Alle Publikationen
2018
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(2018) : Implicit moral cognition. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 516-524
Abstract: What is the best method for understanding moral judgment? We use implicit measurement and mathematical modeling to capture implicit moral evaluations, because this method can address debates over the role of intuition and reason in moral judgment and over domain-general versus domain-specific views of moral psychology. A man kicks a puppy as hard as he can. A son slaps his mother across the face. A soldier betrays his unit. A terrorist defiles a temple. These actions all seem like moral transgressions. And before you deliberate about why they are wrong—that is, what principles do they violate—you probably have an immediate gut reaction: 'That is wrong!' If you don’t have that reaction, that is important for us and everyone else to know, because it might mean you have fewer inhibitions about engaging in such behaviors. And you might know what the 'appropriate' reaction is supposed to look like, so it’s important to find a way to reliably assess your gut reactions b efore yo u can edit your responses. In this chapter, we discuss a new approach to measuring moral intuitions that draws upon advances in implicit social cognition and mathematical modeling. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): The moral psychology of anger. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International (Moral psychology of the emotions)
Abstract: The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, the editors explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. This volume also examines the ways in which rage--anger's cousin--is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society and how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Anger, Emotions, Emotionsforschung, Moral, Morality, Philosophies, social psychology, Sozialpsychologie -
(2018): Keep calm and carry on (ethically). Durable moral courage in the workplace. In: Human Resource Management Review 28 (2), S. 116-130. DOI: 10.1016/j.hrmr.2017.05.011
Abstract: We develop a model of factors that enable morally courageous actors to carry on even after encountering organizational opposition. The model specifies that durable moral courage facilitates continued moral action and that demoralization inhibits it, and presents the perceived manageability of the organizational response as a factor affecting the extent to which an actor experiences durable moral courage and/or demoralization. It is proposed that moral efficacy, hardiness, and planning for endurance insulate the actor before an act of moral courage, by enhancing the perceived manageability of the organizational response; and that emotional self-regulation fortifies the actor by enhancing the perceived manageability of that response once it comes. It is also posited that moral efficacy and hardiness contribute directly to durable moral courage, hardiness and planning for endurance increase durable moral courage by promoting moral efficacy, and emotional self-regulation augments planning for endurance. Implications for research and practice are offered. zitiert von: 2
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(2018) : Moral coherence processes and denial of moral complexity. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: How do people deal with a morally complex and contradictory world? Moral judgment is an intuitive phenomenon, best understood as a process of implicit meaning making that often results in the denial of moral complexity and the shaping of descriptive beliefs to be consistent with prescriptive intuitions. Scholars have long recognized individuals’ tendency to mold seemingly contradictory information about their social world into a coherent whole. Moral judgment, we suggest, is no different, and in this chapter we explore how a desire for moral coherence can lead to the denial of moral complexity and encourage people to shape their descriptive understanding of the world to fit their prescriptive understanding of it. Moreover, we argue that people’s tendency to conflate moral and practical good plays a crucial role in exacerbating political conflict by leading individuals and groups with differing moral values to hold differing factual beliefs as well. (PsycINFO Database Record ( c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Moral dialogs. In: The Social Science Journal 55 (1), S. 6-18. DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2018.02.010
Abstract: Moral dialogs are social processes through which people form new shared moral understandings. They differ from reasoned deliberations because they are focused on values and not on facts, logic or reason. They differ from irrational passions because value statements require moral justifications. Such dialogs take place not just in families and communities, but often on national levels and sometimes even on transnational ones. They played a core role in major societal changes brought about by social movements, such as those that advanced civil rights, women's rights, and the protection of the environment. Most importantly, when successfully concluded, moral dialogs affect not just attitudes and values, but also voluntary behavior as well as laws. Although dialogs may differ greatly in their normative content, they have the same basic sociological format and follow the same basic ‘natural history.’ The article introduces the author's conception of what constitutes moral dialogs by drawing on available evidence, and provides a framework for additional research on the subject at hand. zitiert von: 20
