefrontal Cortex, PSYCHOLOGY, Social Behavior, Ventral Striatum -
(2017): Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. In: Cognition 167, S. 201-211. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28527671 Abstract: Moral psychology research has highlighted several factors critical for evaluating the morality of another's choice, including the detection of norm-violating outcomes, the extent to which an agent caused an outcome, and the extent to which the agent intended good or bad consequences, as inferred from observing their decisions. However, person-centered accounts of moral judgment suggest that a motivation to infer the moral character of others can itself impact on an evaluation of their choices. Building on this person-centered account, we examine whether inferences about agents' moral character shape the sensitivity of moral judgments to the consequences of agents' choices, and agents' role in the causation of those consequences. Participants observed and judged sequences of decisions made by agents who were either bad or good, where each decision entailed a trade-off between personal profit and pain for an anonymous victim. Across trials we manipulated the magnitude of profit and pain resulting from the agent's decision (consequences), and whether the outcome was caused via action or inaction (causation). Consistent with previous findings, we found that moral judgments were sensitive to consequences and causation. Furthermore, we show that the inferred character of an agent moderated the extent to which people were sensitive to consequences in their moral judgments. Specifically, participants were more sensitive to the magnitude of consequences in judgments of bad agents' choices relative to good agents' choices. We discuss and interpret these findings within a theoretical framework that views moral judgment as a dynamic process at the intersection of attention and social cognition.
Keywords: Choice Behavior, Female, Humans, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Male, Moral, Morals, science direct, Social Behavior, Social Perception -
(2017): How "ought" exceeds but implies "can". Description and encouragement in moral judgment. In: Cognition 168, S. 267-275. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.07.008
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28755538 Abstract: This paper tests a theory about the relationship between two important topics in moral philosophy and psychology. One topic is the function of normative language, specifically claims that one "ought" to do something. Do these claims function to describe moral responsibilities, encourage specific behavior, or both? The other topic is the relationship between saying that one "ought" to do something and one's ability to do it. In what respect, if any, does what one "ought" to do exceed what one "can" do? The theory tested here has two parts: (1) "ought" claims function to both describe responsibilities and encourage people to fulfill them (the dual-function hypothesis); (2) the two functions relate differently to ability, because the encouragement function is limited by the person's ability, but the descriptive function is not (the interaction hypothesis). If this theory is correct, then in one respect "ought implies can" is false because people have responsibilities that exceed their abilities. But in another respect "ought implies can" is legitimate because it is not worthwhile to encourage people to do things that exceed their ability. Results from two behavioral experiments support the theory that "ought" exceeds but implies "can." Results from a third experiment provide further evidence regarding an "ought" claim's primary function and how contextual features can affect the interpretation of its functions.
Keywords: Adult, Aged, Female, Humans, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Male, Middle Aged, Moral, Morals, science direct, Social Behavior, Social Norms, Sprachwissenschaften, Young Adult -
(2017): The Rawlsian Critique of Utilitarianism. A Luhmannian Interpretation. In: Journal of Business Ethics 142 (1), S. 25-35. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2786-y
Abstract: The present paper builds on the Rawlsian critique of utilitarianism in order to identify the moral implications of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. While Luhmann aptly discerned the pervasive problems of the precarious system-environment relations throughout the modern society, he took moral communication to be person-centered and thus ill-equipped to deal with these problems. At the same time, the Rawlsian possibility of sacrificing fundamental liberties for the sake of economic gains not only exemplifies the Luhmannian precariousness of the relations of the economic system to its societal environment, but also shows this precariousness to be a moral problem. Thus, from the systems-theoretic perspective, the Rawlsian idea of justice denotes the moral dimension of the capacity of the societal environment to carry the economic system. More generally, the proposed complementarity between Rawls and Luhmann allows to see the precariousness of system-environment relations, for any type of social system, as a moral problem. Two implications follow. First, the morally problematic manifestations of the precarious system-environment relations are not limited to the Rawlsian case of the discrimination of the least advantaged groups but rather include a broad range of social costs and damaging effects of business on society and nature. Second, and related, the proposed systems-theoretic perspective explicates the moral value of sustainability of the economic as well as other social systems in their environment, societal and ecological alike.
Keywords: BUSINESS, business ethics, ethics, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, Disziplin, Economic system, Ethik, Gesellschaftsprofit, John Rawls, Justice, Kosten-Nutzen, Luhmann, Moral, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Morals, Moraltheorie, Niklas Luhmann, Philosophie, Rawls, SOCIAL COSTS, social systems, Societal environment, SYSTEMS, Utilitarianism, Utilitarismus 2016
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(2016): The conceptual link between social desirability and cultural normativity. In: International journal of psychology : Journal international de psychologie 51 (6), S. 474-480. DOI: 10.1002/ijop.12261
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26914819 Abstract: Psychologists have a recurrent concern that socially desirable responding (SDR) is a form of response distortion that compromises the validity of self-report measures, especially in high-stakes situations where participants are motivated to make a good impression. Psychologists have used various strategies to minimise SDR or its impact, for example, forced choice responding, ipsatization, and direct measures of social desirability. However, empirical evidence suggests that SDR is a robust phenomenon existing in many cultures and a substantive variable with meaningful associations with other psychological variables and outcomes. Here, we review evidence of the occurrence of SDR across cultures and tie SDR to the study of cultural normativity and cultural consonance in anthropology. We suggest that cultural normativity is an important component of SDR, which may partly explain the adaptiveness of SDR and its association with positive outcomes.
