Alle Publikationen
2018
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(2018): Reasoning. The neuroscience of how we think. London, England: Academic Press. Online verfügbar unter http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780128092859
Abstract: Reasoning: The Neuroscience of How We Think is a comprehensive guide to the core topics related to a thorough understanding of reasoning. It presents the current knowledge of the subject in a unified, complete manner, ranging from animal studies, to applied situations, and is the only book available that presents a sustained focus on the neurobiological processes behind reasoning throughout all chapters, while also synthesizing research from animal behavior, cognitive psychology, development, and philosophy for a truly multidisciplinary approach. The book considers historical perspectives, state-of-the-art research methods, and future directions in emerging technology and cognitive enhancement. Written by an expert in the field, this book provides a coherent and structured narrative appropriate for students in need of an introduction to the topic of reasoning as well as researchers seeking well-rounded foundational content. It is essential reading for neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, neuropsychologists and others interested in the neural mechanisms behind thinking, reasoning and higher cognition
2017
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Burgoon, Judee K.; Magnenat-Thalmann, Nadia; Pantic, Maja (Hg.) (2017): Social signal processing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: Social Signal Processing is the first book to cover all aspects of the modeling, automated detection, analysis, and synthesis of nonverbal behavior in human-human and human-machine interactions. Authoritative surveys address conceptual foundations, machine analysis and synthesis of social signal processing, and applications. Foundational topics include affect perception and interpersonal coordination in communication; later chapters cover technologies for automatic detection and understanding such as computational paralinguistics and facial expression analysis and for the generation of artificial social signals such as social robots and artificial agents. The final section covers a broad spectrum of applications based on social signal processing in healthcare, deception detection, and digital cities, including detection of developmental diseases and analysis of small groups. Each chapter offers a basic introduction to its topic, accessible to students and other newcomers, and then outlines challenges and future perspectives for the benefit of experienced researchers and practitioners in the field.
Keywords: Computer vision, Computerwissenschaft, Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Favoriten, Human behaviour analysis', Interaktion, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Realtechnik, Sammelband, Signal, Signale, Signaling social preferences/ Social signal processing, Social interactions, social signal processing, Social Signal Processing (SSP), social signalling, Social signals, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, Soziosensitive Systeme, speech processing, Technik -
(2017): Collective intentionality and socially extended minds. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 251-268. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295629
Abstract: There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.
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(2017): The future of social cognition. Paradigms, concepts and experiments. In: Synthese 194 (3), S. 655-672. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1162-5
Abstract: Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff's classic paper introducing the notion of a 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff in Behav Brain Sci 1(4):515-526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.
Keywords: adequate social interaction, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, Überblick, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): Artificial cognition for social human–robot interaction. An implementation. In: Artificial Intelligence 247, S. 45-69. DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2016.07.002
Abstract: Human–Robot Interaction challenges Artificial Intelligence in many regards: dynamic, partially unknown environments that were not originally designed for robots; a broad variety of situations with rich semantics to understand and interpret; physical interactions with humans that requires fine, low-latency yet socially acceptable control strategies; natural and multi-modal communication which mandates common-sense knowledge and the representation of possibly divergent mental models. This article is an attempt to characterise these challenges and to exhibit a set of key decisional issues that need to be addressed for a cognitive robot to successfully share space and tasks with a human. We identify first the needed individual and collaborative cognitive skills: geometric reasoning and situation assessment based on perspective-taking and affordance analysis; acquisition and representation of knowledge models for multiple agents (humans and robots, with their specificities); situated, natural and multi-modal dialogue; human-aware task planning; human–robot joint task achievement. The article discusses each of these abilities, presents working implementations, and shows how they combine in a coherent and original deliberative architecture for human–robot interaction. Supported by experimental results, we eventually show how explicit knowledge management, both symbolic and geometric, proves to be instrumental to richer and more natural human–robot interactions by pushing for pervasive, human-level semantics within the robot's deliberative system.
