Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018) : Implicit moral cognition. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 516-524
Abstract: What is the best method for understanding moral judgment? We use implicit measurement and mathematical modeling to capture implicit moral evaluations, because this method can address debates over the role of intuition and reason in moral judgment and over domain-general versus domain-specific views of moral psychology. A man kicks a puppy as hard as he can. A son slaps his mother across the face. A soldier betrays his unit. A terrorist defiles a temple. These actions all seem like moral transgressions. And before you deliberate about why they are wrong—that is, what principles do they violate—you probably have an immediate gut reaction: 'That is wrong!' If you don’t have that reaction, that is important for us and everyone else to know, because it might mean you have fewer inhibitions about engaging in such behaviors. And you might know what the 'appropriate' reaction is supposed to look like, so it’s important to find a way to reliably assess your gut reactions b efore yo u can edit your responses. In this chapter, we discuss a new approach to measuring moral intuitions that draws upon advances in implicit social cognition and mathematical modeling. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
2017
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(2017): Social groups and social network formation. In: Games and Economic Behavior 103, S. 286-312. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.004
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of social network formation in which a fixed number of agents interact in overlapping social groups. We derive several results on the formation of links in such networks, including results on the degree distribution, on comparative statics relating degree and group size, and on the dynamics of homophily. In particular, we derive comparative statics showing that degree is typically positively related to social group size but negatively related to the size of the overlap across multiple social groups. This is supported by evidence from a Facebook dataset. We also show that homophily over an agent's lifespan in the network can be non-monotonic, reaching a global maximum in some period before eventually decreasing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 6
2016
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(2016): A comparison of head pose and deictic pointing interaction methods for smart environments. In: International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction 32 (4), S. 325-351. DOI: 10.1080/10447318.2016.1142054
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10447318.2016.1142054 Abstract: Pointing is one of the more meaningful gestures in human expression. In this article, deictic and head pose pointing methods are evaluated as interaction means, with the objective of comparing their efficiency and delivered comfort, usability, and user experience to apply them to the deployment of services in smart spaces. Standard tools and questionnaires are applied in a user study with 20 individuals who have tried a Kinect V2-enabled pointing system to a) complete a multidirectional International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9241-9 pointing task and b) test a service to command smart objects. The results show that both deictic and head pose interaction perform in a similar way, providing a throughput of 2.14 and 2.04 bits/s, respectively (comparable to joysticks or touchpads in equivalent ISO tasks). The system being quite robust to the user position in the Kinect coverage area, target size influences performance, but also learnability and the overall response when cursor visual cues are not available. From comfort, usability, and user experience responses, it can be said that deictic is perceived to perform better than head pose in terms of accuracy, efficiency, and organization, although head pose is preferred for its speed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
2014
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(2014): Die Analyse sozialer Kontexte. In: KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 66 (S1), S. 1-16. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-014-0260-y
Abstract: In einer Diskussion grundlegender Probleme der Kontextanalyse wird davon ausgegangen, dass individuelles Verhalten immer in soziale Zusammenhänge eingebettet ist und solche Kontexte eine zentrale Bedingung sind, um individuelles Verhalten zu erklären. aufgeführt. Es wird aufgezeigt, was sich unter einem Kontext verstehen lässt, und Beispiele für Kontexte und ihre Wirkungen werden gegeben. Die sozialen Mechanismen, durch die Kontexte wirken, werden skizziert. Anhand eines Mehrebenen-Modells werden die Probleme der theoretischen Beziehungen zwischen den Ebenen und die dabei auftretenden Schwierigkeiten angemessener statistischer Modellierung untersucht. So ist weitgehend unklar, wie die Mechanismen lauten, die einen Effekt von der Aggregatebene "Land" auf die Ebene "Individuum" unterstellen. Des Weiteren wird unter Verweis auf ähnliche Überlegungen von Simmel und Lazarsfeld auf "cross pressures" zwischen Kontexten eingegangen. Weiterhin werden nicht-lineare Effekte und Selektionseffekte (unobserved variables) als zwei weitere Probleme von Kontextanalysen behandelt. Die Überlegungen werden in einer Skizze einer Theorie der Kontexte zusammengefasst und Vorschläge, wie künftige Studien angelegt werden sollten, um Forschungslücken zu schließen, werden formuliert. (Autorenreferat) zitiert von 31
2008
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Biel, Anders; Eek, Daniel; Gärling, Tommy; Gustafsson, Mathias (Hg.) (2008): New issues and paradigms in research on social dilemmas.. Toward an analysis of cooperation and fairness that includes concepts of cooperative game theory. Unter Mitarbeit von Axel Ostmann und Holger Meinhardt. New York: Springer
Abstract: Presents a game-theoretical analysis of cooperative and fair behavior. First, important concepts such as cooperation, fairness, bargaining, social dilemma, and communication are elaborated. The next sections introduce formal notation used to designate elements of noncooperative and cooperative games, and further define concepts such as core allocation and convexity. Several example games are outlined, including the CP3 game, and the HSW1 and HSW2 games. Solution concepts and properties of each example game are considered. Experimental results attained by S. Hackett et al. are reanalyzed, focusing on player efficiency and compliance, and providing geometric localization of game results. The results of the analysis suggest that common dilemma games are clear and convex, allowing for stable and efficient solutions. Players tended to compromise between the Nash equilibrium, the egalitarian standard, and the fairness standard. The interpretation of the findings considers the role of communication, the activation of behavior standards, and the equity of final results.
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