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(2016): Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?. In: Psychonomic bulletin & review 23 (6), S. 1660-1680. DOI: 10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5 Abstract: Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development. zitiert von 12
Keywords: Causality, Emotional Control, Emotions, Empathy, Executive Function, Humans, Inhibition (Psychology), Intention Medical Subject Headings (MeSH): Arousal, Kognitionswissenschaften, Moral, Morality, Morals, Neurowissenschaften, Response Inhibition, Social Perception, theory of mind, Thinking -
(2016): Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 145 (6), S. 772-787. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000165
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27054685 Abstract: Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record
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(2016): The neural correlates of moral decision-making. A systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations and response decision judgements. In: Brain and Cognition 108, S. 88-97. DOI: 10.1016/j.bandc.2016.07.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27566002 Abstract: The aims of this systematic review were to determine: (a) which brain areas are consistently more active when making (i) moral response decisions, defined as choosing a response to a moral dilemma, or deciding whether to accept a proposed solution, or (ii) moral evaluations, defined as judging the appropriateness of another's actions in a moral dilemma, rating moral statements as right or wrong, or identifying important moral issues; and (b) shared and significantly different activation patterns for these two types of moral judgements. A systematic search of the literature returned 28 experiments. Activation likelihood estimate analysis identified the brain areas commonly more active for moral response decisions and for moral evaluations. Conjunction analysis revealed shared activation for both types of moral judgement in the left middle temporal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and medial frontal gyrus. Contrast analyses found no significant clusters of increased activation for the moral evaluations-moral response decisions contrast, but found that moral response decisions additionally activated the left and right middle temporal gyrus and the right precuneus. Making one's own moral decisions involves different brain areas compared to judging the moral actions of others, implying that these judgements may involve different processes.
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(2016): Assessing the Moral Coherence and Moral Robustness of Social Systems. Proof of Concept for a Graphical Models Approach. In: Science and engineering ethics 22 (6), S. 1761-1779. DOI: 10.1007/s11948-015-9743-0
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26689413 Abstract: This paper presents a proof of concept for a graphical models approach to assessing the moral coherence and moral robustness of systems of social interactions. "Moral coherence" refers to the degree to which the rights and duties of agents within a system are effectively respected when agents in the system comply with the rights and duties that are recognized as in force for the relevant context of interaction. "Moral robustness" refers to the degree to which a system of social interaction is configured to ensure that the interests of agents are effectively respected even in the face of noncompliance. Using the case of conscientious objection of pharmacists to filling prescriptions for emergency contraception as an example, we illustrate how a graphical models approach can help stakeholders identify structural weaknesses in systems of social interaction and evaluate the relative merits of alternate organizational structures. By illustrating the merits of a graphical models approach we hope to spur further developments in this area.
Keywords: Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Graphic model concerning "moral robustness" and "moral coherence", graphical models approach, Human Rights, Humans, Kommunikations-/Interaktionsprinzipien, machine learning, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Theoretical, Moral, moral agents, moralische Gesetze, moralische Kohärenz, moralische Robustheit, Moralphilosophie, Morals, non/compliance, Philosophie, Respektieren und Erfüllen von Interessen von Agenten, Respektieren von Rechten und Pflichten von Agenten, Social Environment, social interaction, Social Responsibility, Moraltheorie, soziale Interaktion, Soziale Angemessenheit, strukturelle Schwächen in sozialen Systemen, Technikphilosophie, Überblick -
(2016): Does children's moral compass waver under social pressure? Using the conformity paradigm to test preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments. In: Journal of experimental child psychology 150, S. 241-251. DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.006
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27367300 Abstract: The current study tested whether preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments change under social pressure using Asch's conformity paradigm. A sample of 132 preschoolers (Mage=3.83years, SD=0.85) rated the acceptability of moral and social-conventional events and also completed a visual judgment task (i.e., comparing line length) both independently and after having viewed two peers who consistently made immoral, unconventional, or visually inaccurate judgments. Results showed evidence of conformity on all three tasks, but conformity was stronger on the social-conventional task than on the moral and visual tasks. Older children were less susceptible to pressure for social conformity for the moral and visual tasks but not for the conventional task. zitiert von: 6
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(2016): The Everyday Moral Judge - Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions. In: PLoS one 11 (12). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0167224
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0167224 Abstract: Moral emotions are typically elicited in everyday social interactions and regulate social behavior. Previous research in the field of attribution theory identified ought (the moral standard of a given situation or intended goal), goal-attainment (a goal can be attained vs. not attained) and effort (high vs. low effort expenditure) as cognitive antecedents of moral emotions. In contrast to earlier studies, mainly relying on thought experiments, we investigated autobiographical recollections of N = 312 participants by means of an online study. We analyzed a diverse range of moral emotions, i.e., admiration, anger, contempt, indignation, pride, respect, schadenfreude, and sympathy, by using a mixed-method approach. Qualitative and quantitative methods clearly corroborate the important role of ought, goal-attainment, and effort as eliciting conditions of moral emotions. Furthermore, we built categorical systems based on our participants' descriptions of real-life situations, allowing for more fine-grained distinctions between seemingly similar moral emotions. We thus identify additional prerequisites explaining more subtle differences between moral emotion clusters as they emerge from our analyses (i.e., cluster 1: admiration, pride, and respect; cluster 2: anger, contempt, and indignation; cluster 3: schadenfreude and sympathy). Results are discussed in the light of attributional theories of moral emotions, and implications for future research are derived.
