Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2007
-
(2007): The Moderators and Mediators of Door-in-the-Face Requests. Is it a Negotiation or a Helping Experience?. In: Communication Monographs 74 (3), S. 333-356. DOI: 10.1080/03637750701543469
Abstract: The Door-in-the-Face ( DITF) compliance-gaining tactic occurs when a large request, expected to be rejected, is followed by a more reasonable request that is granted. The mechanisms underlying the DITF strategy remain unclear. Researchers have posed different explanations for the effectiveness of DITF, including the reciprocal concessions and the social responsibility models. These theoretical rationales for DITF were tested in a 3 ( request type: initial request only, DITF sequence, small request only) x 2 ( initial request size: moderate, large) x 2 ( solicitor familiarity: friend, stranger) between-participants experiment. Findings from the compliance data are mostly consistent with the reciprocal concessions model; but, findings from the cognitive and affective data were mixed. It appears that DITF messages are perceived as a helping situation for friends, but not for strangers. Strangers view request messages of all sizes to be a negotiation, but friends see these requests as a negotiation only when the initial request is large.
1996
-
(1996): Fair division. From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. First published.. Cambridge; New York, NY; Oakleigh, Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam027/95016488.html
Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
- <<
- <
- 1