Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Differences in the Theory of Mind profiles of patients with anorexia nervosa and individuals on the autism spectrum: A meta-analytic review. In: Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 90, S. 146-163. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.009
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.009 Abstract: Background This meta-analytic review examines the theory of mind profiles in both patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) and autistic individuals. Methodology The studies examining theory of mind were divided into the following categories: emotional theory of mind, understanding simple social situations, understanding complex social interactions, and implicit social attribution. All included studies investigated differences between healthy control (HCs) individuals and people with AN or autistic people. Differences in theory of mind profile between people with AN and autistic people were explored by conducting moderator analyses. Results People with AN and autistic people showed a similar theory of mind profile, but autistic individuals showed greater difficulties, particularly in emotional theory of mind. Conclusions Although both people with AN and autistic people have significant difficulties in all aspects of theory of mind relative to the HCs, some differences in the underlying profile may be present. However, due to relative paucity of theory of mind research among people with AN, further research is still needed before firm conclusion can be drawn.
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(2018): On the interaction of social affect and cognition: empathy, compassion and theory of mind. In: Emotion-cognition interactions 19, S. 1-6. DOI: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010 Abstract: Empathy, compassion and Theory of Mind (ToM) are central topics in social psychology and neuroscience. While empathy enables the sharing of others’ emotions and may result in empathic distress, a maladaptive form of empathic resonance, or compassion, a feeling of warmth and concern for others, ToM provides cognitive understanding of someone else's thoughts or intentions. These socio-affective and socio-cognitive routes to understanding others are subserved by separable, independent brain networks. Nonetheless they are jointly required in many complex social situations. A process that is critical for both, empathy and ToM, is self-other distinction, which is implemented in different temporoparietal brain regions. Thus, adaptive social behavior is a result of dynamic interplay of socio-affective and socio-cognitive processes.
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(2018): Theory of a machine's mind. In: New Scientist 237 (3167), S. 6-7. DOI: 10.1016/S0262-4079(18)30365-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(18)30365-8 Abstract: MACHINES are getting to know each other better. An artificial intelligence, developed by Google-owned research firm DeepMind, can now pass an important psychological assessment that most children only develop the skills to pass at around age 4. Its aptitude in …
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(2018): Interventions for the treatment of theory of mind deficits in schizophrenia: Systematic literature review. In: Psychiatry research 267, S. 37-47. DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2018.05.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2018.05.001 Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) plays a central role in regulating social interactions and its impairment is consistently reported in schizophrenia. Regarding schizophrenia, ToM is usually discussed as a sub-domain of social cognition. Since social cognitive deficits have drawn the attention of researchers, a variety of novel treatment techniques and approaches targeting social cognitive deficits have been developed. Encouraging results have repeatedly been reported on the modifiability of social cognitive impairment through these techniques. However, emotional perception seems to be over-represented in these approaches at the expense of other areas, such as ToM. This article presents a systematic review on the social cognitive interventions of the last 10 years, which focused on the remediation of ToM or used techniques primarily focusing on one or more social cognitive domains other than ToM, but with hypothetical effects on it. The aim of our systematic review was to compare these intervention techniques in order to see how effective they are in the remediation of ToM, and to find the best techniques to ameliorate ToM deficits in schizophrenia. According to our findings targeted ToM intervention produced more improvement in ToM tasks, while data regarding non-ToM interventions showed contradictory results with limited effects on ToM.
2017
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(2017): Nonverbal components of Theory of Mind in typical and atypical development. In: Early non-verbal forms of social cognition 48, S. 54-62. DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2016.11.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2016.11.001 Abstract: To successfully navigate the human social world one needs to realize that behavior is guided by mental states such as goals and beliefs. Humans are highly proficient in using mental states to explain and predict their conspecific’s behavior, which enables adjusting one’s own behavior in online social interactions. Whereas according to recent studies even young infants seem to integrate others’ beliefs into their own behavior, it is unclear what processes contribute to such competencies and how they may develop. Here we analyze a set of possible nonverbal components of theory of mind that may be involved in taking into account others’ mental states, and discuss findings from typical and atypical development. To track an agent’s belief one needs to (i) pay attention to agents that might be potential belief holders, and identify their focus of attention and their potential belief contents; (ii) keep track of their different experiences and their consequent beliefs, and (iii) to make behavioral predictions based on such beliefs. If an individual fails to predict an agent’s behavior depending on the agent’s beliefs, this may be due to a problem at any stage in the above processes. An analysis of the possible nonverbal processes contributing to belief tracking and their functioning in typical and atypical development aims to provide new insights into the possible mechanisms that make human social interactions uniquely rich.
