Alle Publikationen
2017
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(2017): Norms in the wild. How to diagnose, measure, and change social norms. New York, NY: Oxford University Press
Abstract: 'Norms in the Wild' takes a look at social norms, answering questions about diagnosis (how can we tell that a shared practice is a social norm?), measurement (how do we measure expectations and preferences?), and change (which tools can we adopt to effect norm change?). The theories developed in the work are brought to life by examining real-life cases of norm creation and abandonment, the rationale behind policy interventions, and how change can be spearheaded by various types of trendsetters, be they individuals, groups, or the media
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(2017): Aprovação social na ponta dos dedos. Representação do eu e gerenciamento de impressões no Tinder. In: Teknokultura 14 (2), S. 339-350. DOI: 10.5209/TEKN.56357
Abstract: This work aims, in an exploratory way, to understand the dynamics of self management on Tinder from the dramaturgical perspective of Erving Goffman. It is understood that, by triggering mechanisms of geolocation and asynchronous interaction, this social app mobilizes different forms of self presentation and legitimation of social faces. Therefore, it is discussed here how users construct themselves using the material limits of the mobile device seeking the social legitimation of their identities putted to the interaction.
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(2017): Normative engagement across difference. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 44 (3), S. 302-325. DOI: 10.1177/0191453717723190
Abstract: This article addresses the problem of inter-normative engagement, of constructing dialogical interaction across substantive normative difference. Focusing on how this affects democratic and pluralistic contexts, it argues that a social-practice-based approach to normativity and reasoning offers unique resources to understand and frame such encounters. It specifically draws on pragmatism and the work of Richard Rorty to reframe normativity, authority, identity, and reason, linking these understandings to recent trends to deliberative political inclusivism in democratic theory. The upshot is that framing inter-normative engagement as calls to responsive engagement between diverse systems of normative authority offers real insights for constructing and maintaining ongoing democratic engagements in a non-hierarchical manner. This, the article argues, extends emerging methodological trends in the broader literature while overcoming the morass between conflict- and consensus-oriented approaches in democratic theory.
Keywords: hierarchy, Natur & Genese von Normen -
(2017): Establishing norms with metanorms over interaction topologies. In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 31 (6), S. 1344-1376. DOI: 10.1007/s10458-017-9364-x
Abstract: Norms are a valuable means of establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which there is no central authority. Axelrod's seminal model of norm establishment in populations of self-interested individuals provides some insight into the mechanisms needed to support this through the use of metanorms, but considers only limited scenarios and domains. While further developments of Axelrod's model have addressed some of the limitations, there is still only limited consideration of such metanorm models with more realistic topological configurations. In response, this paper tries to address such limitation by considering its application to different topological structures. Our results suggest that norm establishment is achievable in lattices and small worlds, while such establishment is not achievable in scale-free networks, due to the problematic effects of hubs. The paper offers a solution, first by adjusting the model to more appropriately reflect the characteristics of the problem, and second by offering a new dynamic policy adaptation approach to learning the right behaviour. Experimental results demonstrate that this dynamic policy adaptation overcomes the difficulties posed by the asymmetric distribution of links in scale-free networks, leading to an absence of norm violation, and instead to norm emergence.
2016
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(2016): Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order. In: Sociological Theory 19 (3), S. 312-324. DOI: 10.1111/0735-2751.00143
Abstract: The article asserts that Goffman's concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is-in turn-predicated "on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints".
