Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Li Zehou's notion of subjectality as a new conception of the human self. In: Philosophy Compass 13 (5). DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12484
Abstract: Li Zehou stands among the most influential Chinese philosophers in the post-Mao era. His notion of subjectality(zhutixing) is of paramount importance for current developments in contemporary Chinese philosophy. It belongs to the central concepts in Li's theoretical framework, around which his entire philosophical system is constructed. With his elaboration of this concept, Li expanded the problem of the self in post-revolutionary modernism. The present article analyzes the theoretical bases of this concept, exposes its importance in the scope of contemporary Chinese theory and shows why and how it represents a call for a new humanism. Through a multidimensional comparative perspective, the author also explains why the human subject, which is based upon Li's notion of subjectality, has the potential not only to transform (post-)modern alienation into a real human condition, that is, into spiritually fulfilled society of autonomous individuals but also to fill up the prevailing vacuum of values.
2017
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(2017): To be or Not to be Authentic. In Defence of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3), S. 567-580. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9803-4
Abstract: It has recently been pointed out that the cloudiness of the concept of authenticity as well as inflated ideologies of the 'true self' provide good reasons to criticize theories and ideals of authenticity. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to defend an ethical ideal of authenticity, not least because of its critical and oppositional force, which is directed against experiences of self-abandonment and self-alienation. I will argue for an elaborated ethical ideal of authenticity: the ambitious ideal of a continuous self-reflective process of 'self-authentication'. For this purpose, the ideal of being authentic in expressing and unfolding one's individual personality and characteristics will be combined with the ideal of being 'an authentic person' - whereby 'a person' is to be understood in a Kantian sense as an autonomous person who is (at least potentially) reasonable and morally responsible.
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(2017): On recognition and self. A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. In: Asian Philosophy 27 (4), S. 292-308. DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (tman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyyikas and Mm?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ntaraksita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
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(2017): Monologic versus Dialogic Distinctions of Selves. In: CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONS (13/1), S. 18-21
Abstract: This commentary contrasts the monologic accounts of self-reference pursued in Kauffman's target article with natural language notions of referring to one's self, drawing distinctions, and constructing identities collaboratively. It suggests that mathematical calculi, which assume the perspective of observers, are fundamentally incapable of accounting for how the selves of interactively involved participants in social systems come to be. It questions the claim that a mathematical notion of "self" can shed light on the being of humans and argues for dialogical distinctions of identities. Finally, it suggests that publishing and enacting monological conceptions of selves can have undesirable social consequences.
Keywords: Beobachter, Beobachterperspektive, Disziplin, Identität, Identitätsstiftung, Incalculability of the self, Kauffmann, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Monolog, natürliche Sprache, Philosophie, Selbst, Selbstreferenz, Self Concept, Dialog, social systems, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Konsequenzen, Soziale Systeme, Systemtheorie -
(2017): Recovering a "Disfigured" Face. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21 (1), S. 1-23. DOI: 10.5840/techne2016121659
Abstract: Prosthetic devices that replace an absent body part are generally considered to be either cosmetic or functional. Functional prostheses aim to restore (some degree of) lost physical functioning. Cosmetic prostheses attempt to restore a “normal” appearance to bodies that lack (one or more) limbs by emulating the absent body part’s looks. In this article, we investigate how cosmetic prostheses establish a normal appearance by drawing on the stories of the users of a specific type of artificial limb: the facial prosthesis. Given that prostheses are first and foremost devices worn upon the body, such an analysis requires an understanding of the ways in which bodies and technologies interact. We thus interpret users’ stories by critically engaging with the work of disability researcher and Actor-Network theorist Myriam Winance, as well as with the postphenomenological scholarship of Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek. Using this framework, we explore users’ attempts to achieve a proper fit between their faces and their prostheses, the technological transparency such a fit enables, and the ways in which transparency mediates users’ everyday exchanges with others. We conclude that a normal appearance, when it is achieved by means of prosthetics, enables the device’s user to navigate a precarious social environment as they encounter and interact with others in public.
