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  • 2015

  • Mitchell, Rachel L. C.; Phillips, Louise H. (2015): The overlapping relationship between emotion perception and theory of mind. In: Neuropsychologia 70, S. 1-10. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.02.018

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.02.018 

    Abstract: Socio-cognitive skills are crucial for successful interpersonal interactions. Two particularly important socio-cognitive processes are emotion perception (EP) and theory of mind (ToM), but agreement is lacking on terminology and conceptual links between these constructs. Here we seek to clarify the relationship between the two at multiple levels, from concept to neuroanatomy. EP is often regarded as a low-level perceptual process necessary to decode affective cues, while ToM is usually seen as a higher-level cognitive process involving mental state deduction. In information processing models, EP tends to precede ToM. At the neuroanatomical level, lesion study data suggest that EP and ToM are both right-hemisphere based, but there is also evidence that ToM requires temporal-cingulate networks, whereas EP requires partially separable regions linked to distinct emotions. Common regions identified in fMRI studies of EP and ToM have included medial prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe areas, but differences emerge depending on the perceptual, cognitive and emotional demands of the EP and ToM tasks. For the future, clarity of definition of EP and ToM will be paramount to produce distinct task manipulations and inform models of socio-cognitive processing.

  • Schaafsma, Sara M.; Pfaff, Donald W.; Spunt, Robert P.; Adolphs, Ralph (2015): Deconstructing and reconstructing theory of mind. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 19 (2), S. 65-72. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.11.007

    DOI: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4314437 

    Abstract: Usage of the term 'theory of mind' (ToM) has exploded across fields ranging from developmental psychology to social neuroscience and psychiatry research. However, its meaning is often vague and inconsistent, its biological bases are a subject of debate, and the methods used to study it are highly heterogeneous. Most crucially, its original definition does not permit easy downward translation to more basic processes such as those studied by behavioral neuroscience, leaving the interpretation of neuroimaging results opaque. We argue for a reformulation of ToM through a systematic two-stage approach, beginning with a deconstruction of the construct into a comprehensive set of basic component processes, followed by a complementary reconstruction from which a scientifically tractable concept of ToM can be recovered.

  • 2012

  • Bzdok, Danilo; Schilbach, Leonhard; Vogeley, Kai; Schneider, Karla; Laird, Angela R.; Langner, Robert; Eickhoff, Simon B. (2012): Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition. ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy. In: Brain structure & function 217 (4), S. 783-796. DOI: 10.1007/s00429-012-0380-y

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22270812 

    Abstract: Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons' representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in 'theory of mind' and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.

  • 2011

  • Ahmed, F. S.; Stephen Miller, L. (2011): Executive function mechanisms of theory of mind. In: JOURNAL OF AUTISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 41 (5), S. 667-678. DOI: 10.1007/s10803-010-1087-7

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20811770 

    Abstract: This study examined the relationship between Executive Function (EF) and Theory of Mind (ToM) using the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) and three tests of ToM (Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET), Strange Stories test, and Faux Pas test). Separate regression analyses were conducted, and EF predictors varied by ToM test. No EF domains accounted for significant variance in RMET scores; only estimated IQ scores were significant predictors of RMET performance. Verbal fluency and deductive reasoning were significant predictors of performance on the Strange Stories test, while verbal fluency, problem solving, and gender accounted for a significant variance in the Faux Pas test. Results suggest that the ToM tests each utilized differing cognitive mechanisms.

  • 2010

  • Adams, Reginald B.; Rule, Nicholas O.; Franklin, Robert G.; Wang, Elsie; Stevenson, Michael T.; Yoshikawa, Sakiko; Nomura, Mitsue; Sato, Wataru; Kveraga, Kestutis; Ambady, Nalini (2010): Cross-cultural reading the mind in the eyes: an fMRI investigation. In: Journal of cognitive neuroscience 22 (1), S. 97-108. DOI: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21187

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21187 

    Abstract: The ability to infer others' thoughts, intentions, and feelings is regarded as uniquely human. Over the last few decades, this remarkable ability has captivated the attention of philosophers, primatologists, clinical and developmental psychologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Most would agree that the capacity to reason about others' mental states is innately prepared, essential for successful human social interaction. Whether this ability is culturally tuned, however, remains entirely uncharted on both the behavioral and neural levels. Here we provide the first behavioral and neural evidence for an intracultural advantage (better performance for same- vs. other-culture) in mental state decoding in a sample of native Japanese and white American participants. We examined the neural correlates of this intracultural advantage using fMRI, revealing greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci recruitment during same- versus other-culture mental state decoding in both cultural groups. These findings offer preliminary support for cultural consistency in the neurological architecture subserving high-level mental state reasoning, as well as its differential recruitment based on cultural group membership.

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