Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2017
-
(2017): Supplemental Material for Consequences, Norms, and Generalized Inaction in Moral Dilemmas. The CNI Model of Moral Decision-Making. In: Journal of personality and social psychology, S. 343-376. DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000086.supp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000086.supp Abstract: Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinom ial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
-
(2017): In a moral dilemma, choose the one you love. Impartial actors are seen as less moral than partial ones. In: The British journal of social psychology 56 (3), S. 561-577. DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12199
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28474440 Abstract: Although impartiality and concern for the greater good are lauded by utilitarian philosophies, it was predicted that when values conflict, those who acted impartially rather than partially would be viewed as less moral. Across four studies, using life‐or‐death scenarios and more mundane ones, support for the idea that relationship obligations are important in moral attribution was found. In Studies 1–3, participants rated an impartial actor as less morally good and his or her action as less moral compared to a partial actor. Experimental and correlational evidence showed the effect was driven by inferences about an actor's capacity for empathy and compassion. In Study 4, the relationship obligation hypothesis was refined. The data suggested that violations of relationship obligations are perceived as moral as long as strong alternative justifications sanction them. Discussion centres on the importance of relationships in understanding moral attributions. (PsycINFO D atabase Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
2012
-
Törnblom, Kjell; Kazemi, Ali (Hg.) (2012): Handbook of Social Resource Theory. Resource types and fairness perceptions in social dilemmas.. New York, NY: Springer New York (Critical Issues in Social Justice)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4175-5 Abstract: The focus in this chapter is on the nature and effects of fairness perceptions and different types of resources in social dilemmas. Most recognizable under the rubrics of equity and distributive justice, theories of fairness in their many incarnations have a long history in the social sciences and have expanded into a variety of research lines. Equity theory employed the terms inputs and outcomes in simple mathematical models designed to account for interpersonal comparisons of these quantities and their impact on feelings of fairness. In the pure game-theoretic sense, there is no place for fairness issues in social dilemmas so long as all participants subscribe to the rules. However, we will argue that (I) social dilemma settings fall within the scope of distributive justice theory, (2) input and outcome patterns activate justice concerns, and (3) these concerns will result in predictable alterations of subsequent inputs with predictable consequences for the group. The s cope of these arguments will be further expanded by taking into account the kinds of resources involved. In this way, our theory will be able to explain the effects of different types of resources on the input side, and/or outcomes involving different types of resources for different members, and/or outcome resources that differ from input resources. Resource theory provides us some direction for establishing a model of resource effects on social dilemmas via fairness processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
2008
-
Biel, Anders; Eek, Daniel; Gärling, Tommy; Gustafsson, Mathias (Hg.) (2008): New issues and paradigms in research on social dilemmas.. Toward an analysis of cooperation and fairness that includes concepts of cooperative game theory. Unter Mitarbeit von Axel Ostmann und Holger Meinhardt. New York: Springer
Abstract: Presents a game-theoretical analysis of cooperative and fair behavior. First, important concepts such as cooperation, fairness, bargaining, social dilemma, and communication are elaborated. The next sections introduce formal notation used to designate elements of noncooperative and cooperative games, and further define concepts such as core allocation and convexity. Several example games are outlined, including the CP3 game, and the HSW1 and HSW2 games. Solution concepts and properties of each example game are considered. Experimental results attained by S. Hackett et al. are reanalyzed, focusing on player efficiency and compliance, and providing geometric localization of game results. The results of the analysis suggest that common dilemma games are clear and convex, allowing for stable and efficient solutions. Players tended to compromise between the Nash equilibrium, the egalitarian standard, and the fairness standard. The interpretation of the findings considers the role of communication, the activation of behavior standards, and the equity of final results.
- <<
- <
- 1