Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.
Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen 2016
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(2016): Book Review. What’s So Social about Social Knowledge?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 98-125. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271927
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(2016): Let’s Pretend!. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 75-97. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271925
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2014
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(2014): Perspective-taking in dialogue as self-organization under social constraints. In: New Ideas in Psychology 32, S. 131-146. DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.03.004
Abstract: We present a dynamical systems account of how simple social information influences perspective-taking. Our account is motivated by the notion that perspective-taking may obey common dynamic principles with perceptuomotor coupling. We turn to the prominent HKB dynamical model of motor coordination, drawing from basic principles of self-organization to describe how conversational perspective-taking unfolds in a low-dimensional attractor landscape. We begin by simulating experimental data taken from a simple instruction-following task, in which participants have different expectations about their interaction partner. By treating belief states as different values of a control parameter, we show that data generated by a basic dynamical process fits overall egocentric and other-centric response distributions, the time required for participants to enact a response on a trial-by-trial basis, and the action dynamics exhibited in individual trials. We end by discussing the theoretical significance of dynamics in dialog, arguing that high-level coordination such as perspective-taking may obey similar dynamics as perceptuomotor coordination, pointing to common principles of adaptivity and flexibility during dialog
Keywords: adaptivity, ADDRESSEES, Communication, Conversation, dynamic systems theory, Dynamical systems, EYE-MOVEMENTS, HKB dynamical model of motor coordination, INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Language, LANGUAGE USE, NONLINEAR DYNAMICS, PERCEPTION, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, social information, Spatial cognition, SPEAKERS, TRANSITIONS, Volltreffer 2012
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(2012): Language as Social Coordination. An evolutionary perspective. In: Interaction Studies 13 (1), S. 103-124. DOI: 10.1075/is.13.1.07fus
Abstract: Human social coordination is often mediated by language. Through verbal dialogue, people direct each other's attention to properties of their shared environment, they discuss how to jointly solve problems, share their introspections, and distribute roles and assignments. In this article, we propose a dynamical framework for the study of the coordinative role of language. Based on a review of a number of recent experimental studies, we argue that shared symbolic patterns emerge and stabilize through a process of local reciprocal linguistic alignment. Such patterns in turn come to facilitate and refine social coordination by enabling the alignment, joint construction and navigation of conceptual models and actions. Implications of the framework are illustrated and discussed in relation to a case study where dyads of interlocutors interact verbally to reach joint decisions in a perceptual discrimination task.
Keywords: adaptivity, affordances, Communication, CONSTRAINTS, Conversation, dialogue, emergence, Evolution, HUMAN-COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INTERACTING MINDS, Interaction, Interaktion, INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION, JOINT ACTION, Koordination, Language, linguistic alignment, Linguistik, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS, social coordination, symbolic patterns 2010
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(2010): The Causal Power of Social Structures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: This book offers a solution to the problem of structure and agency: a new solution, but one that draws on a number of existing traditions of thought, most significantly philosophical theories of emergence and causality, and the sociological debates around structuration theory. This introductory chapter sets the context by explaining the problem of structure and agency and its significance for sociology, and outlines some of the key points of my argument. It also offers the reader some hints on different ways to read the rest of the book and briefly locates it with respect to critical realism, the main philosophical tradition on which I draw. The problem of structure and agency Sociology is founded on the belief that our behaviour is causally influenced and in particular that there are social factors that influence our behaviour. Karl Marx, for example, famously wrote ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx 1978 [1859]: 4). Émile Durkheim, similarly, argued that ‘the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely, collective reality’ (Durkheim 1952 [1897]: 38). Conventionally, the social factors that are held to influence our behaviour are known as social structure, a concept that even today remains implicit in, and indeed essential to, much of the work done in the social sciences. Yet there is also widespread disagreement about what social structure really is and how it could affect us.
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