Alle Publikationen

  • Erweiterte Suche öffnen

Treffer: 3
  • <<
  • 1

  • 2016

  • Croce, Mariano (2016): The Habitus and the Critique of the Present. In: Sociological Theory 33 (4), S. 327-346. DOI: 10.1177/0735275115617801

    Abstract: I tackle some major criticisms addressed to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus by foregrounding its affinities with Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of rule-following. To this end, I first clarify the character of the habitus as a theoretical device, and then elucidate what features of Wittgenstein's analysis Bourdieu found of interest from a methodological viewpoint. To vindicate this reading, I contend that Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following was meant to unearth the internal connection between rules and the performative activities whereby rules are brought into life. By portraying rules as tools that allow agents to stabilize and renegotiate practices, I illustrate the active role social agents play in the production of shared accounts of practices. I conclude by showing that, if viewed through this prism, the habitus proves to be meant to provide guidance on how social theory helps historicize and denaturalize the social world.

    Keywords: Begriff des Habitus, Bourdieu, Bourdieu and theory of practice, Bourdieus Habitustheorie, Disziplin, Habitus, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziologie, Wittgenstein
  • Ogien, Albert (2016): Obligation and Impersonality. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (6), S. 604-623. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116649970

    Abstract: Although sociologists conceive obligation as an objective force (the social) that compels individuals to act and think according to pre-defined norms of conduct and ways of reasoning, philosophers view it as an imperative that is met through the agent's deliberation. The aim of this article is to undermine the standard dichotomy between the deterministically sociological and the moral-philosophical views of obligation by way of contending that Wittgenstein's view on blind obedience (as analyzed by Meredith Williams) bears a conception of the social. I will then argue that Wittgenstein's notion of forms of life and the sociological notion of situation refer to the same encompassing phenomenon: obligation. I will finally claim that this phenomenon should be re-specified in terms of impersonality to devise a shared dynamic conception of obligation admitting that a plurality of contextual normative orders monitor collective and individual action in ordinary life.

    Keywords: blind obedience, das Soziale, Die Natur des Sozialen, Disziplin, Goffman, ich habe doch nur Befehle befolgt, Moralphilosophie, obligation, Philosophie, Soziologie, Theory of interaction (Goffman), Verantwortung, Verpflichtung, Wittgenstein

  • 2004

  • Rorty, Richard (2004): The brain as hardware, culture as software. In: Inquiry 47 (3), S. 219-235. DOI: 10.1080/00201740410006348

    Abstract: For the last fifty years or so there has been a struggle going on between the heirs of Carnap's 'unified science'movement and the followers of the later Wittgenstein. The differences between these two kinds of philosophers are best grasped, nowadays, by

    Keywords: Carnap, Culture, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Philosophie, Plastizität des Gehirns in Bezug auf Kulturvarianz, Rorty, Wiener Kreis, Wittgenstein
  • <<
  • 1