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Treffer: 4
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  • 2006

  • Bierhoff, Hans-Werner; Rohmann, Elke (2006): Conditions for Establishing a System of Fairness. Comment on Brosnan (2006). In: Social Justice Research 19 (2), S. 194-200. DOI: 10.1007/s11211-006-0001-0

    DOI: http://www.springerlink.com/content/1573-6725/ 

    Abstract: Comments on an article by S. Brosnan (same issue) on reactions to inequity among nonhuman species, which are assumed to mirror human response tendencies summarized as inequity aversion. Suggestions made by Brosnan concerning the continuity between humans and nonhuman species in cooperative behavior as well as the evolutionary processes that lead to the formation of a sense of equity are elaborated from a social-psychological perspective. The evolutionary process described as a four-step model may also be used to explain intervention process when equity is violated. The remarkable similarity between animals and humans in their sense of fairness is considered a confirmation of the assumed closeness of humans to their evolutionary ancestors.

  • 2004

  • Dautenhahn, Kerstin (2004) : Socially Intelligent Agents in Human Primate Culture In: Payr, Sabine; Trappl, Robert (Hg.): Agent culture: Human-agent interaction in a multicultural world: Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, S. 45-71

    Abstract: This chapter discusses socially intelligent agents (SIA) in the context of human culture. The first part of the chapter provides an introduction to SIA research and focuses on the issue of realism versus believability- namely, to what extent SIAs need to imitate behavior and appearance of humans. The lifelike agents hypothesis is analyzed in particular from the perspective of social robots. I give examples showing that with respect to realism less might be more. Mori’s ’uncanny valley’ analysis of believable robots is explained. It is shown that the issue of believability is particularly crucial for technology whose purpose is to change the behavior, attitudes, beliefs (or, more generally, minds) of humans, as it is the case for SIAs. Therefore, SIAs fall under the category of technology called persuasive technology. The second part of the chapter addresses primate cultures, their phylogenetic origins, and how human culture is grounded in and shaped by cognitive capacities that the human species have evolved. I suggest that these cognitive capacities are important to consider in the design of SIAs. The chapter concludes by discussing the possible role of SIAs in the evolution of human cultures. I argue that SIAs can play a role in preserving cultural diversity-a huge technological challenge, but a possibility to make SIA technology more humane by acknowledging the individual and cultural roots of people, rather than treating them as an increasingly homogeneous group of users. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

  • 1997

  • Goody, Esther N. (1997) : Social intelligence and language. Another Rubicon? In: Whiten, Andrew; Byrne, Richard W.; Whiten, Andrew (Ed); Byrne, Richard W. (Ed) (Hg.): Machiavellian intelligence II: Extensions and evaluations: New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press, S. 364-396

    Abstract: This chapter begins by looking briefly at the evolutionary trajectory from apes to Homo sapiens sapiens. It suggests that a gradually emerging proto-language among early hominids would have progressively augmented ape social intelligence in several ways: language itself would have to be incorporated in cognitive representations of own and others' intentions; language permits more effective classification and storage of information, and thus more effective use of memory; language-in-use is a powerful tool for the co-operative construction of meaning; language-in-use is a new sort of tool for co-operation between individuals; and language is a tool for construction socio-cultural devices for co-operation among members of a community. It is suggested that early proto-language, and subsequent increasingly complex forms of spoken language, should be thought of as a new sort of tool for thinking with and for acting with. The emergence of spoken language would have provided a new tool for co-operation at the same time that it can only be used through co-operation. Where ape Machiavellian intelligence seeks to outwit others, social intelligence built on language must achieve a framework for co-operation if conversational meanings are to be understood. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

  • Kummer, Hans; Daston, Lorraine; Gigerenzer, Gerd; Silk, Joan B. (1997) : The social intelligence hypothesis In: Weingart, Peter; Mitchell, Sandra D.; Richerson, Peter J.; Maasen, Sabine (Hg.): Human by nature. Between biology and the social sciences: Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, S. 157-179

    Abstract: Examines the different components of the social intelligence hypothesis (SIH), which states that the natural intelligence of primates (including humans) originated in the social domain. A working definition of primate intelligence is formulated. A comparison is made between the complexity of social environments and that of ecological ones. Special character traits of primate sociality are described. Preliminary evidence in support of the SIH is discussed. Regarding the question of whether primates are more intelligent in the social domain than in other domains, the following issues are discussed: (1) individuation of group members, (2) combinatorial prediction and action in polyadic encounters, (3) the complexity of physical vs social tools, and (4) the ability to develop a theory of mind. Various selective pressures in primates are described. Examples of traces of social intelligence in ecological intelligence are pointed out. Some suggestions are provided regarding possible methods for testing the SIH.

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