Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017) : Grundriss einer sozialpsychologischen Respekttheorie Hogrefe Verlag . Online verfügbar unter https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1026/0033-3042/a000326 , zuletzt geprüft am 23.02.2018
Abstract: Outline of a Social Psychological Theory of Respect: Implications for Cooperation and Conflict in Pluralistic Societies Abstract. In this article, I outline a social psychological theory of respect with a particular emphasis on the importance of respect for social life in pluralistic societies. Building on social recognition approaches in social philosophy, I first elaborate on a conception of respect as equality recognition. Subsequently, I discuss empirical findings from our own program of research, which validate the proposed respect concept and illuminate important social consequences of respect (as well as of disrespect). I close with some considerations regarding the dynamics of respect and possible trajectories of politicized struggles for recognition in pluralistic societies.
2016
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(2016): What We Can Intend. Recognition and Collective Intentionality. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1), S. 5-26. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12162
Abstract: The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others' right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.
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(2016): Filiation, corps, sexe et genre dans le parcours ricoeurien de la reconnaissance-identité. In: Symposium 20 (2), S. 64-91. DOI: 10.5840/symposium201620218
Abstract: Dans Parcours de la reconnaissance, « se reconnaître dans le lignage » est conçu comme la première expérience de reconnaissance de soi paisible. Traitant de filiation, Ricoeur cite deux auteurs peu compatibles entre eux : Françoise Héritier et Pierre Legendre. Cet article élucide ce passage, montrant que ce double appel est motivé chez Ricoeur par un souci de voir l’« ordre des places » filiales rester intact. La référence à Héritier exprime un féminisme en germe chez Ricoeur, différencialiste, plaidant pour un binarisme des sexes sans hiérarchie. Quant à la référence à Legendre, elle sert de propédeutique à la phénoménologie ricoeurienne du don « sans prix », mais dénote aussi l’appréhension de Ricoeur quant à certaines demandes contemporaines de reconnaissance. Dans le parcours ricoeurien de la reconnaissance-identité, où « se reconnaître dans le lignage » paraît essentiel, trouve-t-on la place pour des personnes intersexuées, transsexuelles, transgenres ou issues de familles monoparentales, homoparentales, alloparentales? En plus de répondre à cette question, j’explique pourquoi Ricoeur rejette le lacanisme de Legendre, et comment il critiquerait le structuralisme d’Héritier s’il avait pris le temps de le faire.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Disziplin, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Ricoeur, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie -
(2016): Hegel's social and political philosophy. Recent debates. In: Philosophy Compass 11 (12), S. 804-817. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12384
Abstract: This article discusses three topics that have been the subject of debate in recent scholarship on Hegel's social and political philosophy: first, the relevance of Hegel's systematic metaphysics for interpreting Hegel's social and political writings; second, the relation between recognition (Anerkennung), social institutions, and rational agency; and third, the connection between the constellation of institutions and norms that Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and Hegel's theory of freedom. This article provides a critical overview of the positions in these three debates. In the case of the first debate, I clarify the conceptual terrain by distinguishing between several kinds of systematicity that are at issue. In the case of the second debate, I argue that the views of two of the major participants, Axel Honneth and Robert Pippin, are in fact compatible. In the case of the third debate, I seek to clarify the connection in Hegel between two different ideas of freedom in ethical life, each of which has been emphasized by different interpreters of Hegel: the idea of freedom as non-alienation and the idea of freedom as social freedom. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which ethical life, for Hegel, enables the freedom of individuals.
2013
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(2013): A cross-cultural, multimodal, affective corpus for gesture expressivity analysis. In: Journal on Multimodal User Interfaces 7 (1-2), S. 121-134. DOI: 10.1007/s12193-012-0112-x
Abstract: A multimodal, cross-cultural corpus of affective behavior is presented in this research work. The corpus construction process, including issues related to the design and implementation of an experiment, is discussed along with resulting acoustic prosody, facial expressions and gesture expressivity features. However, research work presented here focuses more on the cross-cultural aspect of gestural behavior defining a common corpus construction protocol aiming to identify cultural patterns within non-verbal behavior across cultures i.e. German, Greek and Italian. Culture specific findings regarding gesture expressivity are derived from the affective analysis performed. Additionally, the multimodal aspect, including prosody and facial expressions, is researched in terms of fusion techniques. Finally, a release plan of the corpus to the public domain is discussed aiming to establish the current corpus as a benchmark multimodal, cross-cultural standard and reference point.
