Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Artificial agents among us. Should we recognize them as agents proper?. In: Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1), S. 1-17. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-016-9411-3
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently, as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other-this despite the fact that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and hence as a bearer of rights.
Keywords: agency, Anerkennung, Anerkennung technischer Systeme, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Artificial agent, artificial agents, doppelter Treffer, Favoriten, Group agent, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, RATIONALITY, Realtechnik, recognition and self, responsibility, Rights, Serviceroboter, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Robotik, Technik 2012
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(2012): Technology as Skill and Activity. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (3), S. 208-230. DOI: 10.5840/techne201216315
Abstract: Can we conceive of a philosophy of technology that is not technophobic, yet takes seriously the problem of alienation and human meaning-giving? This paperretrieves the concern with alienation, but brings it into dialogue with more recent philosophy of technology. It defines and responds to the problem of alienation in a way that avoids both old-style human-centered approaches and contemporary thingcentered or hybridity approaches. In contrast to the latter, it proposes to reconcile subject and object not at the ontic level but at the ontological, transcendental level and at the level of skilled activity. Taking inspiration from Dreyfus’s reading of Heidegger and engaging critically with the work of Borgmann and Arendt, it explores a phenomenology and ethics of skill. It is concluded that new and emerging technologies must be evaluated not only as artifacts and their consequences, but also in terms of the skills and activities they involve and require. Do they promote engagement with the world and with others, thus making us into better persons?
Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Entfremdung, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Phänomenologie, Philosophie, Reflexionen über MTR, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik, Technikphilosophie, Zeitschrift: techne -
(2012): Democracy, Narcissism, and the World Wide Web. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (3), S. 252-274. DOI: 10.5840/techne201216317
Abstract: Against a thinker like Martin Heidegger who takes restraints on individual freedom and the promotion of authoritarianism as implicit features in the ongoing development of technology, Andrew Feenberg argues for a “democratic rationalization” of modern technology whereby people effectively choose their own futures, not in spite of their tools, but increasingly because of them. Acknowledging the Web’s democratic potential, I believe that a new threat—far different from authoritarian regimes or structures—has emerged: a rampant and multifarious narcissism that threatens to drown democratic ideals in a wave of self-obsession and self-promotion.
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(2012): The Story of my (Second) Life. Virtual Worlds and Narrative Identity. In: Philosophy & Technology 25 (3), S. 329-343. DOI: 10.1007/s13347-012-0062-y
Abstract: A small but significant number of residents of Second Life (SL) insist that SL is as real to them as Real Life (RL) and that their SL avatars are as much themselves as their offscreen selves. This paper investigates whether this claim can be literally true in any philosophically interesting way. Using a narrative account of personal identity I argue that there is a way of understanding these identity claims according to which the actions and experiences of the offscreen user and the online avatar are indeed actions and experiences of a single person. In the course of describing how this is so, the paper also uncovers new insights into how a narrative approach to personal identity should be structured and developed.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Favoriten, Identität, Informations- & Kommunikationstechnik, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Narrative Online identity, Narrative Online-Identität, Online, Personal identity, Realtechnik, Second Life, Selbst, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik, Virtual Life, Virtual worlds, Zeitschrift: Philosophy and Technology
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