Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Searching for Moral Dumbfounding. Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding. In: Collabra: Psychology 3 (1). DOI: 10.1525/collabra.79
Abstract: Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral psychology. The present research examines the reliability with which dumbfounding can be elicited, and aims to identify measureable indicators of dumbfounding. Study 1 aimed at establishing the effect that is reported in the literature. Participants read four scenarios and judged the actions described. An Interviewer challenged participants’ stated reasons for judgements. Dumbfounding was evoked, as measured by two indicators, admissions of not having reasons (17%), unsupported declarations (9%) with differences between scenarios. Study 2 measured dumbfounding as the selecting of an unsupported declaration as part of a computerised task. We observed high rates of dumbfounding across all scenarios. Studies 3a (college sample) and 3b (MTurk sample), addressing limitations in Study 2, replaced the unsupported declaration with an admission of having no reason, and included open-ended responses that were coded for unsupported declarations. As predicted, lower rates of dumbfounding were observed (3a 20%; 3b 16%; or 3a 32%; 3b 24% including unsupported declarations in open-ended responses). Two measures provided evidence for dumbfounding across three studies; rates varied with task type (interview/computer task), and with the particular measure being employed (admissions of not having reasons/unsupported declarations). Possible cognitive processes underlying dumbfounding and limitations of methodologies used are discussed as a means to account for this variability.
Keywords: A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding, Dominanz, Präzision und Argumentation, Erfüllen erwarteter Erwartungen, Erfüllen von erwarteten Erwartungen ohne geistige Eigenbeteiligung, erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen, Erwartungserfüllung, Moralphilosophie, Moralpsychologie, Normen, Psychologie, Werte 2016
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(2016): Philosophical Anthropology, Shame, and Disability. In Favor of an Interpersonal Theory of Shame. In: Res Philosophica 93 (4), S. 743-765. DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1472
Abstract: This article argues against a leading cognitivist and moral interpretation of shame that is present in the philosophical literature. That standard view holds that shame is the felt-response to a loss of self-esteem, which is the result of negative self-assessment. I hold that shame is a heteronomous and primitive bodily affect that is perceptual rather than judgmental in nature. Shame results from the breakdown and thwarting of our desire for anonymous, unexceptional, and disattentive co-existence with others. I use the sociological theory of Erving Goffman and the theory of shame found in philosophical anthropology to support this view. I also use the cases of shame and chronic shame that often accompany disability to show that shame is separable from negative self-assessment and, instead, emerges as an affective response to a world (of equipment, things, and people) that disallows unburdened and unreflective interpersonal equilibrium.
1994
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(1994): Zur Eigendynamik sozialer Probleme. In: Soziale Probleme 5 (1/2), S. 144-167
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