Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Let’s Pretend!. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 75-97. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271925
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2014
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(2014): Collective Actors without Collective Minds. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1), S. 3-25. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113520397
2011
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(2011): Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3), S. 323-355. DOI: 10.1177/0048393111399100
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