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(2013): Recognition in Capital. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4), S. 713-727. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9410-y
Abstract: In this paper it is shown that in his conception of value, published in the first volume of Capital, Marx relies on Hegel's concept of pure recognition to organise the relations between use- and exchange-value on the one hand and the relation between the social relations between things (goods) and actors (sellers) on the other hand. Establishing this thesis is important in three respects: Firstly it demonstrates that there is a strong continuity in the philosophical thought of Karl Marx, making visible an essential relation between his Economic-philosophical Manuscripts and his later writings. Secondly it helps to better understand Marx's conception of value; and thirdly it shows that "recognition" is an important conception in his critique of political economy.
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(2013): Three Marxian Approaches to Recognition. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4), S. 699-711. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9413-8
Abstract: If it seems fully legitimate to introduce Marx in the contemporary discussion about recognition, it is more disputable to attribute to Marx an unified conception of recognition. There is no doubt that Marx hasn't provided any systematic account of recognition, but he has tackled the issue of recognition from various points of view. Could these various points of view be unified in a general conception of recognition? This article claims that this is not the case since three accounts of recognition should be distinguished that are hardly compatible one with the other: one Feuerbachian account of recognition of the species being in the other, one account of recognition related to the dynamics of disrespect as social experience, and one account of recognition through social roles.
2012
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(2012): Interplay of oxytocin, vasopressin, and sex hormones in the regulation of social recognition. In: Behavioral neuroscience 126 (1), S. 97-109. DOI: 10.1037/a0026464
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22141469 Abstract: Social Recognition is a fundamental skill that forms the basis of behaviors essential to the proper functioning of pair or group living in most social species. We review here various neurobiological and genetic studies that point to an interplay of oxytocin (OT), arginine-vasopressin (AVP), and the gonadal hormones, estrogens and testosterone, in the mediation of social recognition. Results of a number of studies have shown that OT and its actions at the medial amygdala seem to be essential for social recognition in both sexes. Estrogens facilitate social recognition, possibly by regulating OT production in the hypothalamus and the OT receptors at the medial amygdala. Estrogens also affect social recognition on a rapid time scale, likely through nongenomic actions. The mechanisms of these rapid effects are currently unknown but available evidence points at the hippocampus as the possible site of action. Male rodents seem to be more dependent on AVP acting at the level of the lateral septum for social recognition than female rodents. Results of various studies suggest that testosterone and its metabolites (including estradiol) influence social recognition in males primarily through the AVP V1a receptor. Overall, it appears that gonadal hormone modulation of OT and AVP regulates and fine tunes social recognition and those behaviors that depend upon it (e.g., social bonds, social hierarchies) in a sex specific manner. This points at an important role for these neuroendocrine systems in the regulation of the sex differences that are evident in social behavior and of sociality as a whole.
Keywords: Amygdala, Animals, behaviour, Biologische Marker, Erinnerung, Erkennen von Personen und Situationen, Female, Gonadal Steroid Hormones, hierarchy, Hormone, Hormonhaushalt, Male, Metabolism, Neurobiologie, Neuroscientific social cognition, Oxytocin, physiology, RECOGNITION, Social Behavior, Social recognition, Sozialpsychologie, Status, Vasopressins, Wiedererkennen 2011
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(2011): Pathologies of recognition. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 37 (8), S. 851-887. DOI: 10.1177/0191453711413701
Abstract: Recognition is not only a response to social pathologies. It is also an unstable and often ambivalent relationship that has its own pathologies. Owing to the intertwining between recognition and power, certain forms of recognition turn out to be forms of alienation in or from the world. Such pathologies affect inter-individual recognition as well as the recognition between individuals and the socio-political institutions. The article proposes a joint reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right, which provide norms for identifying and dealing with these pathologies. The norm for inter-individual recognition is set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the norm for state/citizen recognition in the Philosophy of Right. The analysis envisages two other aspects of recognition: the interference of the 'I-Me' with the 'I-You' relationship and the incorporation of the 'I-We' into the 'We-Us' dimension of recognition. As regards the interpretation of Hegel's practical philosophy, the article analyses the link between Hegel's concept of recognition and his theory of action. In this view, the highest form of recognition has more to do with reconciliation - reconciliation between human beings, reconciliation with the 'finitude of action' - than with the problematic of individual and collective identity.