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(2017): Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments. In: Games and Economic Behavior 106, S. 209-226. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.008
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.008 Abstract: We investigate our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a central component of “Theory of Mind”, perhaps the capstone of social cognition. This component of theory of mind allows individuals to learn more rapidly in strategic environments with an element of novelty. We show that the capacity to attribute preferences yields an advantage over less sophisticated approaches to strategic interaction (e.g. reinforcement learning) because it allows agents to extrapolate to novel circumstances information about counterparts' preferences that was learned previously. We report experiments investigating this capacity in extensive form games. We find significant learning of others' preferences, providing evidence for the presence and effectiveness of this aspect of theory of mind. Moreover, scores on survey measures of autism-spectrum tendencies are significant determinants of individual learning, so our notion of theory of mind is related to the notion as understood in psychology.
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(2017): Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind. In: Emotion 17, S. 15-21. DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019 Abstract: Sensitivity to others’ emotions is foundational for many aspects of human life, yet computational models do not currently approach the sensitivity and specificity of human emotion knowledge. Perception of isolated physical expressions largely supplies ambiguous, low-dimensional, and noisy information about others’ emotional states. By contrast, observers attribute specific granular emotions to another person based on inferences of how she interprets (or ‘appraises’) external events in relation to her other mental states (goals, beliefs, moral values, costs). These attributions share neural mechanisms with other reasoning about minds. Situating emotion concepts in a formal model of people’s intuitive theories about other minds is necessary to effectively capture humans’ fine-grained emotion understanding.
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(2017): Venturing into the uncanny valley of mind—The influence of mind attribution on the acceptance of human-like characters in a virtual reality setting. In: Cognition 160, S. 43-50. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.010
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.010 Abstract: For more than 40years, the uncanny valley model has captivated researchers from various fields of expertise. Still, explanations as to why slightly imperfect human-like characters can evoke feelings of eeriness remain the subject of controversy. Many experiments exploring the phenomenon have emphasized specific visual factors in connection to evolutionary psychological theories or an underlying categorization conflict. More recently, studies have also shifted away focus from the appearance of human-like entities, instead exploring their mental capabilities as basis for observers' discomfort. In order to advance this perspective, we introduced 92 participants to a virtual reality (VR) chat program and presented them with two digital characters engaged in an emotional and empathic dialogue. Using the same pre-recorded 3D scene, we manipulated the perceived control type of the depicted characters (human-controlled avatars vs. computer-controlled agents), as well as their alleged level of autonomy (scripted vs. self-directed actions). Statistical analyses revealed that participants experienced significantly stronger eeriness if they perceived the empathic characters to be autonomous artificial intelligences. As human likeness and attractiveness ratings did not result in significant group differences, we present our results as evidence for an “uncanny valley of mind“ that relies on the attribution of emotions and social cognition to non-human entities. A possible relationship to the philosophy of anthropocentrism and its “threat to human distinctiveness” concept is discussed.
2016
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(2016): Making sense of social robots: A structural analysis of the layperson's social representation of robots. In: Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology 66 (6), S. 277-289. DOI: 10.1016/j.erap.2016.07.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erap.2016.07.001 Abstract: Introduction Given their novelty, social robots (i.e., robots using natural language, displaying and recognizing emotions) will generate uncertainty among users. Social representations allow making sense of the new, drawing from existing knowledge. Objective A free association questionnaire was administered to 212 Portuguese adults to identify the social representation of robot. Method Data was analysed with EVOC 2000 and SIMI 2000 software. Results The social representation of robot is organized around the ideas of technology, help and future. Differences in the representation according to age, gender and level of education where also identified. Conclusion The social representation of robot is marked by the conception of it as a tool. This contrasts with the concept of social robots as social agents. Implications for social robot's acceptance are discussed. Résumé Introduction Étant donnée leur nouveauté, les robots sociaux (i.e., qui utilisent un langage naturel et montrent et reconnaissent des émotions) vont générer un sentiment d’incertitude chez les futurs utilisateurs. Les représentations sociales permettent de donner du sens aux choses nouvelles à partir des connaissances préexistantes. Objectif Les participants (n=212 adultes portugais) effectuèrent une tâche d’association libre dans le but d’identifier la représentation sociale du robot. Méthode Les données ont été traitées à l’aide des programmes EVOC 2000 et SIMI 2000. Résultats La représentation sociale du robot est organisée autour des idées de technologie, d’aide et d’avenir. Des différences en fonction de l’âge, du genre et du niveau d’éducation sont également identifiées. Conclusion La représentation sociale du robot est marquée par la conception de celui-ci comme un outil. Cela contraste avec le concept de robots sociaux en tant qu’agents sociaux. Les implications pour l’acceptation des robots sociaux sont discutées.
2010
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(2010): Deceptive robots show theory of mind. In: New Scientist 207 (2779), S. 24-25. DOI: 10.1016/S0262-4079(10)62327-5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(10)62327-5 Abstract: The behaviour of the deceptive Rovio represents something much more significant than a crude game of robot hide-and-seek. It is a demonstration of an aspect of social intelligence known as theory of mind, which humans only develop around the age of 4 or 5. If robots can be made to display theory of mind in other situations, it could endow them with a sophisticated intelligence. They might then be able to reason the thoughts, intentions and even feelings of people and other robots … “It was definitely exciting to see it work,” says Alan Wagner of the …
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