Alle Publikationen
2018
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(2018) : Implicit moral cognition. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 516-524
Abstract: What is the best method for understanding moral judgment? We use implicit measurement and mathematical modeling to capture implicit moral evaluations, because this method can address debates over the role of intuition and reason in moral judgment and over domain-general versus domain-specific views of moral psychology. A man kicks a puppy as hard as he can. A son slaps his mother across the face. A soldier betrays his unit. A terrorist defiles a temple. These actions all seem like moral transgressions. And before you deliberate about why they are wrong—that is, what principles do they violate—you probably have an immediate gut reaction: 'That is wrong!' If you don’t have that reaction, that is important for us and everyone else to know, because it might mean you have fewer inhibitions about engaging in such behaviors. And you might know what the 'appropriate' reaction is supposed to look like, so it’s important to find a way to reliably assess your gut reactions b efore yo u can edit your responses. In this chapter, we discuss a new approach to measuring moral intuitions that draws upon advances in implicit social cognition and mathematical modeling. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.) (2018): Atlas of moral psychology. What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.. New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: What do people evaluate when they assess another person’s moral character? In this chapter, we define moral character in novel social cognitive terms and offer empirical support for the idea that the central qualities of moral character are those deemed essential for social relationships. We approach this chapter from the theoretical standpoint that the centrality of character evaluation is due to its function in social life. Evaluation of character is, we think, inherently a judgment about a person’s qualifications for being a solid long-term social investment. That is, people attempt to suss out moral character because they want to know whether a particular agent is the type of person who likely possesses the necessary (even if not sufficient) qualities they expect in a social relationship. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess other s’ mor al character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess others’ moral character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. We begin by putting forward a new idea of what we think moral character means, rooted in a social-cognitive view of the person as a moral being. We introduce the idea that a person’s moral character takes the form of moral cognitive machinery—essentially a processor that accepts inputs that, if the processor functions well, should output morally relevant judgments and behavior. We next take on the question of content: What are the more specific characteristics of a person with good moral character? That is, instead of considering t he abstr act form that moral character may take, we ask what qualities define moral character. In this section, we present several forms of preliminary evidence suggesting that moral qualities are those that describe necessary conditions of social investment. In so doing, we engage with two questions. First, we consider how our perspective is compatible with both moral pluralism and moral universalism— how moral codes may show variety and consistency across cultural contexts. Second, we consider in what circumstances people should be more or less likely to assume that others’ character is more or less upstanding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3 "This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 57 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind"-- "Description: This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 56 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind. Key Words: altruism, badness, beliefs, convictions, ethical behavior, evil, evolutionary psychology, free will, goodness, human behavior, immorality, justice, moral character, moral emotions, moral judgments, moral philosophy, moral psychology, moral reasoning, personality, social cognition, social norms, social psychology, values"--
Keywords: Moral, Morality, Peer Evaluation, Personality Traits, Social Cognition, social sciences, Sonstiges -
(2018): Moral cognition and its basis in social cognition and social regulation.. New York: Guilford Press, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: What is the basis of moral cognition? Moral judgments are grounded in a number of cognitive and social cognitive processes, which guide the social regulation of behavior and are, in turn, constrained by such regulation to be fair and evidence-based. Human beings live complex social lives, composed of various types of relationships across nested social hierarchies, all structured by rights, rules, and obligations. However, selfish goals persist, and keeping individuals’ goals in line with community interests has become the primary challenge of modern morality. To meet this challenge, human societies have developed two major social-cultural tools: a vast network of rules, norms, and values and complex social practices of norm enforcement, such as blame, praise, apology, and reconciliation. This kind of social-cultural morality has to be taught, learned, and enforced by community members, even by the youngest among them. Acquiring norms likely benefits from early-appearing prefere nces for prosocial agents over antisocial agents, but socially mature moral capacities rely heavily on nonmoral capacities: those of social cognition. Social cognition encompasses a hierarchy of interdependent