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(2018): Moral Emotions Toward Others at Work and Implications for Employee Behavior. A Qualitative Analysis Using Critical Incidents. In: Journal of Business and Psychology 33 (1), S. 155-180. DOI: 10.1007/s10869-016-9484-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9484-3 Abstract: We propose a theoretical framework for and, via critical incidents, inductively investigate (a) the situations that trigger moral emotions toward others at work and (b) worker responses to these situations. Critical incidents were collected from a heterogeneous sample of 423 workers. Participants described an incident that caused each of four moral emotions (gratitude, anger, admiration, and contempt) and their response. Incidents and responses were coded, and frequencies, differences across the moral emotions, and associations between incidents and responses were analyzed. Several morally relevant situations at work were found to trigger the moral emotions. Participants responded in ways that had implications for their performance and their own well-being. The incidents largely align with moral foundations theory (Haidt and Graham in Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116, 2007). Responses also show evidence for social exchange, social learning, and rational expectancy-ba sed proc esses and behavior. The incidents specify several practices for managers and organizations to encourage and avoid. This was the first qualitative study of moral emotions at work and one of the few workplace studies to examine these emotions empirically. Several understudied factors and behavioral responses emerged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018) : Into the wild: Big data analytics in moral psychology. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 525-536, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: How can we investigate moral values in the real world? We propose that naturally generated linguistic data, such as social media content, can be used to study morality outside of the laboratory. Moral values are culturally variable entities that emerge from dynamic, hierarchical interactions between individual- and group level phenomena. Human-generated unstructured data from sources such as social media offer an unprecedented opportunity to observe these phenomena in a natural habitat, which is an essential vantage point for understanding moral values and their role in moral judgment and behavior. We believe it is vital that researchers supplement traditional methodologies with alternative approaches that have greater ecological and external validity and that are better able to capture the full social–functional range of morality. In this chapter, we argue that a range of computationally intensive methods, drawn predominantly from computer science and computational linguistics , can help researchers do just this. By mining psychologically relevant information from large-scale, human-generated, online data such as blog posts, news articles, tweets, Facebook status updates, and social network structures—collectively referred to as 'big data'—researchers can use these methods to investigate morally relevant phenomena in the real world. These methods enable researchers to investigate large-scale, diachronic moral phenomena such as the diffusion of moral values through populations and the moralization of specific topics. They also offer researchers new opportunities to investigate the relationship between moral values and moral behavior, which is both notoriously difficult to study in the laboratory and deeply important for understanding how morality functions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 2
Keywords: Data Mining, Medien, Interaktionsforschung, Moral, Judgment, Morality, social media, VALUES -
Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.) (2018): Atlas of moral psychology. What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.. New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: What do people evaluate when they assess another person’s moral character? In this chapter, we define moral character in novel social cognitive terms and offer empirical support for the idea that the central qualities of moral character are those deemed essential for social relationships. We approach this chapter from the theoretical standpoint that the centrality of character evaluation is due to its function in social life. Evaluation of character is, we think, inherently a judgment about a person’s qualifications for being a solid long-term social investment. That is, people attempt to suss out moral character because they want to know whether a particular agent is the type of person who likely possesses the necessary (even if not sufficient) qualities they expect in a social relationship. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess other s’ mor al character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess others’ moral character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. We begin by putting forward a new idea of what we think moral character means, rooted in a social-cognitive view of the person as a moral being. We introduce the idea that a person’s moral character takes the form of moral cognitive machinery—essentially a processor that accepts inputs that, if the processor functions well, should output morally relevant judgments and behavior. We next take on the question of content: What are the more specific characteristics of a person with good moral character? That is, instead of considering t he abstr act form that moral character may take, we ask what qualities define moral character. In this section, we present several forms of preliminary evidence suggesting that moral qualities are those that describe necessary conditions of social investment. In so doing, we engage with two questions. First, we consider how our perspective is compatible with both moral pluralism and moral universalism— how moral codes may show variety and consistency across cultural contexts. Second, we consider in what circumstances people should be more or less likely to assume that others’ character is more or less upstanding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3 "This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 57 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind"-- "Description: This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 56 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind. Key Words: altruism, badness, beliefs, convictions, ethical behavior, evil, evolutionary psychology, free will, goodness, human behavior, immorality, justice, moral character, moral emotions, moral judgments, moral philosophy, moral psychology, moral reasoning, personality, social cognition, social norms, social psychology, values"--
