Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Social Ontology and Varieties of Interpretation. A Hermeneutic Critique of Searle. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (2), S. 192-217. DOI: 10.1177/0048393117742336
2016
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(2016) : Moral Development ☆ In: Stein, John: Reference module in neuroscience and biobehavioral psychology: Place of publication not identified: Elsevier, S. 637-643
Abstract: Moral development involves the acquisition of the attitudes, dispositions, sentiments, and cognitive competencies involved in the process of moral judgment and action. The nature and role of these components depend on how morality is understood. Most contemporary moral psychologists distinguish morality from prudence and from custom or etiquette. They generally agree that to be moral is to treat others fairly and with a concern for their welfare. Moral development occurs through individuals interacting within distinctive cultural settings. Moral maturity involves not only judgments about what is right but also a sense of responsibility based on a moral identity.
2014
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(2014) : Moral competence in social robots: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering: Chicago, IL, USA: IEEE, S. 1-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ETHICS.2014.6893446 Abstract: We propose that any robots that collaborate with, look after, or help humans-in short, social robots-must have moral competence. But what does moral competence consist of? We offer a framework for moral competence that attempts to be comprehensive in capturing capacities that make humans morally competent and that therefore represent candidates for a morally competent robot. We posit that human moral competence consists of four broad components: (1) A system of norms and the language and concepts needed to communicate about these norms; (2) moral cognition and affect; (3) moral decision making and action; and (4) moral communication. We sketch what we know and don’t know about these four elements of moral competence in humans and, for each component, ask how we could equip an artificial agent with these capacities.
Keywords: Affect, Artificial agent, Cognition, Communities, Context, Decision Making, ethical aspects, Ethics, Human Factors, human moral competence, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, intentionality, Mobile robots, Moral & Ethik, Moral action, moral affect, Moral agency, Moral cognition, moral communication, moral decision making, moral language, norms system, PSYCHOLOGY, Robots, Social Cognition, social robots 1991
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(1991): Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. In: The Philosophical Review 100 (2). DOI: 10.2307/2185304
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2185304 Abstract: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
1980
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(1980): Minds, brains, and programs. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3), S. 417-424. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00005756
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756 Abstract: Minds, brains, and programs - Volume 3 Issue 3
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