concepts, processes, and skills that allow individuals to perceive, understand, and—most important for the present topic—evaluate one another. For example, norm enforcers infer the mental processes that generated a transgressive behavior (e.g., motive, belief, intention) before blaming the transgressor. The transgressor must likewise infer the mental processes that generated the social act of blaming (e.g., the norm enforcer’s goals, knowledge, and power of enforcing sanctions) when deciding to deny or admit, maintain or correct the norm-violating behavior. These, then, are the phenomena this chapter aims to illuminate. We show how the elements of social cognition ground people’s moral cognition and how social and moral cognition together guide the social regul ation of behavior by moral norms. We aim to identify the concepts, mechanisms, and practices that go into making various kinds of moral judgments and the forms and functions of socially expressing those judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 4
2017
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(2017): They Love Me, They Love Me Not?. Social Power Shapes Expectations of Acceptance and Concerns about Rejection. In: Social Cognition 35 (5), S. 563-584. DOI: 10.1521/soco.2017.35.5.563
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.5.563 Abstract: Four studies tested the overriding hypothesis that an actor’s high relative to low social power enhances the actor’s expectations of social acceptance, and attenuates his or her concerns about social rejection, from others. Study 1 yielded correlational support for this hypothesis, while Studies 2 and 3 produced causal evidence. Study 3 also suggested that actor-power effects on acceptance expectations and rejection concerns emerge in relation to both opposite-power counterparts and others in general, though the effects tend to be stronger for the former. Finally, Study 4 confirmed that our effects are driven at least partly by an actor’s power, though at times in interaction with the high or low power of potential sources of acceptance/ rejection. The present studies extend a growing literature on power’s effects on processes and phenomena related to social acceptance and rejection. We discuss limitations, implications, and future directions. (PsycINFO Database R ecord (c ) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2017): The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis.. In: Cognition (Vol.166), S. 314-327, zuletzt geprüft am 02.05.2018
Abstract: Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct effect especially in the absence of other factors, such as personal contact. So we aimed to determine how robust the means/byproduct effect is by conducting a meta-analysis of both published and unpublished studies (k = 101; 24,058 participants). We found that while there is an overall small difference between moral judgments of means and byproducts (standardized mean difference = 0.87, 95% CI 0.67–1.06; standardized mean change = 0.57, 95% CI 0.44–0.69; log odds ratio = 1.59, 95% CI 1.15–2.02), the mean effect size is primarily moderated by whether the outcome is brought about by personal contact, which typically involves the use of personal force. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Grammar, Kognitionswissenschaften, Linguistics, Moral, Metaanalyse, Morality, Social Cognition -
(2017): The future of social cognition. Paradigms, concepts and experiments. In: Synthese 194 (3), S. 655-672. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1162-5
Abstract: Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff's classic paper introducing the notion of a 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff in Behav Brain Sci 1(4):515-526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.
Keywords: adequate social interaction, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, Überblick, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): Authorities' coercive and legitimate power. The impact on cognitions underlying cooperation. In: Frontiers in Psychology (Online Journal) 8
Abstract: The execution of coercive and legitimate power by an authority assures cooperation and prohibits free-riding. While coercive power can be comprised of severe punishment and strict monitoring, legitimate power covers expert and informative procedures. The perception of these powers wielded by authorities stimulates specific cognitions: trust, relational climates, and motives. With four experiments, the single and combined impact of coercive versus legitimate power on these processes and on intended cooperation of a total of 720 student participants, is investigated within two exemplary contexts (i.e., tax contributions, insurance claims). The results revealed that coercive power increases an antagonistic climate and enforced compliance, whereas legitimate power increases reason-based trust, a service climate, and voluntary cooperation. Unexpectedly, legitimate power additionally has a negative effect on an antagonistic climate, and a positive effect on enforced compliance. The findings lead to a modification of theoretical assumptions. However, exclusively reason-based trust, but not climate perceptions and motives, mediates the relationship between power and intended cooperation. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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(2017) : Entwicklung des moralischen Urteils und der moralischen Motivation In: Sautermeister, Jochen; Ethik, Münchner Kompetenz Zentrum (Hg.): Moralpsychologie: Transdisziplinäre Perspektiven: Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag (Ethik im Diskurs), S. 108-124