Keywords: Moral, Morality, Peer Evaluation, Personality Traits, Social Cognition, social sciences, Sonstiges -
(2018): Moral foundations of positive and negative intergroup behavior. Moral exclusion fills the gap. In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS 64, S. 67-76. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.03.006
Abstract: Personal criteria about the morally appropriate forms of behavior can be crucial when coming into contact with members of culturally different outgroups. In our study, we investigated whether moral exclusion mediates the relationship between moral foundations and positive and negative behavioral intentions toward Muslim people. Our aim was to identify the psychological mechanism that explains why particular people intend to harm (or not harm), and help (or not help) members of particular outgroups. Using survey data from an online questionnaire, structural equation modeling and mediation analysis showed that individualizing moral foundations had a negative relationship with negative behavioral intentions and a positive relationship with positive intentions towards Muslim people. Binding moral foundations showed the opposite connection with behavioral intentions. The relationship between moral foundations and intergroup behavioral intentions was mediated by moral exclusion. These results imply that moral intuitions form the basis of behavioral intentions toward a culturally different outgroup both directly and by influencing whether or not the outgroup is worthy of moral concern.
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(2018): Who am I?. The role of moral beliefs in children's and adults' understanding of identity. In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, S. 210-219. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.007
Abstract: Adults report that moral characteristics—particularly widely shared moral beliefs—are central to identity. This perception appears driven by the view that changes to widely shared moral beliefs would alter friendships and that this change in social relationships would, in turn, alter an individual's personal identity. Because reasoning about identity changes substantially during adolescence, the current work tested pre- and post-adolescents to reveal the role that such changes could play in moral cognition. Experiment 1 showed that 8- to 10-year-olds, like adults, judged that people would change more after changes to their widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., whether hitting is wrong) than after changes to controversial moral beliefs (e.g., whether telling prosocial lies is wrong). Following up on this basic effect, a second experiment examined whether participants regard all changes to widely shared moral beliefs as equally impactful. Adults, but not children, reported that individuals would change more if their good moral beliefs (e.g., it is not okay to hit) transformed into bad moral beliefs (e.g., it is okay to hit) than if the opposite change occurred. This difference in adults was mediated by perceptions of how much changes to each type of belief would alter friendships. We discuss implications for moral judgment and social cognitive development.
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(2018) : The model of moral motives: A map of the moral domain. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: Motivation is fundamental to morality, which involves both an understanding of right and wrong—of what we should or should not do—and the activation or inhibition of these behaviors. The model of moral motives (MMM) has its roots in the most basic motivational processes recognized in psychology: approach and avoidance. The MMM crosses approach and avoidance processes with distinct levels of analysis reflecting the focus of one’s moral behavior: oneself (intrapersonal), another person (interpersonal), or the group (collective). As evident in this chapter, this produces six cells with unique moral motives, each reflecting how to be moral in that context. Our model explains these two innate processes that are generic from a psychological perspective and culturally uniform in their social function, with a special focus on how these processes manifest in different social contexts. However, it is important to clarify that our model does not try to explain the many ways in which c ultures elaborate on these basic processes. Learned cultural innovations, including everything from rituals and tradition, gossip and reputation, the rule of law, religion, governmental institutions, penal systems, leadership, and various forms of tribalism, are woven into moral behavior in different ways from culture to culture. These cultural elaborations on the two basic processes of moral behavior lead to unique societies that emphasize differing moral motives with differing levels of effectiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018) : Moral judgment: Reflective, interactive, spontaneous, challenging, and always evolving. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: Why is moral reasoning fundamental to an explanation of the development of morality? Reasoning is the process by which humans create and apply principles for how individuals ought to treat one another; it is neither innate nor inculcated, but constructed through everyday interactions over the course of development. In this chapter, we discuss the developmental origins of morality, drawing on theories and empirical research in developmental science. Understanding the origins and developmental changes of any phenomenon provides insights into sources of influence, change, and evolution throughout the life course. Although morality was once thought to be the province of adulthood (children were viewed as selfish, antagonistic, or as a blank slate), a large body of research has demonstrated that children are social beings, oriented toward others, motivated to help others and to cooperate, and, beginning in early childhood, capable of drawing categorical distinctions between mo ral cons iderations and other social organizational norms. Moreover, starting at preschool age, children justify moral judgments by reference to fairness, rights, or others’ welfare, whereas they justify conventional judgments by reference to rules, authority, and social traditions. Over several decades, empirical evidence has demonstrated that the developmental emergence of morality stems out of social interactions, both with peers and through adult-child exchanges, and changes slowly over the life course. Morality is constructed through social interactions and observations of events in the world, involving evaluation, reflection, and judgments about the fair treatment of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Religion, moral attitudes and economic behavior. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 148, S. 282-300. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.022
Abstract: Using data for a representative sample of the Dutch population with information about participants’ religious background, we study the association between religion and moral behavior and attitudes. We find that religious people are less accepting of unethical economic behavior (e.g., tax evasion, bribery) and report more volunteering. They are equally likely as non-religious people to betray trust in an experimental game, where social behavior is unobservable and not directed to a self-selected group of recipients. Religious people also report lower preference for redistribution. Considering differences between denominations, Catholics betray less than non-religious people, while Protestants betray more than Catholics and are indistinguishable from the non-religious. We also explore the intergenerational transmission and the potential causality of these associations.
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(2018): The role of a "common is moral" heuristic in the stability and change of moral norms. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 147 (2), S. 228-242. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000365
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28891657 Abstract: Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record zitiert von: 1
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(2018): An expanded model of the moral self. Beyond care and justice. In: Social science research 72, S. 1-19. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.02.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29609732 Abstract: Most research on moral identities conceptualizes morality exclusively in terms of care and justice, but work from across the social sciences indicates that these represent only a corner of the moral landscape. Emphasizing care and justice alone severely restricts the scope of moral identity models, and risks under-estimating the influence of moral self-processes. To address this, we develop and validate measures of moral identity focused on group loyalty, authority, and purity, three additional facets of morality highlighted in Moral Foundations Theory. Although the loyalty identity is remarkably similar to the care/justice identity, the authority and purity identities are distinct, and demonstrate adequate convergent, divergent, and nomological validity. These identities also predict a wide range of behaviors that traditional care/justice focused moral identities miss. Taken together, our work indicates that the moral self is more complex - and has a much wider scope of influence - than previously supposed.
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(2018): The influence of corporate social responsibility efforts on the moral behavior of high self‐brand overlap consumers.. In: Journal of Consumer Psychology, S. 253-271, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: Corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts are known to affect firm and societal outcomes, but little is known about their effects on consumer well‐being. We address this research gap by investigating whether consumers who have integrated their self‐schema with a brand's schema (i.e., high self‐brand overlap consumers) vicariously balance their moral behavior against a brand's CSR efforts. Specifically, we propose that a brand's socially responsible behavior can negatively influence the moral behavior of high self‐brand overlap consumers (vicarious moral licensing), while a brand's less socially responsible behavior can positively influence the moral behavior of these consumers (vicarious moral cleansing). Further, we do not predict or observe these effects among low self‐brand overlap consumers, given their lack of psychological identification with the CSR brand. Across four experiments, we demonstrate the vicarious moral balancing effect and show process ev idence f or the potential role of pride (guilt) in driving vicarious moral licensing (cleansing) behaviors. Importantly, we also demonstrate two potential methods to eliminate the vicarious moral licensing effect when firms conduct CSR efforts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Konsumenten-Psychologie, Moral -
(2018): Psychoanalytic studies and the work of Adam Smith. Towards a theory of moral development and social relations. London: Routledge (Psychoanalytic explorations)