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(2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen -
(2017): Evaluating the Sensitivity to Virtual Characters Facial Asymmetry in Emotion Synthesis. In: Applied Artificial Intelligence 31 (2), S. 103-118. DOI: 10.1080/08839514.2017.1299983
Abstract: The use of expressive Virtual Characters is an effective complementary means of communication for social networks offering multi-user 3D-chatting environment. In such contexts, the facial expression channel offers a rich medium to translate the ongoing emotions conveyed by the text-based exchanges. However, until recently, only purely symmetric facial expressions have been considered for that purpose. In this article we examine human sensitivity to facial asymmetry in the expression of both basic and complex emotions. The rationale for introducing asymmetry in the display of facial expressions stems from two well-established observations in cognitive neuroscience: first that the expression of basic emotions generally displays a small asymmetry, second that more complex emotions such as ambivalent feeling may reflect in the partial display of different, potentially opposite, emotions on each side of the face. A frequent occurrence of this second case results from the conflict between the truly felt emotion and the one that should be displayed due to social conventions. Our main hypothesis is that a much larger expressive and emotional space can only be automatically synthesized by means of facial asymmetry when modeling emotions with a general Valence-Arousal-Dominance dimensional approach. Besides, we want also to explore the general human sensitivity to the introduction of a small degree of asymmetry into the expression of basic emotions. We conducted an experiment by presenting 64 pairs of static facial expressions, one symmetric and one asymmetric, illustrating eight emotions (three basic and five complex ones) alternatively for a male and a female character. Each emotion was presented four times by swapping the symmetric and asymmetric positions and by mirroring the asymmetrical expression. Participants were asked to grade, on a continuous scale, the correctness of each facial expression with respect to a short definition. Results confirm the potential of introducing facial asymmetry for a subset of the complex emotions. Guidelines are proposed for designers of embodied conversational agent and emotionally reflective avatars.
Keywords: Asymmetrie, Augmented & Virtual Reality, Authentizität von dargestellter Emotion, dominance, Emotionserkennung, Gesichtszüge, Gestik/Mimik, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konventionen, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Neurowissenschaften, Realtechnik, soziale Kognition, Technik 2016
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(2016): Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2), S. 161-184. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1261394
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people's behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people's behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.
Keywords: Angesicht, ASPERGER-SYNDROME, Autism spectrum disorder, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Blick, Disziplin, EYE GAZE, FALSE BELIEF, Interaction, Interaktion, JOINT ATTENTION, mental states, mental states reasoning, mentale Zustände, MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM, NORMAL-CHILDREN, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, OF-MIND DEVELOPMENT, OTHERS ACTIONS, Pathologie, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, Philosophie, pluralist theories, Psychologie, script, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, SPECTRUM DISORDERS 2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach -
(2015): From participatory sense-making to language. There and back again. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4), S. 1089-1125. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9
Abstract: The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana's idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana's initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect "lower-level" sense-making with "higher-order" sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making.
Keywords: Dialectical expansion model, Disziplin, enactive model of cognition and social sense-making/agency, Interaktion, interdisziplinär, Linguistic bodies, Linguistic sensitivities and powers, Normen, Participatory sense-making, Philosophie, Sinnzuweisung, social interaction, soziale Kognition, Wheel of languaging -
(2015): Creating social orientation through language. A socio-cognitive theory of situated social meaning. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Co. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/celcr.17
Abstract: This monograph develops a new socio-cognitive theory of sense-making for analyzing the creative management of situated social meaning. Drawing on cognitive-linguistic and social-interactional heuristics in an innovative way, the book both theorizes and demonstrates how embodied cognizers create complex situated conceptualizations of self and other, which guide and support their interactions. It shows how these sense-making processes are managed through the coordinated social interaction of two (or more) communicative partners. To illustrate the theory, the book draws on two distinct data sets: front-desk tourist-information transactions and online-workgroup discussions. It scrutinizes how the communicative partners use verbal humour as a powerful strategy to creatively establish a situated social image for themselves. This book addresses specialists and advanced students in the areas of cognitive linguistics as well as interactional approaches to language. Moreover, it will be of great value to readers interested in verbal humour, business communication, and computer-mediated communication.
