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  • 2017

  • Sauermann, Jan (2017): Do Individuals Value Distributional Fairness?. How Inequality Affects Majority Decisions. In: Political Behavior 85 (4). DOI: 10.1007/s11109-017-9424-6

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9424-6 

    Abstract: The so-called chaos theorems imply that, under most preference configurations, majority voting in n-dimensional policy spaces is theoretically unrestricted. Empirical research, however, shows an apparent stability of democratic decisions. Recent theoretical developments have emphasized social preferences as a possible explanation for overcoming majority rule’s instability problem. Hence, it is assumed that individuals not only maximize their own well-being, but also value distributional fairness. However, there is little experimental research into the influence of social preferences on majority decisions. This article presents findings from laboratory experiments on majority decisions in two-dimensional policy spaces with a systematic variation of the fairness properties of the incentive structures. The results show that distributional fairness is an important motivational factor in democratic decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

    Keywords: Committee decision making, Committee decision making,Fairness,Laboratory experiment,Majority rule,Social choice,Social preferences, entscheiden, Fairness, Laboratory experiment, Majority rule, Social choice, Social preferences

  • 1989

  • Elster, Jon (1989): The cement of society. A study of social order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Studies in rationality and social change)

    Abstract: The question Jon Elster addresses in this challenging book is what binds societies together and prevents them from disintegrating into chaos and war. He analyses two concepts of social order: stable, predictable patterns of behaviour, and co-operative behaviour. The book examines various aspects of collective action and bargaining from the perspective of rational-choice theory and the theory of social norms. It is a fundamental assumption of the book that social norms provide an important kind of motivation for action that is irreducible to rationality. The book represents a major statement by Elster, which will be of particular interest to political scientists, political philosophers, sociologists, and economists

    Keywords: Collective bargaining, Rational expectations (Economic theory), Social choice, Social Norms
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