Abstract: Die Entwicklung des moralischen Urteils und der moralischen Motivation wird zusammenfassend dargestellt. Im Einzelnen betreffen die Ausführungen folgende Aspekte: das kindliche Moralverständnis, moralisches Wissen, moralische Motivation, auf die Moral bezogene Lernprozesse, die Entwicklung moralischer Motivation, die Entwicklung kognitiver Strukturen, die soziokognitive Strukturentwicklung, das Zusammenspiel von Motivation und Urteil (moralische Sensibilität, moralische Haltung), moralpsychologische Forschungsdesiderate. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass nach der neueren Forschung Kohlbergs Theorie Dimensionen bündelt, die unabhängig voneinander variieren können - moralisches Wissen und moralische Motivation, Entwicklung kognitiver und soziokognitiver Denkstrukturen, bereichsspezifische Wissenssysteme. Bereits Kinder wissen früh um die kategorische Sollgeltung moralischer Normen. Moralische Motivation, ein intrinsisches, formal-urteilbezogenes "second-order desire", entwickelt sich aber erst verzögert. Sie nimmt dann im Durchschnitt stetig zu, wobei allerdings individuelle Verläufe - auch in Abhängigkeit von der Identifikation mit herrschenden Geschlechtsstereotypen - erheblich variieren. Differenzierte moralische Urteilsbildung erfordert die Entwicklung kognitiver und soziokognitiver Strukturen sowie die Bereitschaft zu moralischem Selbstmanagement, also die Bereitschaft, automatisch und unbewusst ablaufende Prozesse vorurteilsgesteuerter Wahrnehmung durch bewusst eingesetzte Gegenstrategien zu kontrollieren.
Keywords: Childhood Development, Development, Judgment, Moral, Moral Development, Morality, Motivation, Social Cognition -
(2017): Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 146 (11), S. 1586-1605. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000350
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28805441 Abstract: Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record zitiert von: 2
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(2017): Harm to self outweighs benefit to others in moral decision making. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (30), S. 7963-7968. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1706693114
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1706693114 Abstract: How we make decisions that have direct consequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society. Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximizing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful electric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants' unwillingness to harm themselves for others' benefit. The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understanding of economic and social interactions in our society.
Keywords: Altruism, Death and Dying, Decision Making, entscheiden, Gesellschaft, Moral, Social Cognition -
(2017): Enabling robotic social intelligence by engineering human social-cognitive mechanisms. In: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 43, S. 190-207. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.09.005
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.09.005 Abstract: For effective human-robot interaction, we argue that robots must gain social-cognitive mechanisms that allow them to function naturally and intuitively during social interactions with humans. However, a lack of consensus on social cognitive processes poses a challenge for how to design such mechanisms for artificial cognitive systems. We discuss a recent integrative perspective of social cognition to provide a systematic theoretical underpinning for computational instantiations of these mechanisms. We highlight several commitments of our approach that we refer to as Engineering Human Social Cognition. We then provide a series of recommendations to facilitate the development of the perceptual, motor, and cognitive architecture for this proposed artificial cognitive system in future work. For each recommendation, we highlight their relation to the discussed social-cognitive mechanisms, provide the rationale for these recommendations and potential benefits, and detail examples of associated computational formalisms that could be leveraged to instantiate our recommendations. Overall, the goal of this paper is to outline an interdisciplinary and multi-theoretic approach to facilitate the design of robots that will one day function, and be perceived, as socially interactive and effective teammates. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2017): Habit in Personality and Social Psychology. In: Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 21 (4), S. 389-403. DOI: 10.1177/1088868317720362
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28737111 Abstract: Habits are largely absent from modern social and personality psychology. This is due to outdated perspectives that placed habits in conflict with goals. In modern theorizing, habits are represented in memory as implicit context-response associations, and they guide responding in conjunction with goals. Habits thus have important implications for our field. Emerging research shows that habits are an important mechanism by which people self-regulate and achieve long-term goals. Also, habits change through specific interventions, such as changes in context cues. I speculate that understanding of habits also holds promise for reducing intergroup discrimination and for understanding lay theories of the causes for action. In short, by recognizing habit, the field gains understanding of a central mechanism by which actions persist in daily life. zitiert von 6
2016
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(2016): Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2), S. 161-184. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1261394
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people's behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people's behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.