2014
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(2014): Inference or Familiarity? The Embodied Roots of Social Cognition. In: SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 29 (2), S. 253-272
Abstract: I consider two distinct deflationary theories in social cognition that aim to explain action understanding without demanding meta-representational or mindreading processes: the first one is the 'teleological stance hypothesis' (TSH), claiming that we infer the intended goal of a certain observed action based on the mere perception of its effects and of its situational constraints; I decided to dub the second one 'the embodied familiarity hypothesis' (EFH) to comprise all the theories claiming that we recognize the intended goal of a certain action based on the perceptual or motoric expertise developed within the sensorimotor contingencies associated to that action's context. TSH's main requirement is that the observer could ascribe efficiency, and therefore rationality, to the observed agent's movement, while EFH's main requirement is that the observer were somehow exposed to the perceptual or motoric details of the observed agent's action. I argue that EFH describes a more primitive and fundamental form of action understanding, i.e. one that is necessarily presupposed by TSH: in fact, while recognizing efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for detecting goal-relatedness, some kind of perceptual or motoric familiarity with the details of the observed action's context is always necessary for any ascription of efficiency, and therefore of rationality, to the observed agent. I conclude that, while TSH might certainly be effective in describing certain rational forms of action understanding, it implicitly requires EFH to be true, as its inferential system would be groundless without an assumed familiar background of embodied expertise.
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(2014): Minds as social institutions. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), S. 121-143. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9324-0
Abstract: I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as "artifacts," tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of "scripts" and "roles"; when we play a role we wear a "mind." No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) "as if" we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these "as if" (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions.
Keywords: als ob, belief in beliefs, Coordination, coordination artifacts, Extended mind, Interaktion, Kooperation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konventionen, philosophy of mind, script, Social frames, Social institutions, social interaction, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Überzeugungen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2014): Politeness processing as situated social cognition. A RT-theoretic account. In: Journal of Pragmatics 71, S. 117-131. DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2014.07.010
Abstract: That Relevance Theory (RT) is capable in principle of explaining social or interpersonal dimensions of verbal communication has been adequately documented in the literature (as partly summarized in Wilson and Sperber, 2005). Of all the available attempts at applying the theory in this direction, the most discussed issue is perhaps politeness. Major studies along this line include Escandell-Vidal (1996, 1998), Jary (1998a), Watts (1989, 2003), Christie (2007) and Ruhi (2008). Admittedly, these studies have advanced our understanding of how politeness is processed in the course of communication, but some new issues have arisen, mainly including (i) whether the use of conventional polite forms relative to their default contexts is communicatively relevant or not; (ii) what politeness is taken to be social adequacy, means of maintaining or improving social relations, or perlocutionary effect; (iii) whether politeness interpretation relies on the recognition of speakers' intention or not; (iv) how frames, schemata, etc. are activated in the course of politeness interpretation such that the same utterance might be assigned different interpretations, polite, neutral, or impolite; and (v) whether the communication of politeness is an individual-based social act or a joint action. These issues make it necessary to continue the discussion further. Accordingly, my aim in this study is to propose a new account of how RT might be employed to more fully explain the phenomenon of politeness. Drawing on the fundamental assumptions of RT, together with some pertinent insights on situated social cognition (Langlotz, 2010), I explore the cognitive processing of politeness in three major types of case: the situated use of conventional polite forms, contents, and associations. Approaching politeness in relevance-theoretic terms, I will argue that (i) politeness processing is a matter of situated social cognition, involving interaction between assumptions derived from various sources in a dynamic context; (ii) situated social cognition of polite behavior as a joint act which may be conscious to varying degrees is relevance-oriented; and (iii) processing different manifestations of politeness in dynamic contexts is communicatively relevant in that it yields interpersonal cognitive effects as part and parcel of utterance meaning. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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(2014): Advances in social cognition research. Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publisher's, Inc (Perspectives on cognitive psychology)
2012
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(2012): In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics. In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2), S. 187-212. DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0080-1
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(2012): Between Homo Sociologicus and Homo Biologicus. The Reflexive Self in the Age of Social Neuroscience. In: Science & Education 21 (10), S. 1507-1526. DOI: 10.1007/s11191-012-9447-7
Abstract: The social sciences rely on assumptions of a unified self for their explanatory logics. Recent work in the new multidisciplinary field of social neuroscience challenges precisely this unproblematic character of the subjective self as basic, well-defined entity. If disciplinary self-insulation is deemed unacceptable, the philosophical challenge arises of systematically bringing together neurological, psychological, sociological, and anthropological dimensions of analysis in one framework such as dynamic systems theory; and of finding bridging concepts such as memory, social cognition, and cultural scripts that can facilitate the cross disciplinary study of the reflexive self. Relying on the systemic philosophy of science developed by Mario Bunge, this paper takes some steps in this direction.