Keywords: Akzeptanz der äußeren Erscheinung in prekären sozialen Begegnungen in der Öffentlichkeit, Anblick, Human Enhancement Technologies, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), normales Erscheinungsbild, Philosophie, Prothesen, Realtechnik, Selbst, Technik, Technikphilosophie, Technologie, Technologische Konstruktion, Visuelle Wahrnehmung, Zeitschrift: techne -
(2017): “Extimate” Technologies and Techno-Cultural Discontent. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21 (1), S. 24-54. DOI: 10.5840/techne20174560
Abstract: According to a chorus of authors, the human life-world is currently invaded by an avalanche of high-tech devices referred to as “emerging,” ”intimate,” or ”NBIC” technologies: a new type of contrivances or gadgets designed to optimize cognitive or sensory performance and / or to enable mood management. Rather than manipulating objects in the outside world, they are designed to influence human bodies and brains more directly, and on a molecular scale. In this paper, these devices will be framed as ‘extimate’ technologies (both intimate and external; both embedded and foreign; both life-enhancing and intrusive), a concept borrowed from Jacques Lacan. Although Lacan is not commonly regarded as a philosopher of technology, the dialectical relationship between human desire and technological artefacts runs as an important thread through his work. Moreover, he was remarkably prescient concerning the blending of life science and computer science, which is such a distinctive feature of the current techno-scientific turn. Building on a series of Lacanian concepts, my aim is to develop a psychoanalytical diagnostic of the technological present. Finally, I will indicate how such an analysis may inform our understanding of human life and embodiment as such.
2016
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(2016): Self-Identification and Alienation. In: The Sociological Quarterly 7 (3), S. 255-264. DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1966.tb01692.x
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(2016): Grounding the Postmodern Self. In: The Sociological Quarterly 35 (4), S. 685-703. DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1994.tb00423.x
Abstract: In postmodern discourse, self is displaced as a central presence in experience and reappropriated as yet another personal signifier. This paper describes key postmodern views, then reframes postmodern vocabulary in terms of interpretive practice. It argues that the postmodern framing of self is too abstract and that a distinctly modern discourse focused on the deprivatization of interpretive activity can account empirically for features of postmodern ''presence.'' Comparative ethnographic and narrative material is offered in illustration. We conclude by suggesting how self can be retrieved for classical sociological commentary and research.
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(2016): Diagnosing the Selfie. Pathology or Parody?: Networking the Spectacle in Late Capitalism. In: THIRD TEXT 30 (3-4), S. 264-273
Abstract: Social networking sites are now reportedly flooded with millions of selfies, the purportedly narcissistic tendency to reproduce with webcams and smartphones self-images intended for widespread online dissemination. Like the chain-letter craze of yesteryears, selfies have become fast reduplicating memes targeted at no single destination and orbited in digital space as self-identities transformed into virtual signs. Psychological interpretations cast them as pathological manifestations of low self-esteem and attention-seeking behaviour, perhaps even a form of psychosis. However, defenders attempt to demonstrate selfie circulation as a reality sui generis with its own codes of communication and decorum that may even suggest the formation of new digital communities. However, this defence neglects the question of selfies as spectacles in network culture coinciding with the growth of surveillance practices. Intensification of spectacles aided by the spread of new media technologies may be seen as favouring an interpretation of selfies as reflecting the power of network memes rather than a pathological manifestation of narcissism.
Keywords: Datenschutz & Privatssphäre, decorum, doppelter Treffer, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Informations- & Kommunikationstechnik, Interaktion, Medienwissenschaft, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), narcissism, network meme, Parodie, Pathologie, Postkasten, Privacy and data, Psychologie, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Selfies, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Social Network, Social Network Einfluss, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Netzwerke, surveillance, Technik, Überwachung -
(2016): "Before you even know ..." - Big Data und die Erkennbarkeit des Selbst. In: IRIE - International Review of Information Ethics 24 (5), S. 44-54