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Disziplin, Erwartungen, erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen, familiarity, Frame theory, Frameanalysis Rahmenanalyse Framing, Goffman, Interaktion, kollektive Intentionalität, Natur & Genese von Normen, Soziale Ordnung, Soziologie, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), Theory of interaction (Goffman), Vertrauen -
(2016): Sozialisation. Über die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum und die Bedingungen von Identität. 2. Aufl. 2016. Wiesbaden: Springer VS (Studientexte zur Soziologie)
Abstract: Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? -- Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? -- Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? -- Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Sozialisation ist eine Antwort auf die soziologische Grundfrage nach der Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum. Die drei Fragen, wie wir werden, was wir sind, wie wir durch unser Denken und Handeln gesellschaftliche Ordnung reproduzieren, aber auch gestalten, und wie wir unsere Identität in der Interaktion mit Anderen herstellen und wahren, standen schon am Anfang der Soziologie. Sie sind in der fortgeschrittenen Moderne noch drängender geworden. Das Lehrbuch stellt die breite soziologische Diskussion von ihren Anfängen bis in die allerjüngste Zeit vor. Für die zweite Auflage wurden alle Kapitel überarbeitet und aktualisiert und die theoretische Diskussion erheblich erweitert. Der Inhalt Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Die Zielgruppen Studierende der Soziologie, der Pädagogik, der Psychologie und der Sozialarbeit Studierende aus Studiengängen für das Lehramt und für erziehende Berufe Alle, die schon immer an Antworten auf die oben genannten Fragen interessiert waren Die Autoren Dr. Dr. Heinz Abels, em. Univ.-Prof. am Institut für Soziologie der FernUniversität in Hagen. Dr. Alexandra König, Akademische Rätin in der Fachgruppe Soziologie der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal
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(2016): Digital Social Norm Enforcement. Online Firestorms in Social Media. In: PLoS one 11 (6). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155923
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27315071 Abstract: Actors of public interest today have to fear the adverse impact that stems from social media platforms. Any controversial behavior may promptly trigger temporal, but potentially devastating storms of emotional and aggressive outrage, so called online firestorms. Popular targets of online firestorms are companies, politicians, celebrities, media, academics and many more. This article introduces social norm theory to understand online aggression in a social-political online setting, challenging the popular assumption that online anonymity is one of the principle factors that promotes aggression. We underpin this social norm view by analyzing a major social media platform concerned with public affairs over a period of three years entailing 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. Results show that in the context of online firestorms, non-anonymous individuals are more aggressive compared to anonymous individuals. This effect is reinforced if selective incentives are present and if aggressors are intrinsically motivated.
Keywords: Aggression/psychology, Anonymität, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Crime/legislation & jurisprudence, Digital Norms, Disziplin, Favoriten, Firestorms, Good manners, Humans, Internet/legislation & jurisprudence, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Motivation, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Politics, Social Media/legislation & jurisprudence, Social Norm Theory, Social Norms, Social Norms Marketing, Social Theory, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Soziologie, Technik -
Schulte, Joachim (2016): Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Werkausgabe Band 1. 22. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft)
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(2016) : Philosophische Untersuchungen In: Schulte, Joachim: Tractatus logico-philosophicus: Werkausgabe Band 1: 22. Auflage: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft), S. 225-580
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(2016): Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation. In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 11 (2), S. 313-343. DOI: 10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
Abstract: Both laboratory and field evidence suggest that people tend to voluntarily incur costs to punish non-cooperators. While costly punishment typically reduces the average payoff as well as promotes cooperation. Why does the costly punishment evolve? We study the role of punishment in cooperation promotion within a two-level evolution framework of individual strategies and social norms. In a population with certain social norm, players update their strategies according to the payoff differences among different strategies. In a longer horizon, the evolution of social norm may be driven by the average payoffs of of all members of the society. Norms differ in whether they allow or do not allow for the punishment action as part of strategies, and, for the former, they further differ in whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of cooperative evolutionary stable state (CESS) become larger, but also the convergence speed to CESS is faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm. This model can be used to explain the widespread existence of costly punishment in human society.
