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2017
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(2017): Ein pleonastisches Oxymoron. Konstruktionsprobleme von Pierre Bourdieus Schlüsselkonzept der symbolischen Gewalt. In: Berliner Journal für Soziologie 27 (1), S. 7-33. DOI: 10.1007/s11609-017-0335-5
Abstract: According to Pierre Bourdieu, it is due to symbolic violence that social domination can be sustained without resorting to physical force. Because the dominated perceive their situation by means of categories which themselves are structured by power relations, they accept their own domination as legitimate, necessary, or functional. While the concept of symbolic violence takes center stage in Bourdieu's sociology, upon close analysis it turns out to be highly problematic. The paper shows that symbolic violence runs counter to the intentional and experiential structure of acts which are usually perceived as violent. As a result, the relation between symbolic and physical aspects of violence remains ambiguous in Bourdieu's writings. This, again, contributes to an inconsistent view on the history of violence and compromises the very normative grasp the extended notion of violence was actually intended to facilitate. Contrary to the prevailing interpretation, the article argues that the conceptual inconsistencies do not constitute a rhetorical artifice, but result from an unintended deviation from Bourdieu's fundamental terminological strategy to interlink the emic perspective of the actors and the etic perspective of sociology by means of seemingly contradictory phrases. Furthermore, Bourdieu's account of symbolic violence is not convincing with reference to the conceptualization of socialization and the (re)production of symbolic domination in concrete interaction. In a constructive vein the paper finally calls for the continuing analysis of the subtle and manifold modes of symbolic dominance by the use of more appropriate concepts.
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(2017): Cooperation Via Intimidation. An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order. In: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 20 (4). DOI: 10.18564/jasss.3336
Abstract: Can human aggressiveness promote peaceful cooperation? Despite the seeming contradiction of these phenomena, our study suggests the answer is yes. We develop two agent-based models of cooperative interactions among aggressive agents threatening each other. In Model 1, we show that aggressive displays performed by dominance-seeking individuals create a system of mutual threats that effectively enforces cooperation and inhibits agents from escalating conflicts. This happens because agents observe each other fighting, which deters them from attacking each other due to aggressive reputations. In Model 2 we extend this effect to third-party interventions showing that forming alliances makes attacks more efficient and promotes the emergence of common rules determining whom to fight against. In such a state, social order is maintained by the existence of moral alliances - groups of agents willing to fight against norm violators. In summary, we argue that reputation for toughness and the aggressive predisposition of humans could have played an important role in the evolution of cooperation and moral systems.
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