Abstract: Der Big Data - Technologie wird das Potenzial zugeschrieben, durch Mustererkennung in aggregierten Daten Verhaltensweisen von Personen zu prognostizieren, noch bevor diese intendiert und reflektiert würden. Zumeist widmet sich die Big Data Debatte daher den Befürchtungen möglicher Einbußen von Privatheit und Freiheit. In unserem Beitrag wählen wir jedoch einen anderen Zugriff und fragen, inwiefern die Big Data Visionen das Selbstsein betreffen, also das Konzept davon, wer ich selbst eigentlich bin. Wenn Selbstsein, Martin Heidegger zufolge, eigentlich bedeutet, in kritischer Distanz zu vorgegebenen Möglichkeiten zu leben, stellt sich die Frage, welches Kriterium hier eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit gewährleistet: Wie kann ich wissen, echt ich selbst zu sein, ohne nur wiederum andere Üblichkeiten nachzuahmen? Wir fragen daher, ob die Big Data Technologie subjektive Verzerrungen und Täuschungen über das Selbst ausschalten könnte. Hierfür wird der Begriff „Selbstsein“ bei Heidegger erarbeitet. Dabei lässt sich allerdings zeigen, dass dieser letztlich ohne Trennschärfe bleibt, da die nur negative Charakterisierung von eigentlichem Selbstsein, Heidegger zufolge, echt oder unecht ausgestaltet sein kann – der aus der Möglichkeit echter oder unechter Selbsterzählung resultierende Relativismus wurde bisher nicht hinreichend beachtet. Big Data k ann zwar uneigentliche Erzählmuster vermeiden, nicht aber uneigentliches oder eigentliches Verhalten differenzieren; ob ich z.B. manches – unecht eigentlich – aus Trotz oder Kalkül gegen mein eigenes Selbstverständnis tat, bleibt verborgen. Fazit: Es muss entweder ein Kriterium für echtes Eigentlichsein entwickelt oder der Anspruch, darüber Auskunft zu geben, verworfen werden – bei Heidegger und Big Data. Verzichtet man jedoch auf die Idee einer (echten) Eigentlichkeit verzichtet man auf den Begriff des Sel bst.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Big Data, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Favoriten, Heidegger, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Realtechnik, Philosophie, recognition and self, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Selbst und Eigentlichkeit (Heidegger), Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Technik -
(2016): Information Privacy and Social Self-Authorship. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 20 (3), S. 216-239. DOI: 10.5840/techne201671548
Abstract: The dominant approach in privacy theory defines information privacy as some form of control over personal information. In this essay, I argue that the control approach is mistaken, but for different reasons than those offered by its other critics. I claim that information privacy involves the drawing of epistemic boundaries—boundaries between what others should and shouldn’t know about us. While controlling what information others have about us is one strategy we use to draw such boundaries, it is not the only one. We conceal information about ourselves and we reveal it. And since the meaning of information is not self-evident, we also work to shape how others contextualize and interpret the information that they have about us. Information privacy is thus about more than controlling information; it involves the constant work of producing and managing public identities, what I call “social self-authorship.” In the second part of the essay, I argue that thinking about information privacy in these terms reveals threats to privacy that the control approach neglects. Namely, information technology makes social self-authorship invisible and unnecessary by making it difficult for us to know when others are forming impressions about us and by providing others with tools for making assumptions about who we are which obviate the need for our involvement in the process.
2015
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(2015): The Technological Construction of the Self. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 19 (2), S. 211-232. DOI: 10.5840/techne20159936
Abstract: This paper aims at constructing the ontological and epistemological background for a methodology to be applied in Techno-Anthropological reflection and practice. The background is constructed as a patchwork, where structuralism, constructivism and post-phenomenology are woven together in order to support Techno-Anthropological reflection and practice in relation to the construction of the self through and with technology. The paper will specifically address what has been named the morality of things, primarily by Jacques Ellul, Hans Jonas, Michel Foucault and Peter-Paul Verbeek. It is the intent of this paper to point out a direction for an appropriate and value-based Techno-Anthropology. This direction is represented by a codex that here has been coined as the 7 ‘E’s: engagement, empathy, embodiment, enactment, enhancement, empowerment, and emancipation. The paper will conclude by showing how these are connected within a Techno-Anthropological perspective.