Keywords: Bestrafung, Disziplin, economics, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Kooperation, Modelle/Theorien, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Ökonomische Theorie sozialer Normen, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, Wandel von Normen 2015
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(2015): Developing Democratic Dispositions. Eighteenth-Century Public Debating Societies and the Generative Capacity of Decorum. In: RHETORIC SOCIETY QUARTERLY 45 (4), S. 324-345
Abstract: This essay argues that public debating societies that emerged in Britain in the later eighteenth century functioned as sites of invention where citizens could develop dispositions associated with a more inclusive form of democracy. I locate the generative aspects of these forums in the principle of decorum. I argue that this principle functioned as a means for participants to negotiate traditional codes of conduct and standards of speech that constrained interactions among various constituents of the body politic. To illustrate this claim, I focus on the clash of codes exemplified in an encounter between a Quaker woman and a member of Parliament in a public debating forum. By highlighting these discursive interactions, this essay extends current conversations in public sphere theory that call for a focus on the processes and forms of rhetorical engagement among diverse publics.
2014
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(2014): Vorfragen zur Wahrheit: Ein Traktat über kognitive Sprachen. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter (Scientia nova). Online verfügbar unter https://books.google.de/books?id=d9-dCgAAQBAJ
2012
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(2012): One’s a Crowd?. On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4), S. 519-530. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112454335
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393112454335 Abstract: In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Durkheim, Game Theory, Gilbert, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, individualism, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, kollektive Intentionalität, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natur & Genese von Normen, Ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, Realtechnik, social psychology, Sociology, Technik, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 2011
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(2011): Race Differences in Tipping. Testing the Role of Norm Familiarity. In: Cornell Hospitality Quarterly 52 (1), S. 73-80. DOI: 10.1177/1938965510389297
Abstract: On average, blacks tip less than whites in the United States. As a result, many servers dislike waiting on black tables and deliver inferior service to those blacks seated in their sections. Furthermore, this race difference makes it difficult to attract and retain waitstaff in predominately black neighborhoods, which makes such neighborhoods less attractive places for corporations to locate full-service restaurants. To address these issues, race differences in tipping need to be sizably reduced, which requires an understanding of their underlying causes. This study tests and supports the role of norm familiarity in producing race differences in tipping by demonstrating that norm awareness mediates those differences in tipping and that race does not moderate the effects of norm awareness on tipping. These results support the idea that race differences in tipping can be sizably reduced by educating blacks about appropriate tipping norms, so restaurant managers as well as major industry organizations are encouraged to engage in such educational campaigns.
2009
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(2009): History and the Critique of Social Concepts. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1), S. 3-29. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109350678
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109350678 Abstract: Many theorists have regarded genealogy as an important technique for social criticism. But it has been unclear how genealogy can go beyond the accomplishments of other, more mundane, critical methods. I propose a new approach to understanding the critical potential of history. I argue that theorists have been misled by the assumption that if a claim is deserving of criticism, it is because the claim is false. Turning to the criticism of concepts rather than criticism of claims, I expand on the distinction between “descriptive semantics” and “foundational semantics” to show that genealogy can be uniquely qualified to explore the foundations of concepts, and hence to criticize concepts that are problematic in nonobvious ways.
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(2009): Geschichte der Gouvernementalität. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
2006
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(2006): The Grammar of Society. The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2005
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(2005): Evolution of indirect reciprocity. In: Nature 437 (7063), S. 1291-1298. DOI: 10.1038/nature04131
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16251955 Abstract: Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.
Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Biologie, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Humans, Indirekte Reziprozität, Kooperation, Models, Biological, Morals, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Reziprozität, Soziale Angemessenheit, Trust, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2004
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(2004): Social norms and human cooperation. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 8 (4), S. 185-190. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15050515 Abstract: The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-selfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human cooperation.
