Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2017
-
(2017): Artificial agents among us. Should we recognize them as agents proper?. In: Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1), S. 1-17. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-016-9411-3
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently, as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other-this despite the fact that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and hence as a bearer of rights.
Keywords: agency, Anerkennung, Anerkennung technischer Systeme, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Artificial agent, artificial agents, doppelter Treffer, Favoriten, Group agent, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, RATIONALITY, Realtechnik, recognition and self, responsibility, Rights, Serviceroboter, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Robotik, Technik 2016
-
(2016): Book Review. What’s So Social about Social Knowledge?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 98-125. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271927
2015
-
(2015): Higher incentives can impair performance. Neural evidence on reinforcement and rationality. In: Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 10 (11), S. 1477-1483
Abstract: Examined the assumption that monetary incentives always result in increased performance. Human decision makers frequently focus on past performance, a form of reinforcement learning occasionally at odds with rational decision making. An incentivized belief-updating task from economics was employed to investigate this conflict through measurements of neural correlates of reward processing. 85 healthy college students (aged 19-29 years) participated in 2 experiments while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Results showed that higher incentives fail to improve performance when immediate feedback on decision outcomes is provided. Subsequent analysis of the feedback-related negativity, an early event-related potential following feedback, revealed the mechanism behind this paradoxical effect. As incentives increase, the win/lose feedback becomes more prominent, leading to an increased reliance on reinforcement and more errors. This mechanism is relevant for economic decision making and the debate on performance-based payment. zitiert von 15
-
(2015) : Technology and Social Control In: Wright, James D.: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition): Oxford: Elsevier, S. 117-124
Abstract: One aspect of modernization is the use of science-based technology in rule enforcement. In the ‘engineered society,’ an ethos of rationalization is seen in the application of means to ends. The events of 11 September 2001, and the war on terror have brought increased attention to the question, but the increased use of technical means for control reflects continuity rather than disjuncture. Six social control strategies are discussed and illustrated: target removal, target devaluation, target insulation, offender incapacitation, offender exclusion, and identification of offenses and offenders. In complex settings in a democratic society, relying primarily on technology to control human behavior has clear social and ethical limitations. The technology's narrowing of focus may come at a cost of failing to see larger systemic contexts, alternatives, and longer range consequences. The complexity and fluidity of human situations makes this a rich area for the study of trade-off, irony, and paradox. There are some parallels to iatrogenic medical practices in which one problem is cured, but at a cost of creating another. Technical efforts to ensure conformity may be hindered by conflicting goals, unintended consequences, displacement, lessened equity, complacency, neutralization, invalidity, escalation, system overload, a negative image of personal dignity and the danger of the means determining, or becoming ends. zitiert von 39
Keywords: Deviance, Dignity, Manipulation, Means–ends relations, Medien, Mensch-Technik-Relation, Police, RATIONALITY, rules, science direct, social control, Social engineering, surveillance, Suspect weakening, System overload, Target hardening, technology, Unintended consequences, Verhaltensforschung 2014
-
(2014): Collective Actors without Collective Minds. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1), S. 3-25. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113520397
2013
-
(2013): Simple heuristics in a social world. Social learning: A route to good cue orders. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press (Evolution and cognition)
Abstract: Discusses how individuals learn good cue orders in social learning. The process of how people can learn this both individually and socially by exchanging information is outlined. It is hypothesized that information exchange can help boundedly rational individuals efficiently solve the problem of learning which cues are good by the use of various heuristics. Illustrative data from recent experimental research regarding both individuals and groups are discussed. Results showed that individual learning of cue orders was slower than when engaged socially with others, likely due to the participant's imitation of a group's most accurate member. In conclusion, it is argued that an integrative view of both individual and social learning is most relevant when studying the learning of good cue orders.