Keywords: Cognition, cultural scripts, Culture, dynamic systems theory, History and Philosophy of Science, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mario Bunge, MEMORY, Modelle/Theorien, SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, script, SELVES, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, subjective self 2010
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(2010): Cognition, brain, and consciousness. Introduction to cognitive neuroscience. 2. ed.. Burlington, MA: Academic Press/Elsevier. Online verfügbar unter http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780123750709
Abstract: This is the fully revised and updated second edition of the very sucessful introductory textbook on cognitive neuroscience. Written by two leading experts in the field, this textbooknbsp,book takes a unique thematic approach to introduce concepts of cognitive neurosciences, guiding students along a clear path to understand the latest findings whether or not they have a background in neuroscience. New to this edition are Frontiers in Cognitive Neurosciencetext boxes, each one focuses on a leading researcher and their topic of expertise. There is a new chapter on Genes and Molecules of Cognition, and all other chapters have been thoroughly revised, based on the most recent discoveries. New edition of a very successful textbookCompletely revisednbsp,to reflect new advances, and feedback from adopters and studentsIncludes a new chapter on Genes and Molecules of CognitionStudent Solutions available athttp://www.baars-gage.com/For Teachers:Rapid adoption and course preparation:A wide array of instructor support materials are available online including PowerPoint lecture slides, a test bank with answers, and eFlashcords on key concepts for each chapter. A textbook with an easy-to-understand thematic approach:in a way that is clear for students from a variety of academic backgrounds, the text introduces concepts such as working memory, selective attention, and social cognition.A step-by-step guide for introducing students to brain anatomy: color graphics have been carefully selected to illustrate all points and the research explained. Beautifully clear artist's drawings are used to 'build a brain' from top to bottom, simplifying the layout of the brain.For students:An easy-to-read, complete introduction to mind-brain science:all chapters begin from mind-brain functions and build a coherent picture of their brain basis. A single, widely accepted functional framework is used to capture the major phenomena. Learning Aidsinclude a student support site with study guides and exercises, a new Mini-Atlas of the Brainand a full Glossary of technical terms and their definitions.Richly illustrated with hundreds of carefully selected color graphics to enhance understanding.