Keywords: Cooperative Behavior, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Favoriten, Games, Experimental, Good manners, Humans, Interaktion, Interpersonal Relations, Kooperation, Kooperationsvermögen, Modelle/Theorien, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Postkasten, Psychologie, Sanktionierung, Social Behavior, Social Environment, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Sozialkompetenz, Überblick, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2004): Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 8 (2), S. 60-65. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.003
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15588809 Abstract: Animals often aid others without gaining any immediate benefits. Although these acts seem to reduce the donor's fitness, they are only apparently altruistic. Donors typically help because they or their kin receive future benefits or avoid costly punishment. Reciprocal altruism--alternating the roles of donor and recipient--has been a well-studied form of cooperation among non-kin because of its intuitive appeal in explaining human cooperation. Despite immense theoretical interest, little empirical evidence substantiates the biological importance of reciprocal altruism in non-human animals. We propose that this is because psychological mechanisms constrain its application in cooperative contexts. In particular, we contend that cognitive limitations such as temporal discounting, numerical discrimination and memory make reciprocity difficult for animals.
Keywords: Altruism, Animals, Biologie, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Game Theory, Genese, Good manners, Höflichkeit, Humans, Interaktion, Kooperation, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Problem Solving, reziproker Altruismus, Reziprozität, Social Behavior, Soziale Angemessenheit, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2001
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Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.) (2001): Social norms. New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation
Abstract: Social norms are rules that prescribe what people should and should not do given their social surroundings and circumstances. Norms instruct people to keep their promises, to drive on the right, or to abide by the golden rule. They are useful explanatory tools, employed to analyze phenomena as grand as international diplomacy and as mundane as the rules of the road. But our knowledge of norms is scattered across disciplines and research traditions, with no clear consensus on how the term should be used. Research on norms has focused on the content and the consequences of norms, without paying enough attention to their causes. Social Norms reaches across the disciplines of sociology, economics, game theory, and legal studies to provide a well-integrated theoretical and empirical account of how norms emerge, change, persist, or die out. Social Norms opens with a critical review of the many outstanding issues in the research on norms: When are norms simply devices to ease cooperation, and when do they carry intrinsic moral weight? Do norms evolve gradually over time or spring up spontaneously as circumstances change? The volume then turns to case studies on the birth and death of norms in a variety of contexts, from protest movements, to marriage, to mushroom collecting. The authors detail the concrete social processes, such as repeated interactions, social learning, threats and sanctions, that produce, sustain, and enforce norms. One case study explains how it can become normative for citizens to participate in political protests in times of social upheaval. Another case study examines how the norm of objectivity in American journalism emerged: Did it arise by consensus as the professional creed of the press corps, or was it imposed upon journalists by their employers? A third case study examines the emergence of the norm of national self-determination: has it diffused as an element of global culture, or was it imposed by the actions of powerful states? The book concludes with an examination of what we know of norm emergence, highlighting areas of agreement and points of contradiction between the disciplines. Norms may be useful in explaining other phenomena in society, but until we have a coherent theory of their origins we have not truly explained norms themselves. Social Norms moves us closer to a true understanding of this ubiquitous feature of social life.
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(2001) : Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms In: Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.): Social norms: New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, S. 3-34
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(2001) : Game theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms In: Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.): Social norms: New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, S. 105-138
Abstract: Rational choice theory argues that soci al norms emerge because the norms' content yields benefits for some agents. Game theory is that branch of rational choice theory that d eals with soci al interactions among rational actors. The subject of game theory is therefore social action and social relations among rational agents (in Max Weber's sense). The emergence of social norms is closely related to the Hobbesi an problem of social order, and i ts explanation is among the most important issues of social theory. In this chapter I discuss game theoretical approaches to social norms.
Keywords: Disziplin, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Modelle/Theorien, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Rational Choice Theory, Sanktionierung, Social Norms, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Soziologie, Spieltheorie 2000
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(2000): Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3), S. 137-158. DOI: 10.1257/jep.14.3.137
Abstract: I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
1997
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(1997): Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft)Keywords: Natur & Genese von Normen, Norbert Elias' Theorie der höfischen Gesellschaft, Normenwandel, Sozialer Prozess / Zivilisation / Entwicklung, sozialer Wandel, Sozialer Wandel / Zivilisation, Soziologie, Zivilisation, Zivilisation / Entwicklung / Sozialer Prozess, Zivilisation / Sozialer Wandel