-
(2013): Blame It on the Norm. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2), S. 131-150. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113510468
-
(2013): The Idea of Philosophy and Its Relation to Social Science. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2), S. 151-178. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113510856
2012
-
(2012): Minimal Cooperation. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (1), S. 45-73. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112457428
2010
-
(2010): Die Struktur der moralischen Orientierung. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven - Deliberation und Intuition in moralischen Entscheidungen und Urteilen. Wien; Zürich; Berlin; Münster: Lit (Ethik interdisziplinär)
Abstract: Die Frage, was Moral ist und aus welchen Quellen sich die moralische Orientierung speist, wurde in den letzten Jahren über die Ethik hinaus zunehmend Gegenstand auch empirischer Forschung. Deren Ergebnisse kritisch zu sichten und in ein Gespräch zu bringen, ist das Ziel des vorliegenden Bandes. Neben Beiträgen aus genuin ethischer Perspektive (J. Fischer; P. Schaber; A. Hügli) vereint er Einblicke aus neuro- und verhaltensbiologischer (M. Christen; C. van Schaik / C. Rudolf v. Rohr), entwicklungspsychologischer (M. Keller/J.-C. Heilinger) und religionspädagogischer Perspektive (Th. Schlag). Die Rolle von rationaler Deliberation und emotional gefärbter Intuition in moralischen Entscheidungssituation wird erörtert. Zunächst wird konstatiert, dass derzeit weder in der Psychologie noch in den Neurowissenschaften eine haltbare Konzeption vorliegt, die beiden Polen moralischer Entscheidungsfindung - Rationalität und Emotionalität - angemessen Rechnung trägt. Unter Einbeziehung einer ontogenetischen Entwicklungsperspektive wird dann das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Emotionalität im moralischen Urteilen zu klären versucht. Dabei werden zunächst einige Grundannahmen des kognitiven Ansatzes skizziert, die Frage der moralischen Motive in diesem Ansatz reflektiert und alternative Theorien angesprochen, die versucht haben, das Problem der moralischen Emotion und Motivation zu klären. Anschließend werden die intuitionistischen Kritiker als neueste Variante emotivistischer Positionen dargestellt und ausführlich diskutiert. Abschließend wird auf die Notwendigkeit einer beide Pole umfassenden Theorie hingewiesen. zitiert von: 2
-
(2010): The more humanlike, the better? How speech type and users’ cognitive style affect social responses to computers. In: Computers in Human Behavior 26 (4), S. 665-672. DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2010.01.003
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2010.01.003 Abstract: The present experiment investigated if anthropomorphic interfaces facilitate people’s tendency to project social expectations onto computers and how such effects might vary depending on users’ cognitive style. In a 2 (synthetic vs. recorded speech)×2 (flattering vs. generic feedback)×2 (low vs. high rationality)×2 (low vs. high experientiality) experiment, participants played a trivia game with a computer. Use of recorded speech did not amplify the previously documented flattery effects (Fogg & Nass, 1997), challenging the notion that anthropomorphism will promote social responses to computers. Participants evaluated the human-voiced computer more positively and conformed more to its suggestions than the one using synthetic speech, but such effects were found only among less analytical or more intuition-driven individuals, suggesting dispositional differences in people’s susceptibility to anthropomorphic cues embedded in the interface.
2008
-
(2008): The Three Logics of Selection theory of Action as Theory of Defining the Situation. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie (37.5), S. 362-379
Abstract: Using Hartmut Esser's model of frame selection as a point of reference, this paper examines how different ways of defining a situation influence the selection of action. The introduction of the model of frame selection has substantially changed the theory of action within the macro-micro-macro-model of sociological explanation. The theory of action has become closely related to the sociology of knowledge: the theory of action as the theory of defining the situation. This paper contributes to this theoretical approach. It is argued that the criteria for selecting between the interpretive patterns which orient and guide actions depend on three different forms of defining the situation: (1) defining the situation constatively, i.e. identifying the characteristics of a given situation; anti two forms of defining the situation performatively: (2) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is effectively enforceable or (3) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is commonly shared. The assumption that the different ways of selecting between interpretive patterns depend on these three forms of defining the situation contradicts the view of the current model of frame selection, which in this respect refers to the difference between an automatic-spontaneous and a reflective-calculating mode of selection.
2006
-
Hertwig, Ralph (2006): Do legal rules rule behavior?. Heuristics and the law. Berlin, Germany. Berlin, Germany: Dahlem University Press (Dahlem workshop reports)
Abstract: Economic analyses of law share an implicit or explicit belief in unbounded rationality. Here two boundedly rational psychological principles are discussed that together provide an alternative explanation for why most people behave in accordance with legal rules most of the time. These principles are the capacity for social learning and the impact of environmental cues and constraints. The ability to observe others' behavior and its consequences helps people conform to behavioral norms without memorizing the legal canon or Miss Manners's rules of etiquette. Environmental and institutional constraints help winnow down the set of actions available to people, and environmental cues suggest which of the available actions are desirable. If people who aspire to live by legal rules, standards, and institutions are to have a chance of doing so, lawmakers must recognize the psychological realities of boundedly rational decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 13
- <<
- <
- 1