2009
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(2009): Automatic nonverbal analysis of social interaction in small groups. A review. In: Image and Vision Computing 27 (12), S. 1775-1787. DOI: 10.1016/j.imavis.2009.01.004
Abstract: An increasing awareness of the scientific and technological value of the automatic understanding of face-to-face social interaction has motivated in the past few years a surge of interest in the devising of computational techniques for conversational analysis. As an alternative to existing linguistic approaches for the automatic analysis of conversations, a relatively recent domain is using findings in social cognition, social psychology, and communication that have established the key role that nonverbal communication plays in the formation, maintenance, and evolution of a number of fundamental social constructs, which emerge from face-to-face interactions in time scales that range from short glimpses all the way to long-term encounters. Small group conversations are a specific case on which much of this work has been conducted. This paper reviews the existing literature on automatic analysis of small group conversations using nonverbal communication, and aims at bridging the current fragmentation of the work in this domain, currently split among half a dozen technical communities. The review is organized around the main themes studied in the literature and discusses, in a comparative fashion, about 100 works addressing problems related to the computational modeling of interaction management, internal states, personality traits, and social relationships in small group conversations, along with pointers to the relevant literature in social science. Some of the many open challenges and opportunities in this domain are also discussed.
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(2009): The Face of Need. Facial Emotion Expression on Charity Advertisements. In: Journal of Marketing Research 46 (6), S. 777-787. DOI: 10.1509/jmkr.46.6.777
Abstract: Advertisements for charities often display photographs of the people they help to evoke the kind of sympathy that engenders giving. This article examines how the expression of emotion on a victim's face affects both sympathy and giving. Building on theories of emotional contagion and sympathy, the authors propose that (1) people "catch" the emotions displayed on a victim's face and (2) they are particularly sympathetic and likely to donate when they see sad expressions versus happy or neutral expressions. Consistent with emotional contagion, participants felt sadder when viewing a sad-faced victim, and their own sadness mediated the effect of emotion expression on sympathy. Contagion effects are automatic and noninferential, but they are diminished by deliberative thought. The authors discuss the implications of using subtle emotional expressions on charitable and other marketing appeals.
2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung 2006
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(2006): The influence of emotion recognition and emotion regulation on intercultural adjustment. In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS 30 (3), S. 345-363. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.08.006
Abstract: Previous studies have consistently shown emotion regulation to be an important predictor of intercultural adjustment. Emotional intelligence theory suggests that before people can regulate emotions they need to recognize them; thus emotion recognition ability should also predict intercultural adjustment. The present study tested this hypothesis in international students at three times during the school year. Recognition of anger and emotion regulation predicted positive adjustment; recognition of contempt, fear and sadness predicted negative adjustment. Emotion regulation did not mediate the relationship between emotion recognition and adjustment, and recognition and regulation jointly predicted adjustment. These results suggest recognition of specific emotions may have special functions in intercultural adjustment, and that emotion recognition and emotion regulation play independent roles in adjustment.
2005
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(2005): Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, and Linguistic Politeness. In: Journal of Politeness Research. Language, Behaviour, Culture 1 (1), S. 73-93. DOI: 10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.73
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.73 Abstract: Politeness can be viewed as a theoretical construct existing at the intersection of cultural, social, cognitive, and linguistic processes. Because of this, an understanding of politeness requires an understanding of its social-cognitive underpinnings, and conversely, an understanding of many social-cognitive phenomena can be improved by considering the role played by politeness in those processes. In this article I review research on the social-cognitive underpinnings of politeness, focusing particularly on the concepts of face and face-work and the relationship between linguistic politeness and several social-cognitive variables. I also discuss the relevance of politeness phenomena for several research areas in social and cognitive psychology, including person perception and impression management, cross-cultural communication, and language comprehension.
2003
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(2003): Entschuldigen, Rechtfertigen und die Verletzung sozialer Normen. Teilw. zugl.: Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Geistes-, Sozial- und Erziehungswissenschaften, Diss., 2002 u.d.T.: Fritsche, Immo: Die Verhaltensrelevanz von Rechenschaftslegung. 1. Aufl.. Weinheim: Beltz (Psychologie - Forschung - aktuell)Keywords: Entschuldigen, Neutralisation, norm, Normen, Normlosigkeit, normwidriges Verhalten, Psychologie, Psychology, Social, Rechenschaft, Rechenschaftsforschung, rechtfertigen, Social Behavior Disorders, soziale Kognition, Soziale Normen, Sozialpsychologie, Sozialverhalten, umweltpsychologie, Umweltschaden