Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): A new look at the attribution of moral responsibility. The underestimated relevance of social roles. In: Philosophical Psychology 31 (4), S. 595-608. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2018.1429592
Abstract: What are the main features that influence our attribution of moral responsibility? It is widely accepted that there are various factors which strongly influence our moral judgments, such as the agent’s intentions, the consequences of the action, the causal involvement of the agent, and the agent’s freedom and ability to do otherwise. In this paper, we argue that this picture is incomplete: We argue that social roles are an additional key factor that is radically underestimated in the extant literature. We will present an experiment to support this claim.
2017
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(2017): Collective intentionality and socially extended minds. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 251-268. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295629
Abstract: There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.
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(2017): A tale of two processes. On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (6), S. 832-848. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1299857
Abstract: We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.
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(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen 2016
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(2016): Conversation, responsibility, and autism spectrum disorder. In: Philosophical Psychology 29 (7), S. 1015-1028. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1207240
Abstract: In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory.
2014
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(2014): In Defense of Shame. The Faces of an Emotion. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (7), S. 1083-1086. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.926439
Abstract: [book review] Reviewed publication: This is the first monograph on shame to take the results of many different disciplines into account. In it the authors present an original theory of shame centering on a distinctive form of self-evaluation involving the subject's feeling incapable to be and to behave in ways compatible with the values to which she is attached. It includes an extended critical examination of the most recent and older theories of shame (in particular those of M. Scheler, J. Rawls, G. Taylor, J. Deigh, D. Velleman, J. P. Tangney, R. Benedict, R. Wollheim, and H. B. Lewis) The authors clarify many common claims and misconceptions about shame (e.g. that shame is a social emotion, that shame is morally bad, etc.) and explain how shame is distinguished from other self-reflexive negative emotions such as guilt, embarrassment and humiliation. The book sheds light on the relations between shame episodes and the sense of shame (dignity, integrity, pudeur, decency) It hinges on several controversial theses: shame is not a social emotion, shame has to do with the subject's experiencing her own incapacity, shame is morally relevant and can be morally good.
2013
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(2013): Why we do things together. The social motivation for joint action. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (4), S. 588-603. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905
Abstract: Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.
Keywords: Herkunft von Sozialität, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Joint Action, Joint Intentions, Social Bonds, Social Emotions, Social Motivation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, Neuropsychologie, Philosophical Psychology, Soziale Motivation, Spezifika von Menschen -
(2013): The cultural ecosystem of human cognition. In: Philosophical Psychology 27 (1), S. 34-49. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.830548
Abstract: Recent experimental studies in cognitive science report the influence of “disgust” and “cleanliness” manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust- and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views, I argue, are those that posit causal effects from a single common cognitive mechanism for both disgust and cleanliness.
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(2013): The moral behavior of ethics professors. Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior. In: Philosophical Psychology 27 (3), S. 293-327. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.727135
Abstract: Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to student emails, charitable giving, and honesty in responding to survey questionnaires. On some issues, we also had direct behavioral measures that we could compare with the self-reports. Ethicists expressed somewhat more stringent normative attitudes on some issues, such as vegetarianism and charitable donation. However, on no issue did ethicists show unequivocally better behavior than the two comparison groups. Our findings on attitude-behavior consistency were mixed: ethicists showed the strongest relationship between behavior and expressed moral attitude regarding voting but the weakest regarding charitable donation. We discuss implications for several models of the relationship between philosophical reflection and real-world moral behavior.
Keywords: Applied Ethics, Attitude-Behavior Consistency, Charity, Ethics, Experimental Philosophy, Moral Behavior, Moral Psychology, Vegetarianism, Voting, Ethik Professoren, Ethik, Ethische Überzeugungen, Fehlverhalten, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Performative Kraft von wertender Überzeugung?, Philosophical Psychology, Stehlen, Werte -
(2013): The effects of cleanliness and disgust on moral judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (4), S. 556-568. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.877386
Abstract: Recent experimental studies in cognitive science report the influence of “disgust” and “cleanliness” manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust- and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views, I argue, are those that posit causal effects from a single common cognitive mechanism for both disgust and cleanliness.
Keywords: Beeinflussung der Bewertung moralischer Urteile, Bewertung von sozialem Verhalten (/sozialer Angemessenheit), Cleanliness and disgust, Disgust, Ekel, Emotionaler Zustand, Models of causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment, Moral, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Philosophical Psychology 2012
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(2012): Surprising connections between knowledge and action. The robustness of the epistemic side-effect effect. In: Philosophical Psychology 25 (5), S. 689-715. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.622439
2009
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(2009): Some things are better left unsaid II. Topic avoidance in friendships. In: Communication Quarterly 46 (3), S. 231-249. DOI: 10.1080/01463379809370099Keywords: Philosophical Psychology
2008
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(2008): Nature and Nurture in the Development of Social Smiling. In: Philosophical Psychology 21 (3), S. 349-357. DOI: 10.1080/09515080802190547
Abstract: Research on the origins of human social smiling is presented as a case study of how a species-specific, species-typical behavior may emerge from thousands of momentary events in which a continuously changing biological organism acts to make, respond to, and learn from its experience.
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(2008): Social skills in their proper place. In: Philosophical Psychology 1 (3), S. 351-357. DOI: 10.1080/09515088808572950
Abstract: This paper considers the notion of ‘social skills’ from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy. The authors note first prejudices for and against an approach to human problems in terms of identificable ‘skills’. They then stipulate a definition of ‘social skills’ in terms of techniques ('knowing how'), and point to other essential aspects of change and treatment which fall outside this definition (in particular, the aspects of attitude or desire and judgement). Some generalisations are attempted relevant to the question of what problems are likely to yield to a ‘social skills’ approach, and what problems are likely to go deeper than such an approach can cure. Attention is drawn to the necessity of defining what is to count as success in such training, and the logical limits of ‘social skills’ training are clarified.