Keywords: Angesicht, ASPERGER-SYNDROME, Autism spectrum disorder, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Blick, Disziplin, EYE GAZE, FALSE BELIEF, Interaction, Interaktion, JOINT ATTENTION, mental states, mental states reasoning, mentale Zustände, MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM, NORMAL-CHILDREN, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, OF-MIND DEVELOPMENT, OTHERS ACTIONS, Pathologie, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, Philosophie, pluralist theories, Psychologie, script, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, SPECTRUM DISORDERS -
(2016) : The development of other-gender interactions: Behavioral, biological, cognitive, and contextual influences. In: Roberts, Tomi-Ann: Feminist perspectives on building a better psychological science of gender: Berlin, Germany: Springer, S. 121-139
Abstract: The goal of this chapter is to present a model that considers how biology, early peer experiences, cognitive, and contextual factors may relate to changes in other-gender interactions. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes the normative developmental patterns of children's and adolescents' same- and other-gender peer interactions and does this by reviewing the existing literature from early childhood through adolescence. The second section is largely theoretical and considers the influence of behavioral characteristics (e.g., early peer experiences), biological development (e.g., pubertal development), social cognitions (e.g., expectancies and efficacy), and contextual factors (e.g., family characteristics and school composition) and the influence these factors might have on individual differences in the development of other-gender/mixed gender interactions. The final sections highlight the importance of other-gender interactions and prov ide futu re directions and suggestions for studying and understanding individual differences in children's and adolescents' other-gender interactions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 2
2015
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(2015): Near or far? It depends on my impression. Moral information and spatial behavior in virtual interactions. In: Acta psychologica 161, S. 131-136. DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.09.003
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26386781 Abstract: Near body distance is a key component of action and social interaction. Recent research has shown that peripersonal space (reachability-distance for acting with objects) and interpersonal space (comfort-distance for interacting with people) share common mechanisms and reflect the social valence of stimuli. The social psychological literature has demonstrated that information about morality is crucial because it affects impression formation and the intention to approach-avoid others. Here we explore whether peripersonal/interpersonal spaces are modulated by moral information. Thirty-six participants interacted with male/female virtual confederates described by moral/immoral/neutral sentences. The modulation of body space was measured by reachability-distance and comfort-distance while participants stood still or walked toward virtual confederates. Results showed that distance expanded with immorally described confederates and contracted with morally described confederates. This pattern was present in both spaces, although it was stronger in comfort-distance. Consistent with an embodied cognition approach, the findings suggest that high-level socio-cognitive processes are linked to sensorimotor-spatial processes.
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(2015): Creating social orientation through language. A socio-cognitive theory of situated social meaning. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Co. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/celcr.17
Abstract: This monograph develops a new socio-cognitive theory of sense-making for analyzing the creative management of situated social meaning. Drawing on cognitive-linguistic and social-interactional heuristics in an innovative way, the book both theorizes and demonstrates how embodied cognizers create complex situated conceptualizations of self and other, which guide and support their interactions. It shows how these sense-making processes are managed through the coordinated social interaction of two (or more) communicative partners. To illustrate the theory, the book draws on two distinct data sets: front-desk tourist-information transactions and online-workgroup discussions. It scrutinizes how the communicative partners use verbal humour as a powerful strategy to creatively establish a situated social image for themselves. This book addresses specialists and advanced students in the areas of cognitive linguistics as well as interactional approaches to language. Moreover, it will be of great value to readers interested in verbal humour, business communication, and computer-mediated communication.