2013
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(2013): Introduction. Face, identity and im/politeness. Looking backward, moving forward: From Goffman to practice theory. In: Journal of Politeness Research 9 (1), S. 1-33. DOI: 10.1515/pr-2013-0001
Abstract: The field of linguistic politeness has of late experienced a renewed interest in conceptualizations of one of its core concepts, face. Since the publication of Brown and Levinson’s formative paper in 1978 and the subsequent application of its tenets, politeness scholars, mainly Asian and non-Anglo, have raised concerns regarding the suitability of Brown and Levinson’s conceptualization of face to their respective cultures (Wierzbicka 1985; Matsumoto 1988; Ide 1989; Gu 1990; Nwoye 1992; Mao 1994). Different options were put forth to solve what was seen by many as a fundamental flaw of the model, from culture-specific reconceptualizations (Sifianou 1992; Strecker 1993; Bravo 1999) to elaborations (O’Driscoll 1996; Terkourafi 2008) or simplifications (Bousfield 2008). Some (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003; Locher and Watts 2005), have argued for a return to the Goffmanian essence of face. Yet, others, Arundale (2006, 2009, 2010), have posited new approaches to face inspired by more current models of communication based on the dyad and on social constructionist premises or have come up with discursive accounts of face (O’Driscoll 2011, Sifianou 2011). Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus that to come to grips with an understanding of face, it has to be studied on its own right, aside from politeness (Bargiela Chiappini and Haugh 2009; Haugh and Bargiela-Chiappini 2010). This renewed interest in face has coincided with the advent, albeit with some delay, of the discursive turn within politeness scholarship. The discursive turn refers to the strong trend that emerged toward the end of the 20th century to reconfigure the subject as something socio-cultural and socio-historical: an unfinished product of discourse (Benwell and Stokoe 2006). Its impact on im/politeness scholarship has been manifold. Among the many effects, it has had important repercussions for the relationship between face and identity, the focus of this special issue.
2012
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(2012): Web 2.0 Technologies of the Self. In: Philosophy & Technology 25 (3), S. 399-413. DOI: 10.1007/s13347-011-0032-9
Abstract: Although no scholarly consensus exists on the issue, the claim that a substantive reconfiguration of the Internet has occurred in the beginning of the 2000s has settled firmly in public common sense. The label tentatively chosen for the new turn in the medium’s evolution is Web 2.0. The developments constituting this turn have been contemplated from different perspectives in technical and business publications (O’Reilly 2005), in treatises on “convergence” or “participatory” culture (Jenkins 2006; Jenkins et al. 2009), and could be usefully interrogated by means of political economy concepts such as the “social factory” and “free labor” (Terranova 2004). Marked, or rather symbolically constructed, by these discursive pickets lies a field of practice that the members of the participatory culture, the “produsers” (Bruns 2008) of open journalism, blogs, social networking sites and other characteristic Web 2.0 applications inhabit and animate with their everyday thought, decision making and action. This paper undertakes a theoretical exploration of the user practices emerging and consolidating around the new technological and organizational models making up Web 2.0. It is informed by a qualitative study of bloggers and Facebook users conducted through focus group methodology, although the concrete empirical data are not presented here. Rather, the analysis employs the concept of “technologies of the self” by Foucault (1988) as a heuristic device in order to situate Web 2.0 use, first, in a long history of culturally evolved forms of self-constitution and, second, in a complex matrix of relationships with other types of technologies, namely, those of production, sign systems and power. This conceptual choice, we argue, furnishes a study of Web 2.0 use, which holds in balance its liberatory potential and its susceptibility to new forms of domination, rationalization and commodification.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Art des Kommunikationsmediums, Blogs, critical Theory, Disziplin, Foucault, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophie, (post)strukturalistische Ansätze, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Social networking sites, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Technologies of the self, Web 2.0, Zeitschrift: Philosophy and Technology -
(2012): The Story of my (Second) Life. Virtual Worlds and Narrative Identity. In: Philosophy & Technology 25 (3), S. 329-343. DOI: 10.1007/s13347-012-0062-y
Abstract: A small but significant number of residents of Second Life (SL) insist that SL is as real to them as Real Life (RL) and that their SL avatars are as much themselves as their offscreen selves. This paper investigates whether this claim can be literally true in any philosophically interesting way. Using a narrative account of personal identity I argue that there is a way of understanding these identity claims according to which the actions and experiences of the offscreen user and the online avatar are indeed actions and experiences of a single person. In the course of describing how this is so, the paper also uncovers new insights into how a narrative approach to personal identity should be structured and developed.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Favoriten, Identität, Informations- & Kommunikationstechnik, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Narrative Online identity, Narrative Online-Identität, Online, Personal identity, Realtechnik, Second Life, Selbst, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik, Virtual Life, Virtual worlds, Zeitschrift: Philosophy and Technology -
(2012): The Post-Modern Self. A Retrospective. In: Society 49 (4), S. 328-332. DOI: 10.1007/s12115-012-9556-6
Abstract: This paper examines the idea that the self is now post-modern, meaning fragmented, fluid, boundaryless, defenseless and lacking identity. This idea was popular a while back, but it now looks faddish and out-dated. The pomo self theorists over-emphasized some things and under-emphasized others, i.e. they engaged in the fallacy of reduction. They mistook minor changes in the self for major ones. They overlooked the power of the primary group. And they under-rated the self's defenses, especially inner speech as a device for protecting the self and agency as a weapon for managing one's environment.