Keywords: Philosophical Psychology, Sozialkompetenz 2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung -
(2007): A Dual Mechanism Neural Framework for Social Understanding. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (1), S. 43-63. DOI: 10.1080/09515080601085864
Abstract: In this paper a theoretical framework is proposed for how the brain processes the information necessary for us to achieve the understanding of others that we experience in our social worlds. Our framework attempts to expand several previous approaches to more fully account for the various data on interpersonal understanding and to respond to theoretical critiques in this area. Specifically, we propose that social understanding must be achieved by at least two mechanisms in the brain that are capable of parallel information processing. The first mechanism, based on research into mirror matching systems in the brain, suggests that representations of others are mapped onto an observer's representations of these same schemas in order to understand them. The second mechanism requires semantic analysis of a given social situation in order to understand the actions of others and most likely involves conscious processes. We suggest that experimental correlates of these systems should be dissociable using both behavioral and neuroimaging techniques.
Keywords: Gehirnfunktion, Intellektualtechnik, Interaktionspartner, interpersonal, interpersonal communication, Kogn. Architektur, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kognitive Architekturen, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Neuronale Netzwerke, Neurowissenschaften, Philosophical Psychology, Realtechnik, Semantics, Semantik, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theory of mind -
(2007): A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding. Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (6), S. 731-748. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701694110
Abstract: Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call ‘moral dumbfounding’. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms of his ‘Rawlsian creature’ model of moral judgment. I show that Haidt and Hauser assume that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of features of a.) moral judgment that are b.) construed in terms of the intrinsic features of individuals. By contrast, I hypothesize that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of moral reasoning, more specifically in terms of the social dynamics of such reasoning. Finally, I argue that this hypothesis points towards an externalistic account of both moral reasoning and moral judgment.
2003
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(2003): Responsible psychopaths. In: Philosophical Psychology 16 (3), S. 417-429. DOI: 10.1080/0951508032000121797
Abstract: Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, as a question of our appropriate reactive attitudes toward an agent for what she does, and as distinct from the question of the agent's own motivating attitudes, which lead him to do what he does. The latter is the question more directly relevant to free will, though moral motivation normally depends on the capacity in early childhood to pick up motivating attitudes from others' reactive attitudes. Reactive attitudes based on hatred rather than anger (e.g. disgust or contempt) count as alternative forms of blame that may be appropriately directed toward agents manifesting bad qualities of will, even as a matter of motivational impairment. So psychopaths may still be said to deserve blame, even if they are incapable of modifying their behavior in response to blame.
Keywords: Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Fehlverhalten, Moral emotions, Moral und Kognition, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Moralpsychologie, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pathologie, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychopathie, Schuld 2002
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(2002): Psychology and ethics. Interactions and conflicts. In: Philosophical Psychology 15 (4), S. 489-508. DOI: 10.1080/0951508021000042030
Abstract: The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. If the former, then psychology is incapable of identifying universal moral imperatives because of the fact/value dichotomy that rejects the possibility of logically deriving moral principles or social policies from factual statements. In addition, the inevitability of moral pluralism raises the question as to how natural science methodology can select moral truths or social policies from a variety of presumed alternatives. In contrast, human science psychology, which emphasizes phenomenological experience as a source of psychological truths, has attempted to bridge the fact/value gap. Upon close examination, this approach has failed to suggest a rule as to how the "correct" set of values can be identified. The conclusion is that facts cannot dictate moral principles or social policies but they can help illuminate their consequences. Policy decisions become the responsibility of a democratic society, not of psychology.
2001
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(2001): Cognitive science meets multi-agent systems. A prolegomenon. In: Philosophical Psychology 14 (1), S. 5-28. DOI: 10.1080/09515080120033599
Abstract: In the current research on multi-agent systems (MAS), many theoretical issues related to sociocultural processes have been touched upon. These issues are in fact intellectually profound and should prove to be significant for MAS. Moreover, these issues should have equally significant impact on cognitive science, if we ever try to understand cognition in the broad context of sociocultural environments in which cognitive agents exist. Furthermore, cognitive models as studied in cognitive science can help us in a substantial way to better probe multi-agent issues, by taking into account essential characteristics of cognitive agents and their various capacities. In this paper, we systematically examine the interplay among social sciences, MAS, and cognitive science. We try to justify an integrated approach for MAS which incorporates different perspectives. We show how a new cognitive model, CLARION, can embody such an integrated approach through a combination of autonomous learning and assimilation.
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(2001): Simulation, theory, and the frame problem. The interpretive moment. In: Philosophical Psychology 14 (2), S. 141-153. DOI: 10.1080/09515080120051535
Abstract: The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved.
1999
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(1999): On becoming a person. In: Philosophical Psychology 12 (1), S. 79-98. DOI: 10.1080/095150899105945
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person.
1995
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(1995): Emotion as a natural kind. Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. In: Philosophical Psychology 8 (1), S. 59-84. DOI: 10.1080/09515089508573145
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation‐governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers. The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework.
1993
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(1993): The emotional origins of social understanding. In: Philosophical Psychology 6 (3), S. 227-249. DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573090
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co‐ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of ‘persons’ who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism.
Keywords: Autismus, Entwicklungspsychologie, Evolutionsbiologie, Herkunft von Sozialität, Interpersonale Wahrnehmung, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Pathologie, Person Sein, Philosophical Psychology, Soziales Miteinander, soziales Verhalten, Sozialphilosophie, Spezifika von Menschen, Verstehen
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