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(2015): Social cognition. In: Animal Behaviour 103, S. 191-202. DOI: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.01.030
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.01.030 Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
2014
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(2014): Politeness processing as situated social cognition. A RT-theoretic account. In: Journal of Pragmatics 71, S. 117-131. DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2014.07.010
Abstract: That Relevance Theory (RT) is capable in principle of explaining social or interpersonal dimensions of verbal communication has been adequately documented in the literature (as partly summarized in Wilson and Sperber, 2005). Of all the available attempts at applying the theory in this direction, the most discussed issue is perhaps politeness. Major studies along this line include Escandell-Vidal (1996, 1998), Jary (1998a), Watts (1989, 2003), Christie (2007) and Ruhi (2008). Admittedly, these studies have advanced our understanding of how politeness is processed in the course of communication, but some new issues have arisen, mainly including (i) whether the use of conventional polite forms relative to their default contexts is communicatively relevant or not; (ii) what politeness is taken to be social adequacy, means of maintaining or improving social relations, or perlocutionary effect; (iii) whether politeness interpretation relies on the recognition of speakers' intention or not; (iv) how frames, schemata, etc. are activated in the course of politeness interpretation such that the same utterance might be assigned different interpretations, polite, neutral, or impolite; and (v) whether the communication of politeness is an individual-based social act or a joint action. These issues make it necessary to continue the discussion further. Accordingly, my aim in this study is to propose a new account of how RT might be employed to more fully explain the phenomenon of politeness. Drawing on the fundamental assumptions of RT, together with some pertinent insights on situated social cognition (Langlotz, 2010), I explore the cognitive processing of politeness in three major types of case: the situated use of conventional polite forms, contents, and associations. Approaching politeness in relevance-theoretic terms, I will argue that (i) politeness processing is a matter of situated social cognition, involving interaction between assumptions derived from various sources in a dynamic context; (ii) situated social cognition of polite behavior as a joint act which may be conscious to varying degrees is relevance-oriented; and (iii) processing different manifestations of politeness in dynamic contexts is communicatively relevant in that it yields interpersonal cognitive effects as part and parcel of utterance meaning. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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(2014) : Moral competence in social robots: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering: Chicago, IL, USA: IEEE, S. 1-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ETHICS.2014.6893446 Abstract: We propose that any robots that collaborate with, look after, or help humans-in short, social robots-must have moral competence. But what does moral competence consist of? We offer a framework for moral competence that attempts to be comprehensive in capturing capacities that make humans morally competent and that therefore represent candidates for a morally competent robot. We posit that human moral competence consists of four broad components: (1) A system of norms and the language and concepts needed to communicate about these norms; (2) moral cognition and affect; (3) moral decision making and action; and (4) moral communication. We sketch what we know and don’t know about these four elements of moral competence in humans and, for each component, ask how we could equip an artificial agent with these capacities.
Keywords: Affect, Artificial agent, Cognition, Communities, Context, Decision Making, ethical aspects, Ethics, Human Factors, human moral competence, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, intentionality, Mobile robots, Moral & Ethik, Moral action, moral affect, Moral agency, Moral cognition, moral communication, moral decision making, moral language, norms system, PSYCHOLOGY, Robots, Social Cognition, social robots 2013
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(2013): Can social intelligence be measured? Psychometric properties of the Tromsø Social Intelligence Scale—English Version. In: The Irish Journal of Psychology 34 (1), S. 1-12. DOI: 10.1080/03033910.2012.737758