2009
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(2009): Impoliteness and identity in the American news media. The “Culture Wars”. In: Journal of Politeness Research. Language, Behaviour, Culture 5 (2). DOI: 10.1515/JPLR.2009.014
Abstract: This paper argues that identity theory can be a useful analytical tool for the scholar of relational work (Locher and Watts 2005). By focusing oil current news interviews broadcast in the USA, it shows how impoliteness is inextricably linked to the (co) construction of the identity of the hosts, the guests and the audience of an emergent "new" news genre; news as confrontation (Garces-Conejos Blitvich 2007, forthcoming). Impoliteness is defined as a negative identity practice (Bucholtz 1999) used by the hosts to position themselves within their own community of practice. Applying Anton and Peterson's (2003) model of subject positions, an alternative definition is proposed that posits that impoliteness - and confrontation - may ensue when there is a mismatch between self asserted subject positions, i. e., the positions we temporarily choose to assume, and other asserted subject positions, i. e., the positions that others impose on us. By challenging our self asserted subject positions, the view of the world that comes along with them is questioned as well. Impoliteness is also used to forge the collective identity of one of the factions, here identified with the target audience of shows included in the study, currently waging the "Culture Wars". This metaphor has long been used to claim that political conflict within the USA is due to a conflict between "traditional" and "progressive" values.
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(2009) : Dimensions of the postmodern self In: Denzin, Norman K.: Studies in symbolic interaction: Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited (Studies in symbolic interaction), S. 183-196
Abstract: In this essay I examine a variety of approaches to the contemporary postmodern self. I argue that this diverse literature may be analytically distinguished along two general lines. The first concerns institutional or structural claims regarding what a self "is'' or "is not.'' The second focuses instead on what a self "does'' or "does not do.'' I conclude by recommending a more comprehensive approach that takes into account the salience of both of these analytical dimensions in the contemporary debates over the postmodern self.
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(2009): Others in mind. Social origins of self-consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812484
Abstract: Introduction : main ideas -- Self-conscious species -- Six propositions -- Variety of self-reflective mind states -- Mind states in development -- Birth of self-consciousness -- Shame and self-knowledge -- Roots of guilt -- Giving and sharing -- Origins of owning and sharing -- Social construction of identity -- Conclusion : moral space and the self In this book, Philippe Rochat explores self-consciousness, how it originates and how it shapes our lives, arguably the most important and revealing of all psychological problems. Why are we so prone to guilt and embarrassment? Why do we care so much about how others see us, about our reputation? What are the origins of such afflictions? Rochat argues that it is because we are members of a species that evolved the unique propensity to reflect upon themselves as an object of thoughts; an object of thoughts that is potentially evaluated by others. Based on empirical observations, this is a book of ideas, tapping into both developmental and anthropological phenomena and guided by strong existential intuitions regarding the human condition. At the core of these intuitions, there is the idea that human psychic life is predominantly determined by what we imagine others perceive of us
Keywords: Aufmerksamkeit, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erklärung und Genese von Sozialität und Zwischenmenschlichkeit, Herkunft von Sozialität, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychologie, Selbst, Selbstbewusstsein, Self, Self / Social aspects, Self-consciousness (Sensitivity), Self-knowledge, Theory of, Social aspects -
(2009): A strange hand. On self-recognition and recognition of another. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3), S. 321-342. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9127-5
Abstract: This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl's account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty's later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one's "hereness" and "thereness". The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
Keywords: Anderkennung des Anderen, Anerkennung, Anerkennung des Selbst und des Anderen (Phänomenologie), Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Favoriten, Husserl, IDENTIFICATION, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Merleau-Ponty, Mirror image, Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Phänomenologie, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Recognition of another, Rubber hand illusion, Selbst, Selbst-Anerkennung, Self-recognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie 1999
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(1999): On becoming a person. In: Philosophical Psychology 12 (1), S. 79-98. DOI: 10.1080/095150899105945
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person.
1998
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(1998): Friendship and the Self. In: Ethics 108 (3), S. 502-527. DOI: 10.1086/233824
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