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1966
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(1966): Social Perception and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (4). DOI: 10.2307/2106220
Abstract: 1. The Two Basic Concepts We shall use the term social perception, as we were using it in our previous publications, not without some misgivings. We shall continue, however, to use it because this term has been widely accepted in the contemporary social psychology. Yet social perception is only one among several modes of social consciousness, or social awareness. In order, therefore, to avoid any likely, or even possible confusion., it is neces- sary to clarify this concept quite at the, outset of this study. By "social perception," then, we shall understand on the following pages any kind of consciousness or awareness concerning other persons as well as any social relations among them, provided that either the inner aspects of those persons or relations is the object of our awareness and of our interest; or both the inner and the external aspect, i.e., if and when the "external aspect" is perceived or viewed as appearance, mani- festation, expression, or symbol of the inner personality, and not only as a merely physical fact. Thus, the counter-concept to social perception, defined in such a way, is physical or thing-perception, in which latter case the the inner aspect does either actually not exist, or does exist, but is disregarded because, for one reason or another, we are not interested in it. As already mentioned social perception is only one among several other modes of social consciousness or awareness, which other modes may consist not in perceiving, but in assuming, thinking, imagining, and the like. These different modes are not only phenomenologically different but play also a different dynamic role in the processes of social aware- ness, a fact which has to be taken into account in dealing with these problems. Whenever necessary, we shall indicate whether we are using the concept in terms of of perception proper, i.e., in the narrow meaning of this term, or in the broader meaning including the other modes of social perception. Hence, if no special qualification is inserted, "social perception" will mean any of its various modes (assuming, thinking, etc.). It is worth mentioning that often we do approach physical facts ("things") in terms of social perception, apprehending them as if they were "persons," or at least personalized. We are dealing then either with various forms of animism and anthropomorphism, or with various forms of aesthetic perception. Hence between the analysis and theory of social perception and of aesthetic perception there is a very close relationship, as is particularly clear when we are dealing with the facts of empathy, and many related problems. However, any further clarification of these concepts is not relevant in the context of our present inquiry and can, therefore, be here disregarded. Our second basic concept, namely that of moral judgment, we shall use in this essay also in a very broad sense. Hence by moral judgment we shall not only understand judgment proper, but any kind of reac- tions, attitudes, and sentiments insofar as they contain or imply approval or disapproval of "right" and "wrong," of "good" and "bad," of "virtue" and "vice." And again, we shall not pursue any further clarification of this concept, because what we just stated is sufficient in the context of our present interest.
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