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/03033910.2012.737758 Abstract: Despite its intuitive appeal as a construct relevant to a number of psychological outcomes, adequate operationalisation of social intelligence has been problematic for researchers. This research aimed to extend the understanding of the measurement of social intelligence by investigating the psychometric properties of the English version of Tromsø Social Intelligence Scale by Silvera, Martinussen and Dahl. Factor analysis (N = 328; Maximum Likelihood with Promax rotation) revealed three clear factors that paralleled the original Norwegian measure: social skills, social information processing and social awareness. Construct validity was also examined (N = 116). As predicted, social intelligence was strongly and significantly related to political skill, emotional intelligence (EI) and empathy in both males and females. In addition, as predicted, there were weak relationships with social desirability; however, for males, there was no relationship between social intelligence and social desirability. Internal reliability was adequate to good, and temporal stability over a 2-week interval was excellent. It is concluded that the English version of the scale has sound psychometric properties, that the factor structure of the Tromsø Social Intelligence Scale is stable in the English version and that the relationships evident with political skill, EI and empathy suggest that the measure is successfully capturing the nature of social intelligence. While social intelligence remains a difficult construct to operationalise, consideration of the construct within a developing nomological network is indicated. The Tromsø Social Intelligence Scale—English Version may be a useful tool for researchers aiming to operationalise trait or typical social intelligence in an easy to administer, self-report format in English-speaking samples. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2013): Development and validation of Social Intelligence Scale for university students. In: Pakistan Journal of Psychological Research 28 (1), S. 65-83
Abstract: The present research was undertaken to develop and validate the social intelligence scale. Attributes of social intelligence were elicited from 35 university students. After empirical validation, 431 university students were asked to rate themselves on the 98 item on a 4-point scale. Factor analysis revealed five factors namely; Social Manipulation (SM), Social Facilitation (SF), Social Empathy (SE), Extroversion (E), and Social Adaptability (SA). SM and SA appeared to be the two ends of social skills judged to be negative and positive. SM comprising rather devious set of items used to exploit others for selfish ends. SA represented honest and sincere interaction with others resulting in mutual benefit. SF was positively related to SE and SA whereas SM was not. Extroversion correlated highly with all factors. Construct validity was established with the help of Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 1997) and test retest reliability was also found to be satisfactory. The findings are discussed in terms of the factor structure and function of SI in the context of the culture. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2013) : Die Entwicklung und Förderung moralischen Denkens und moralischer Gefühle in der Kindheit In: Wagner, Petra: Handbuch Inklusion: Grundlagen vorurteilsbewusster Bildung und Erziehung: 1. Ausg. der überarb. Neuausg. (3. Gesamtaufl.): Freiburg [u.a.]: Herder, S. 66-87
Abstract: Die entwicklungspsychologische Forschung zur Entwicklung und Förderung moralischen Denkens und moralischer Gefühle in der Kindheit wird dargestellt. Zunächst wird J. Piagets Theorie der moralischen Entwicklung und deren Weiterführung in L. Kohlbergs Stufenmodell besprochen. Dann wird auf C. Gilligans Thesen einer "weiblichen" Moral sowie auf den Zusammenhang zwischen moralischen Gefühlen und Verantwortungszuschreibung eingegangen. Außerdem wird eine Typologie moralischer Gefühle vorgestellt. Anschließend wird über eine eigene Längsschnittstudie und kulturvergleichende Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung sozio-moralischer Sensibilität berichtet. Kinder und Jugendliche wurden zu einem moralisch relevanten Freundschaftsdilemma sowie auch zu einem Dilemma in der Familie befragt. Im Unterschied zu Kohlbergs Vorgehensweise ging es jedoch darum, mit den Kindern und Jugendlichen über die verschiedenen Perspektiven der Personen in dem Konflikt nachzudenken. Insgesamt bestätigten diese Untersuchungen die gleiche Entwicklungsabfolge bei allen Kindern in den verschiedenen Gesellschaften. Welche Aspekte der Situation jedoch als besonders wichtig angesehen wurden, war nicht nur vom Entwicklungsstand abhängig, sondern auch von gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen. Weitere Punkte, die besprochen werden, sind die Forschung zur moralischen Entwicklung von Kindern im frühesten Lebensalter und die Rolle der Umwelt beim sozialen Lernen.