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(2016): Bullying and defending behavior. The role of explicit and implicit moral cognition. In: JOURNAL OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY 59, S. 67-81. DOI: 10.1016/j.jsp.2016.09.005
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27923442 Abstract: Research on bullying has highlighted the role of morality in explaining the different behavior of students during bullying episodes. However, the research has been limited to the analysis of explicit measures of moral characteristics and moral reasoning, whereas implicit measures have yet to be fully considered. To overcome this limitation, this study investigated the association between bullying and defending, on one hand, and both explicit (moral disengagement, self-importance of moral values) and implicit (immediate affect toward moral stimuli [IAMS]) moral components, on the other hand. Young adolescents (N=279, mean age=11years, 9months, 44.4% girls) completed a series of self-report scales and individually performed a computer task investigating the IAMS. Two hierarchical regressions (bootstrapping method) were performed. Results showed that moral disengagement was associated with bullying and defending behavior at high levels of IAMS, however not when IAMS was low. In contrast, self-importance of moral values was not significantly associated to the two behaviors when IAMS was high whereas both associations were significant at low levels of IAMS. These results significantly expand previous knowledge about the role of morality in bullying and defending behavior. In particular, they highlight the role of the interaction between explicit and implicit moral dimensions in predicting bullying and defending behaviors.
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(2016): Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust. In: Social science research 58, S. 34-45. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.02.008
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27194650 Abstract: Since Puntam's seminal work on declining levels of social capital, the question of how social trust is formed has reached unprecedented heights of critical enquiry. While most of the current research concentrates on ethnic diversity and income inequality as the main influences driving down generalized trust, we focus on opinion polarization as another potential impact factor on trust. In more detail, we investigate the extent to which polarization over morally charged issues such as homsexuality, abortion and euthanasia affects individuals' likelihood to trust others. We hypothesize that moral issues have a natural tendency to divide societies' opinions into opposing poles and, thus, to challenge social cohesion in modern civil societies. Based on hierarchical analyses of the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) - comprising a sample of 39 countries - our results reveal that individuals living in countries characterized by more opinion polarization tend to have less trust in other people.
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(2016): How prescriptive norms influence causal inferences. In: Cognition 156, S. 164-176. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.07.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27591550 Abstract: Recent experimental findings suggest that prescriptive norms influence causal inferences. The cognitive mechanism underlying this finding is still under debate. We compare three competing theories: The culpable control model of blame argues that reasoners tend to exaggerate the causal influence of norm-violating agents, which should lead to relatively higher causal strength estimates for these agents. By contrast, the counterfactual reasoning account of causal selection assumes that norms do not alter the representation of the causal model, but rather later causal selection stages. According to this view, reasoners tend to preferentially consider counterfactual states of abnormal rather than normal factors, which leads to the choice of the abnormal factor in a causal selection task. A third view, the accountability hypothesis, claims that the effects of prescriptive norms are generated by the ambiguity of the causal test question. Asking whether an agent is a cause can be understood as a request to assess her causal contribution but also her moral accountability. According to this theory norm effects on causal selection are mediated by accountability judgments that are not only sensitive to the abnormality of behavior but also to mitigating factors, such as intentionality and knowledge of norms. Five experiments are presented that favor the accountability account over the two alternative theories.
Keywords: Adult, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Moral, Moral Obligations, Morals, Normen, Social Norms -
(2016): Intuition and Moral Decision-Making - The Effect of Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Moral Judgment and Altruistic Behavior. In: PLoS one 11 (10). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0164012
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0164012 Abstract: Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking-induced by time pressure and cognitive load-in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making. zitiert von 19