Alle Publikationen
2017
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(2017): Social Ontology and Varieties of Interpretation. A Hermeneutic Critique of Searle. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (2), S. 192-217. DOI: 10.1177/0048393117742336
2016
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(2016): Clarifying Some Misunderstandings about Social Systems and their Mechanisms. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3), S. 371-381. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104266860
Abstract: The goal of this article is to answer some of the criticisms of my views on social science formulated by contributors to the symposium on my philosophy of social science.
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(2016): How Does It Work?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 182-210. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262550
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393103262550 Abstract: This article addresses the following problems: What is a mechanism, how canit be discovered, and what is the role of the knowledge of mechanisms in scientific explanation and technological control? The proposed answers are these. A mechanism is one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is— for example, metabolism in cells, interneuronal connections in brains, work in factories and offices, research in laboratories, and litigation in courts of law. Because mechanisms are largely or totally imperceptible, they must be conjectured. Once hypothesized they help explain, because a deep scientific explanation is an answer to a question of the form, “How does it work, that is, what makes it tick—what are its mechanisms?” Thus, by contrast with the subsumption of particulars under a generalization, an explanation proper consists in unveiling some lawful mechanism, as when political stability is explainedby either coercion, public opinion manipulation, or democratic participation. Finding mechanisms satisfies not only the yearning for understanding, but also the need for control.
Keywords: explanation, function, mechanism, philosophy of the social sciences, process, system, systemism -
(2016): The Seven Pillars of Popper's Social Philosophy. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (4), S. 528-556. DOI: 10.1177/004839319602600405
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(2016): A Critical Social Systems View of the Internet. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4), S. 471-500. DOI: 10.1177/0048393107307664
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(2016): “We Always Have a Beer after the Meeting”. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (3), S. 251-275. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106289791
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(2016): How Not to Structure a Social Theory. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4), S. 464-479. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106293456
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(2016): Cultural Evolution, Reductionism in the Social Sciences, and Explanatory Pluralism. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3), S. 331-361. DOI: 10.1177/004839310003000301
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(2016): Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1), S. 3-27. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116654869
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(2016): Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 237-259. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262552
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(2016): Between Social Science and Social Technology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4), S. 459-487. DOI: 10.1177/004839310103100401
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(2016): Social Practices and Normativity. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (1), S. 46-56. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106296542
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(2016): A New Societist Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2), S. 174-202. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103033002002
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(2016): Book Review. What’s So Social about Social Knowledge?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 98-125. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271927
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(2016): Complexity Theories, Social Theory, and the Question of Social Complexity. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (3), S. 323-360. DOI: 10.1177/004839310103100303
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(2016): Let’s Pretend!. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 75-97. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271925
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
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(2016): Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1), S. 25-50. DOI: 10.1177/004839310203200102
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(2016): Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2), S. 149-169. DOI: 10.1177/004839319002000201
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/004839319002000201 Abstract: According to the article, Neurath’s reflexive epistemology - expressed by the metaphor of the ship in need of reconstruction on the open sea - represents a philosophical alternative to the classical and contemporary forms of scientific realism and ethical cognitivism, including Popper’s falsificationism. Against Quine’s reductive interpretation of Neurath’s boat argument as the basis for a ’naturalized epistemology,’ the article maintains that the metaphor suggests the idea of an insuperable situation of linguistic and conceptual circularity. This prevents any attempt at self-foundation in scientific knowledge, as well as in ethics and politics, and rules out any ’constructive philosophy’ aiming to break circularity in pursuit of some methodological beginning.
Keywords: philosophy of the social sciences 2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach -
(2015): Interpersonal Communication as Social Action. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 407-423. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580265
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(2015): A Framework for Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2), S. 147-167. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115613494
2014
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(2014): Collective Actors without Collective Minds. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1), S. 3-25. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113520397
2013
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(2013): Causally Redundant Social Objects. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6), S. 798-809. DOI: 10.1177/0048393114521364
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393114521364 Abstract: In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.
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(2013): Blame It on the Norm. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2), S. 131-150. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113510468