Abstract: Psychoanalytic Studies of the Work of Adam Smith blends the rich intellectual heritage of the hermeneutic tradition with the methods and concepts of psychoanalysis, in order to examine the seminal works of Adam Smith. This is the first book on Smith to analyze the works of the ground-breaking moral theorist and founding father of economics from a psychoanalytic perspective, whilst also examining the human capacities and skills that are necessary to put Smith's ideas into practice. Starting with a detailed discussion of the psychological difficulties that afflicted Smith, Ozler and Gabrinetti examine the influence that Smith's life had on the ideas that are found in his major works. The authors explore the sympathetic process in Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) from an intersubjectivist perspective and use ideas from developmental psychology to argue that sympathy leads to morality. This book contains a thorough analysis of the defenses that are used to create Smith's moral system in the TMS and explores how Smith's ideas were precursors to concepts later developed by Freud. The authors show that Smith's attitude toward women was at best ambivalent and consider the reciprocal interaction between markets and morality from an evolutionary psychology perspective. Covering an impressive range of topics, this book will appeal to academics and postgraduate students with an interest in psychoanalysis, moral philosophy, history of thought and the social sciences. The book should also be of interest to more advanced undergraduate students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 1
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(2018) : The history of moral norms. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 266-267
Abstract: How does history shape moral values? There are several different theoretical perspectives on moral change, and each has led to lines of evidence that shed light on the nature of morality. The cognitive sciences tend to focus on synchronic methods: studying mental life here and now in living populations. Occasionally, work is also done exploring evolutionary accounts, which is an especially popular approach when it comes to studying morals. Far less frequent is work on the history of morals. This is, in part, because history is difficult to study using psychological methods. This neglect is unfortunate, however, because changes over historical time can deepen our understanding of moral psychology. Like evolutionary approaches, historical approaches help us understand both the mechanisms of morality and their function. But historical approaches also shed light on moral learning, sociocultural contributors to moral norms, transformations over time, and moral conflict. In thi s chapte r, I consider relevant work in philosophy and cultural history, as well as research in the social sciences: anthropology, behavioral economics, political science, sociology, and psychology. Working together, these fields can deepen our understanding of how morality works. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Attributions of Morality and Mind to Artificial Intelligence after Real-World Moral Violations. In: Computers in Human Behavior, S. 401-411. DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2018.05.014
Abstract: Highlights: •AI’s real-world moral violations only reported 43.5% of the time •Knowledge of algorithm increases moral violation perception •AI not organization, programmer, or use is attributed wrongness •AI attributed mind, awareness, intentionality, justification, and responsibility
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(2018): Sociology. Moral dialogues and normative change. In: The Social Science Journal 55 (1), S. 19-22. DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2018.02.005
Abstract: Moral dialogues are one mechanism of cultural change, allowing communities to resolve conflicts and revise the fundamental norms and values governing their members’ relationships. This essay illustrates the moral dialogue process with the debates over sexual harassment in the Trump era. Victimized women launched a transnational “megalogue” that pervaded politics, business, entertainment, academia, and other spheres. It transformed norms, institutions, and enforcement of acceptable behavior in employment and in public, resulting in a new shared moral understanding. However, the fact that the President is not punished for immorality demonstrates that normative change ultimately requires the rule of law.
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(2018): Supplemental Material for Unethical and Inept?. The Influence of Moral Information on Perceptions of Competence. In: Journal of personality and social psychology, S. 195-210. DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000097.supp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000097.supp Abstract: While moral character heavily influences global evaluations of others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), its causal effect on perceptions of others’ competence (i.e., one’s knowledge, skills, and abilities) is less clear. We found that people readily use information about another’s morality when judging their competence, despite holding folk intuitions that these domains are independent. Across 6 studies (n = 1,567), including 2 preregistered experiments, participants judged targets who committed hypothetical transgressions (Studies 1 and 3), cheated on lab tasks (Study 2), acted selfishly in economic games (Study 4), and received low morality ratings from coworkers (Study 5 and 6) as less competent than control or moral targets. These findings were specific to morality and were not the result of incidentally manipulating impressions of warmth (Study 4), nor were they fully explained by a general halo effect (Studies 2 and 3). We hypothesized that immoral targets are seen as less competent because their immoral actions led them to be viewed as low in social intelligence. Studies 4 and 5 supported this prediction, demonstrating that social intelligence was a more reliable mediator than perceptions of self-control or general intelligence. An experimental test of this mediation argument found that presenting targets as highly socially intelligent eliminated the negative effect of immoral information on judgments of competence (Study 6). These results suggest that information about a person’s moral character readily influences perceptions of their competence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): The Influence of Media Exposure on the Accessibility of Moral Intuitions and Associated Affect. In: Journal of Media Psychology 30 (2), S. 79-90. DOI: 10.1027/1864-1105/a000183
