Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Reasoning about Imprecise Beliefs in Multi-Agent Systems with PDT Logic. In: KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 31 (1), S. 63-71. DOI: 10.1007/s13218-016-0455-7Keywords: abductive reasoning, Abduktion, abduktives Schließen, Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, Angemessenheit von Überzeugungen, Bedeutung, Belief updates, deutsche Community, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Formalisierung, frame semantics, imprecise beliefs, Imprecise probabilities, Intellektualtechnik, Knowledge representation, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), model, Modell, Modellierung, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, PDT Logic, Probabilistic Doxastic Temporal Logic, Realtechnik, Technik, Ungenaue Überzeugungen, Wahrscheinlichkeit
2016
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(2016): Epistemic logics for sceptical agents. In: JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION 26 (6), S. 1815-1841
Abstract: In this article, we introduce an epistemic modal operator modelling knowledge over distributive non-associative full Lambek calculus with a negation. Our approach is based on the relational semantics for substructural logics: we interpret the elements of a relational frame as information states consisting of collections of data. The principal epistemic relation between the states is the one of being a reliable source of information, on the basis of which we explicate the notion of knowledge as information confirmed by a reliable source. From this point of view it is natural to define the epistemic operator formally as the backward-looking diamond modality. The framework is a generalization and extension of the system of relevant epistemic logic proposed by Majer and Peliš (2009, college Publications, 123–135) and developed by Bílková et al. (2010, college Publications, 22–38). The system is modular in the sense that the axiomatization of the epistemic operator is sound and complete with respect to a wide class of background logics, which makes the system potentially applicable to a wide class of epistemic contexts. Our system admits a weak form of logical omniscience (the monotonicity rule), but avoids stronger ones (a necessitation rule and a K-axiom) as well as some closure properties discussed in normal epistemic logics (like positive and negative introspection). For these properties we provide characteristic frame conditions, so that they can be present in the system if they are considered to be appropriate for some specific epistemic context. We also prove decidability of the weakest epistemic logic we consider, using a filtration method. Finally, we outline further extensions of our framework to a multiagent system
Keywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, Disziplin, epistemic modal operator, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Epistemische Operatoren, frame semantics, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mögliche Welten, mögliche Welten Theorie, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Philosophie, possible worlds theory, Realtechnik, relational frame, Sprache, Sprachtheorie, Sprachverstehen, Technik 2014
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(2014): Believing on trust. In: Synthese 191 (9), S. 2009-2028. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0376-z
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335-49, 1985; J Philos 88:693-708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig's claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig's writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the 'system knows', social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, Annahmen, Disziplin, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophie, Realtechnik, social systems, Sozialverstehen, Technik, Trust, Überzeugung, Vertrauen
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