Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Exposure to Hedione Increases Reciprocity in Humans. In: Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience 11. DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00079
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28512400 Abstract: Cooperation among unrelated humans is frequently regarded as a defining feature in the evolutionary success of our species. Whereas, much research has addressed the strategic and cognitive mechanisms that underlie cooperation, investigations into chemosensory processes have received very limited research attention. To bridge that gap, we build on recent research that has identified the chemically synthesized odorant Hedione (HED) as a ligand for the putative human pheromone receptor (VN1R1) expressed in the olfactory mucosa, and hypothesize that exposure to HED may increase reciprocity. Applying behavioral economics paradigms, the present research shows that exposure to the ligand causes differentiated behavioral effects in reciprocal punishments (Study 1) as well as rewards (Study 2), two types of behaviors that are frequently regarded as essential for the development and maintenance of cooperation.
2016
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(2016): Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation. In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 11 (2), S. 313-343. DOI: 10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
Abstract: Both laboratory and field evidence suggest that people tend to voluntarily incur costs to punish non-cooperators. While costly punishment typically reduces the average payoff as well as promotes cooperation. Why does the costly punishment evolve? We study the role of punishment in cooperation promotion within a two-level evolution framework of individual strategies and social norms. In a population with certain social norm, players update their strategies according to the payoff differences among different strategies. In a longer horizon, the evolution of social norm may be driven by the average payoffs of of all members of the society. Norms differ in whether they allow or do not allow for the punishment action as part of strategies, and, for the former, they further differ in whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of cooperative evolutionary stable state (CESS) become larger, but also the convergence speed to CESS is faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm. This model can be used to explain the widespread existence of costly punishment in human society.
Keywords: Bestrafung, Disziplin, economics, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Kooperation, Modelle/Theorien, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Ökonomische Theorie sozialer Normen, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, Wandel von Normen 2009
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(2009): Differential roles of fairness- and compassion-based motivations for cooperation, defection, and punishment. In: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1167, S. 41-50. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04733.x
DOI: http://www.nyas.org/annals/index.asp Abstract: The present paper briefly describes and contrasts two different motivations crucially involved in decision making and cooperation, namely fairness-based and compassion-based motivation. Whereas both can lead to cooperation in comparable social situations, we suggest that they are driven by fundamentally different mechanisms and, overall, predict different behavioral outcomes. First, we provide a brief definition of each and discuss the relevant behavioral and neuroscientific literature with regards to cooperation in the context of economic games. We suggest that, whereas both fairness- and compassion-based motivation can support cooperation, fairness-based motivation leads to punishment in cases of norm violation, while compassion-based motivation can, in cases of defection, counteract a desire for revenge and buffer the decline into iterative noncooperation. However, those with compassion-based motivation alone may get exploited. Finally, we argue that the affective states underlying fairness-based and compassion-based motivation are fundamentally different, the former driven by anger or fear of being punished and the latter by a wish for the other person's well-being.
2008
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(2008): Students’ reaction to classroom discipline in Australia, Israel, and China. In: Teaching and Teacher Education 24 (3), S. 715-724. DOI: 10.1016/j.tate.2007.05.003
Abstract: This study investigates the extent to which students from Australia, Israel, and China report that their teachers' classroom disciplinary behaviour affects their attitudes towards schoolwork and the teacher. They also report how justifiable a teacher's intervention appeared. In all three settings, both punishment and aggression relate significantly to the level of students' distraction and negative affect towards the teacher. Teachers' recognition of responsible behaviour and discussion with students relate to less distraction and greater belief that the intervention was necessary. Hinting and the involvement of students in classroom discipline decision making relate to a stronger belief that the disciplinary actions. taken are warranted. Implications are discussed. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2002
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(2002): Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. In: Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) 13 (1), S. 1-25. DOI: 10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26192593 Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
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