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000183 Abstract: The model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME) predicts that media content can increase the accessibility of preconscious moral intuitions, which shape subsequent moral decision making. To date, attempts to demonstrate evidence of this intuitive, preconscious process with self-report measures have met with little success. The current paper presents results from a study designed to test the MIME’s predictions, measuring the accessibility of moral intuitions with a moral foundations–affect misattribution procedure (MF-AMP) argued in the current paper to be more capable of detecting the aforementioned effect. An experiment manipulated exposure to media content that focused on care and fairness to test the proposition that media content can increase the accessibility of these moral intuitions. The findings offer preliminary evidence supporting the MIME’s proposition that media content featuring behaviors relevant to specific moral intuitions can increase (temporar ily at l east) the accessibility of those specific moral intuitions in the audiences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 6
Keywords: Intuition, Media Exposure, Medien, MODELS, Moral, Morality, Social Influences, Test Construction -
(2018): Moral cognition and its basis in social cognition and social regulation.. New York: Guilford Press, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: What is the basis of moral cognition? Moral judgments are grounded in a number of cognitive and social cognitive processes, which guide the social regulation of behavior and are, in turn, constrained by such regulation to be fair and evidence-based. Human beings live complex social lives, composed of various types of relationships across nested social hierarchies, all structured by rights, rules, and obligations. However, selfish goals persist, and keeping individuals’ goals in line with community interests has become the primary challenge of modern morality. To meet this challenge, human societies have developed two major social-cultural tools: a vast network of rules, norms, and values and complex social practices of norm enforcement, such as blame, praise, apology, and reconciliation. This kind of social-cultural morality has to be taught, learned, and enforced by community members, even by the youngest among them. Acquiring norms likely benefits from early-appearing prefere nces for prosocial agents over antisocial agents, but socially mature moral capacities rely heavily on nonmoral capacities: those of social cognition. Social cognition encompasses a hierarchy of interdependent concepts, processes, and skills that allow individuals to perceive, understand, and—most important for the present topic—evaluate one another. For example, norm enforcers infer the mental processes that generated a transgressive behavior (e.g., motive, belief, intention) before blaming the transgressor. The transgressor must likewise infer the mental processes that generated the social act of blaming (e.g., the norm enforcer’s goals, knowledge, and power of enforcing sanctions) when deciding to deny or admit, maintain or correct the norm-violating behavior. These, then, are the phenomena this chapter aims to illuminate. We show how the elements of social cognition ground people’s moral cognition and how social and moral cognition together guide the social regul ation of behavior by moral norms. We aim to identify the concepts, mechanisms, and practices that go into making various kinds of moral judgments and the forms and functions of socially expressing those judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 4
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(2018): Trait anger and aggression. A moderated mediation model of anger rumination and moral disengagement. In: Personality and Individual Differences 125, S. 44-49. DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.12.029
Abstract: Although trait anger has been shown to play an important role in aggression, little is known about mediating and moderating mechanisms underlying this relation. Based on the general aggression model, we investigated the mediating role of anger rumination in the association between trait anger and aggression and the moderating role of moral disengagement. Four hundred and sixty-four Chinese young adults completed the measures of trait anger, anger rumination, moral disengagement, and aggression. The results indicated that trait anger was significantly and positively associated with aggression and anger rumination mediated this relation. Moral disengagement moderated the relation between anger rumination and aggression and the relation between trait anger and aggression. Specifically, the significant relation between anger rumination and aggression only existed among high moral disengagement individuals and the relation between trait anger and aggression became weaker for high moral disengagement individuals.
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(2018): The role of the media in developing a shared moral understanding. In: The Social Science Journal 55 (1), S. 34-36. DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2018.02.011
Abstract: Over the last few decades, research has shown that media outlets are good at telling people what to think about, fulfilling what researchers call the agenda-setting role of the media. To that end, media outlets from social media to newspapers can play a pivotal role in developing a shared moral understanding.