Alle Publikationen
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2011
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(2011) : Linking Norms and Culture: 2011 Second International Conference on Culture and Computing (Culture Computing): 2011 Second International Conference on Culture and Computing (Culture Computing): Kyoto, Japan: 10/20/2011 - 10/22/2011: Kyoto, Japan: IEEE / Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Incorporated, S. 9-14
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to propose a method of modelling the evolution of social norms in different cultural settings. We analyse the role of culture in shaping agents' normative reasoning and hence their behaviour. The general notion of 'value' is discussed from the perspective of the BDI framework as a means to represent cultural regularities in social interactions. Culture is described as a system of shared values, which are linked to the Hofstede dimensions of culture. This system is represented by so-called metanorms that define appropriate, culturally-varying, behaviour in different relational contexts. In this way culture affects the possibility of normative changes, in particular the acceptance of policies designed to issue new norms in a society. Throughout the paper a scenario related to the enactment of smoking ban policies in Europe is presented to discuss the evaluation of normative change in specific cultural settings.
Keywords: BDI, culturally-varying, Culture, FRAMEWORK, Gert Jan Hofstede, Gesetze, Kultur, modelling, Normen, norms, rauchen, relational context, Smoking 1999
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(1999) : The Belief-Desire-Intention Model of Agency In: Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.): Intelligents agents V: Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings, 1555: New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence), S. 1-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49057-4_1 Abstract: Within the ATAL community, the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model has come to be possibly the best known and best studied model of practical reasoning agents. There are several reasons for its success, but perhaps the most compelling are that the BDI model combines a respectable philosophical model of human practical reasoning, (originally developed by Michael Bratman [1]), a number of implementations (in the IRMA architecture [2] and the various PRS-like systems currently available [7]), several successful applications (including the now-famous fault diagnosis system for the space shuttle, as well as factory process control systems and business process management [8]), and finally, an elegant abstract logical semantics, which have been taken up and elaborated upon widely within the agent research community [14, 16].
1998
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(1998): Modelling social action for AI agents. In: Artificial Intelligence 103 (1), S. 157-182. DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3 Abstract: In the new AI of the 90s an important stream is artificial social intelligence. In this work basic ontological categories for social action, structure, and mind are introduced. Sociality (social action, social structure) is let emerge from the action and intelligence of individual agents in a common world. Also some aspects of the way-down—how emergent collective phenomena shape the individual mind—are examined. First, interference and dependence are defined, and then different kinds of coordination (reactive versus anticipatory; unilateral versus bilateral; selfish versus collaborative) are characterised. “Weak social action”, based on beliefs about the mind of the other agents, and “strong social action”, based on goals about others' minds and their actions, are distinguished. Special attention is paid to Goal Delegation and Goal Adoption that are considered as the basic ingredients of social commitment and contract, and then of exchange, cooperation, group action, and organisation. Different levels of delegation and then of autonomy of the delegated agent are described; and different levels of goal-adoption are shown to characterise true collaboration. Social goals in the minds of the group members are argued to be the real glue of joint activity, and the notion of social commitment, as different from individual and from collective commitment, is underlined. The necessity for modelling social objective structures and constraints is emphasised and the “shared mind” view of groups and organisations is criticised. The spontaneous and unaware emergence of a dependence structure is explained, as well as its feedback on the participants' minds and behaviours. Critical observations are presented on current confusions such as that between “social” and “collective” action, or between communication and social action. The main claims of the paper are the following: (a) The real foundation of all sociality (cooperation, competition, groups, organisation, etc.) is the individual social action and mind. One cannot reduce or connect action at the collective level to action at the individual level unless one passes through the social character of the individual action, (b) Important levels of coordination and cooperation necessarily require minds and cognitive agents (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). (c) However, cognition, communication and agreement are not enough for modelling and implementing cooperation: emergent pre-cognitive structures and constraints should be formalised, and emergent forms of cooperation are needed also among planning and deliberative agents, (d) We are going towards a synthetic paradigm in AI and Cognitive Science, reconciling situatedness and plans, reactivity and mental representations, cognition, emergence and self-organisation.
1995
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(1995): BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice. AAAI. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent SystemsKeywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, agents, Architekturen, BDI, belief, belief-desire, desire, Überzeugung, Überzeugungen
1991
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(1991): Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. In: The Philosophical Review 100 (2). DOI: 10.2307/2185304
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2185304 Abstract: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
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