Keywords: alienation, alienation and recognition, Anerkennung, Anerkennung als menschliche Grundkategorie, Disziplin, Entfremdung, Entfremdung bei Hegel, finitude of action, Hegel, Hegels Begriff der Anerkennung, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Philosophie, power relationships, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, universal freedom 2009
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(2009): Labour, exchange and recognition. Marx contra Honneth. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 35 (8), S. 935-959. DOI: 10.1177/0191453709340637
Abstract: This article explores Marx's contention that the achievement of full personhood and, not just consequently, but simultaneously, of genuine intersubjectivity depends upon the attainment of recognition for one's place in the social division of labour, recognition which is systematically denied to some individuals and groups of individuals through the capitalist organization of production and exchange. This reading is then employed in a critique of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition which, it is argued, cannot account for the systematic obstacles faced by some struggles for recognition.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Disziplin, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Kampf um Anerkennung, Konstitution des Selbst, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Lebenswelt, Marx, Marxens Begriff(e) der Anerkennung, Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie -
(2009): A strange hand. On self-recognition and recognition of another. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3), S. 321-342. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9127-5
Abstract: This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl's account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty's later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one's "hereness" and "thereness". The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
Keywords: Anderkennung des Anderen, Anerkennung, Anerkennung des Selbst und des Anderen (Phänomenologie), Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Favoriten, Husserl, IDENTIFICATION, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Merleau-Ponty, Mirror image, Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Phänomenologie, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Recognition of another, Rubber hand illusion, Selbst, Selbst-Anerkennung, Self-recognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie 2002
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(2002): Anthropology, Social Theory, and Politics. Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 433-446. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947531
Abstract: This article presents and discusses. Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as a specific constellation, i.e. as a theoretical endeavour spanning over and interrelating positions in the fields of anthropology, social theory, and politics. As essential components in this constellation I discern an anthropology of recognition, a social philosophy of different forms of recognition, a morality of recognition, a theory of democratic ethical life as a social ideal, and a notion of political democracy as an ambitious reflexive form of social cooperation. A tentative attempt is also made to elucidate the motivational history that underlies and animates Honneth's theoretical endeavour and accounts for its specific `spirit'.
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(2002): Grounding Recognition. A Rejoinder to Critical Questions. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 499-519. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947577Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und soziale Konflikte/Transzendentaler Status von Anerkennung (Honneth), Disziplin, Erwiderung, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Modelle/Theorien, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie
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(2002): On the Genus and Species of Recognition. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 447-462. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947540
Abstract: This article makes several conceptual proposals for a closer analysis of recognition more or less in line with Axel Honneth's account of recognition: (1) a proposal as to the genus of recognitional attitude and recognition, (2) a sketch of an analytical scheme intended to be heuristically useful for analysing the different species of recognitional attitude and recognition, (3) some proposals as to the precise contents of self-conceptions involved in each species and subspecies of recognition, and (4) suggestions as to the relation of the species of recognitional attitude to social settings and concrete personal relationships as well as to the totalities of attitudes instantiated in these settings and relationships. A guiding idea is that the somewhat mechanistic Meadian vocabulary of 'urges' and `internalizations' of Honneth's original formulations should be replaced with formulations where recognition is consistently conceptualized as consisting of attitudes with propositional or judgmental content.
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(2002): Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 479-498. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947568
Abstract: Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique. It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched.
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