Keywords: Adolescent Development, Attribution, Childhood Development, Cross Cultural Differences, Developmental Stages, Early Childhood Development, Emotions, Entwicklungspsychologie, Kohlberg (Lawrence), Kulturforschung/ kulturelle Unterschiede, Moral, Moral Development, Piaget (Jean), responsibility, Social Cognition, Social Influences -
(2013): Kultur und Kognition. Wie das Selbst das Denken formt
Abstract: Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie die Kultur das Selbstkonzept einer Person beeinflusst und welche Konsequenzen das Selbstkonzept fur personliches Erleben und Handeln hat. Das Verhaltnis zwischen dem Einzelnen und sozialen Gruppen, denen der Mensch angehort, bzw. die relative Betonung von Autonomie versus sozialer Eingebundenheit, stellen eine der wichtigsten Kulturdimensionen dar. Entlang dieser Dimension finden sich auch Unterschiede in den Selbstkonzepten der jeweiligen Kulturmitglieder. So konnen Personen sich selbst einerseits vorwiegend durch solche Aspekte definieren, die die eigene Unabhangigkeit betonen (etwa eigene Ansichten, Fahigkeiten oder Eigenschaften). Andererseits kann das Selbst durch solche Merkmale definiert werden, die den sozialen Bezug zu anderen Personen herstellen (zum Beispiel eigene Gruppenmitgliedschaften oder soziale Rollen). Wann immer ein psychologischer Prozess die eigene Person betrifft, wirkt sich der Unterschied in den Selbstkonzepten auf das Ergebnis aus. Dies gilt etwa auch fur subjektive Erklarungen von eigenen und fremden Handlungen. Personen neigen generell dazu, den Einfluss von internen Merkmalen des Handelnden (etwa seine Motive oder Einstellungen) zu uberschatzen, situative Einflusse jedoch nicht ausreichend zu berucksichtigen. Eigene Entscheidungen werden uberdies als Ausdruck der personlichen Identitat angesehen und als solche oftmals auch im Nachhinein gerechtfertigt. Diese Urteilstendenzen sind in solchen Kulturen, die die Autonomie des Einzelnen betonen, besonders stark ausgepragt. Der Vortrag wurde anlasslich des Symposiums turmdersinne "Bewusstsein - Selbst - Ich: Die Hirnforschung und das Subjektive" vom 04. bis 06. Oktober 2013 in Furth aufgezeichnet.
2012
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(2012): Between Homo Sociologicus and Homo Biologicus. The Reflexive Self in the Age of Social Neuroscience. In: Science & Education 21 (10), S. 1507-1526. DOI: 10.1007/s11191-012-9447-7
Abstract: The social sciences rely on assumptions of a unified self for their explanatory logics. Recent work in the new multidisciplinary field of social neuroscience challenges precisely this unproblematic character of the subjective self as basic, well-defined entity. If disciplinary self-insulation is deemed unacceptable, the philosophical challenge arises of systematically bringing together neurological, psychological, sociological, and anthropological dimensions of analysis in one framework such as dynamic systems theory; and of finding bridging concepts such as memory, social cognition, and cultural scripts that can facilitate the cross disciplinary study of the reflexive self. Relying on the systemic philosophy of science developed by Mario Bunge, this paper takes some steps in this direction.
Keywords: Cognition, cultural scripts, Culture, dynamic systems theory, History and Philosophy of Science, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mario Bunge, MEMORY, Modelle/Theorien, SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, script, SELVES, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, subjective self -
(2012): Is Sexism a Gender Issue?. A Motivated Social Cognition Perspective on Men's and Women's Sexist Attitudes Toward Own and Other Gender. In: European Journal of Personality 26 (3), S. 350-359. DOI: 10.1002/per.843
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/per.843 Abstract: The present research investigated the antecedents of ambivalent sexism (i.e., hostile and benevolent forms) in both men and women toward own and other gender. In two heterogeneous adult samples (Study 1: N = 179 and Study 2: N = 222), it was revealed that gender itself was only a minor predictor of sexist attitudes compared with the substantial impact of individual differences in general motivated cognition (i.e., need for closure). Analyses further showed that the relationship between need for closure and sexism was mediated by social attitudes (i.e., right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), which were differently related to benevolent and hostile forms of sexism. In the discussion, it is argued that sexism primarily stems from individual differences in motivated cognitive style, which relates to peoples’ perspective on the social world, rather than from group differences between men and women. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights re served)