Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018) : Implicit moral cognition. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 516-524
Abstract: What is the best method for understanding moral judgment? We use implicit measurement and mathematical modeling to capture implicit moral evaluations, because this method can address debates over the role of intuition and reason in moral judgment and over domain-general versus domain-specific views of moral psychology. A man kicks a puppy as hard as he can. A son slaps his mother across the face. A soldier betrays his unit. A terrorist defiles a temple. These actions all seem like moral transgressions. And before you deliberate about why they are wrong—that is, what principles do they violate—you probably have an immediate gut reaction: 'That is wrong!' If you don’t have that reaction, that is important for us and everyone else to know, because it might mean you have fewer inhibitions about engaging in such behaviors. And you might know what the 'appropriate' reaction is supposed to look like, so it’s important to find a way to reliably assess your gut reactions b efore yo u can edit your responses. In this chapter, we discuss a new approach to measuring moral intuitions that draws upon advances in implicit social cognition and mathematical modeling. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Fairness, fast and slow. A review of dual process models of fairness. In: Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, S. 49-60. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.02.016
Abstract: Fairness, the notion that people deserve or have rights to certain resources or kinds of treatment, is a fundamental dimension of moral cognition. Drawing on recent evidence from economics, psychology, and neuroscience, we ask whether self-interest is always intuitive, requiring self-control to override with reasoning-based fairness concerns, or whether fairness itself can be intuitive. While we find strong support for rejecting the notion that self-interest is always intuitive, the literature has reached conflicting conclusions about the neurocognitive systems underpinning fairness. We propose that this disagreement can largely be resolved in light of an extended Social Heuristics Hypothesis. Divergent findings may be attributed to the interpretation of behavioral effects of ego depletion or neurostimulation, reverse inference from brain activity to the underlying psychological process, and insensitivity to social context and inter-individual differences. To better dissect the neurobiological basis of fairness, we outline how future research should embrace cross-disciplinary methods that combine psychological manipulations with neuroimaging, and that can probe inter-individual, and cultural heterogeneities.
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(2018): The Influence of Media Exposure on the Accessibility of Moral Intuitions and Associated Affect. In: Journal of Media Psychology 30 (2), S. 79-90. DOI: 10.1027/1864-1105/a000183
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000183 Abstract: The model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME) predicts that media content can increase the accessibility of preconscious moral intuitions, which shape subsequent moral decision making. To date, attempts to demonstrate evidence of this intuitive, preconscious process with self-report measures have met with little success. The current paper presents results from a study designed to test the MIME’s predictions, measuring the accessibility of moral intuitions with a moral foundations–affect misattribution procedure (MF-AMP) argued in the current paper to be more capable of detecting the aforementioned effect. An experiment manipulated exposure to media content that focused on care and fairness to test the proposition that media content can increase the accessibility of these moral intuitions. The findings offer preliminary evidence supporting the MIME’s proposition that media content featuring behaviors relevant to specific moral intuitions can increase (temporar ily at l east) the accessibility of those specific moral intuitions in the audiences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 6
Keywords: Intuition, Media Exposure, Medien, MODELS, Moral, Morality, Social Influences, Test Construction 2017
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(2017): Moral vindications. In: Cognition 167, S. 124-134. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.005
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28545629 Abstract: Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions.
2014
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(2014): Transfer effects between moral dilemmas. A causal model theory. In: Cognition 131 (1), S. 28-43. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24440432 Abstract: Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory's key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented. zitiert von: 40
2012
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(2012): Building bridges across cognitive sciences across the world. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, Tex.: Cognitive Science Soc. Online verfügbar unter https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2012/papers/0145/paper0145.pdf
Abstract: People seamlessly generate moral intuitions about a wide range of events they observe, but to date the cognitive processes underlying this competency are poorly understood. We propose that our moral intuitions are grounded in force-dynamic intuitions. We show how the evaluation of entities engaged in schematized interactions can be predicted from specific force-dynamic properties of those interactions, and we point out how these evaluative tendencies relate to our moral norm of not interfering with others' interests. zitiert von: 6
2011
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(2011): Mapping the moral domain. In: Journal of personality and social psychology 101 (2), S. 366-385. DOI: 10.1037/a0021847
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847 Abstract: The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.
2010
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(2010): Die Struktur der moralischen Orientierung. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven - Deliberation und Intuition in moralischen Entscheidungen und Urteilen. Wien; Zürich; Berlin; Münster: Lit (Ethik interdisziplinär)
Abstract: Die Frage, was Moral ist und aus welchen Quellen sich die moralische Orientierung speist, wurde in den letzten Jahren über die Ethik hinaus zunehmend Gegenstand auch empirischer Forschung. Deren Ergebnisse kritisch zu sichten und in ein Gespräch zu bringen, ist das Ziel des vorliegenden Bandes. Neben Beiträgen aus genuin ethischer Perspektive (J. Fischer; P. Schaber; A. Hügli) vereint er Einblicke aus neuro- und verhaltensbiologischer (M. Christen; C. van Schaik / C. Rudolf v. Rohr), entwicklungspsychologischer (M. Keller/J.-C. Heilinger) und religionspädagogischer Perspektive (Th. Schlag). Die Rolle von rationaler Deliberation und emotional gefärbter Intuition in moralischen Entscheidungssituation wird erörtert. Zunächst wird konstatiert, dass derzeit weder in der Psychologie noch in den Neurowissenschaften eine haltbare Konzeption vorliegt, die beiden Polen moralischer Entscheidungsfindung - Rationalität und Emotionalität - angemessen Rechnung trägt. Unter Einbeziehung einer ontogenetischen Entwicklungsperspektive wird dann das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Emotionalität im moralischen Urteilen zu klären versucht. Dabei werden zunächst einige Grundannahmen des kognitiven Ansatzes skizziert, die Frage der moralischen Motive in diesem Ansatz reflektiert und alternative Theorien angesprochen, die versucht haben, das Problem der moralischen Emotion und Motivation zu klären. Anschließend werden die intuitionistischen Kritiker als neueste Variante emotivistischer Positionen dargestellt und ausführlich diskutiert. Abschließend wird auf die Notwendigkeit einer beide Pole umfassenden Theorie hingewiesen. zitiert von: 2
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