Alle Publikationen
2018
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(2018): Li Zehou's notion of subjectality as a new conception of the human self. In: Philosophy Compass 13 (5). DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12484
Abstract: Li Zehou stands among the most influential Chinese philosophers in the post-Mao era. His notion of subjectality(zhutixing) is of paramount importance for current developments in contemporary Chinese philosophy. It belongs to the central concepts in Li's theoretical framework, around which his entire philosophical system is constructed. With his elaboration of this concept, Li expanded the problem of the self in post-revolutionary modernism. The present article analyzes the theoretical bases of this concept, exposes its importance in the scope of contemporary Chinese theory and shows why and how it represents a call for a new humanism. Through a multidimensional comparative perspective, the author also explains why the human subject, which is based upon Li's notion of subjectality, has the potential not only to transform (post-)modern alienation into a real human condition, that is, into spiritually fulfilled society of autonomous individuals but also to fill up the prevailing vacuum of values.
2017
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(2017): Subjetividad y biopolítica. La pregunta por «la vida». In: Daímon. DOI: 10.6018/daimon/269911
Abstract: With modernity a new definition of the political is established. This article will reflect on the implications of what authors such as Michel Foucault or Hannah Arendt have called "the entrance of life" in the political. From the sharing of these insights, a range of questions will emerge about the possibility of contemporary subjectivity. These questions will be approached by using the contributions of Judith Butler and her theories about precariousness, vulnerability and acknowledgment.
Keywords: acknowledgment, acknowledgment and subjectivity, Anerkennung, biopolitics, Butler, Disziplin, Favoriten, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), life, Modelle/Theorien, Philosophie, (post)strukturalistische Ansätze, postmodern, postmoderne Theorien der Subjektivität, precariousness, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, subject -
(2017): Affective recognition and social freedom - the psychoanalytic and normative-reconstructive logics of grounding social critique in Axel Honneth’s work. In: Filozofija i drustvo 28 (3), S. 415-434. DOI: 10.2298/FID1703415E
Abstract: The task of this paper is the following: how should one explain and solve the theory- immanent tension in Honneth's recent works, i.e. the tension that reflects the difference between the concept of social freedom (a concept grounded in Hegel's social philosophy methodologically articulated through normative reconstruction) and the concept of 'affective recognition' (which has replaced the earlier normative concept) - in other words: is there a certain logically-factually grounded path from the question of subjective-individual recognition to the intersubjective recognition of free (legal) subjects in society? My thesis is the following: this supposed tension is a pseudo-tension. It loosens up - without completely resolving itself - as soon as we combine the two logics of grounding critique that we find in Honneth. However, unrelated to my claim about the pseudo-nature of the mentioned tension, the psychoanalytic mode of grounding critique is erroneous, since one cannot directly arrive at collective components of society starting from the empirical constellation of individual consciousnesses. The relation between subjective individuality and objective (intersubjective) generality is an objective contradiction (as opposed to a purely theoretical tension). If we still decide to pursue this path of grounding critique, we we inadvertently introduce a psychologistic approach into social theory. Such an approach can be found in Honneth's theory of intersubjective (normative) recognition as well.
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(2017): On recognition and self. A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. In: Asian Philosophy 27 (4), S. 292-308. DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (tman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyyikas and Mm?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ntaraksita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
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(2017): Noumenal Alienation. Rousseau, Kant and Marx on the Dialectics of Self-Determination. In: Kantian Review 22 (04), S. 523-551. DOI: 10.1017/S1369415417000267
Abstract: This article argues that alienation (as Entfremdung) should be understood as a particular form of individual and social heteronomy that can only be overcome by a dialectical combination of individual and collective autonomy, recovering a deontological sense of normative authority. If we think about alienation in Kantian terms, the main source of alienation is a denial of standing or, in the extreme, losing a sense of oneself as a rational normative authority equal to all others. I call the former kind of alienation, where persons deny others equal standing as a normative authority in moral or political terms, first order noumenal alienation, as there is no proper mutual cognition and recognition of each other in such a social context. I call the latter kind of alienation, where a subject does not consider themselves an equal normative authority - or an 'end in oneself' second order noumenal alienation (again, in a moral and a political form). In this sense, alienation violates the dignity of humans as moral and political lawgivers - a dignity seen by Rousseau, Kant and Marx as inalienable: It can be denied or violated, but it cannot be lost.
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(2017): Artificial agents among us. Should we recognize them as agents proper?. In: Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1), S. 1-17. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-016-9411-3
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently, as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other-this despite the fact that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and hence as a bearer of rights.
Keywords: agency, Anerkennung, Anerkennung technischer Systeme, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Artificial agent, artificial agents, doppelter Treffer, Favoriten, Group agent, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, RATIONALITY, Realtechnik, recognition and self, responsibility, Rights, Serviceroboter, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Robotik, Technik -
(2017) : Grundriss einer sozialpsychologischen Respekttheorie Hogrefe Verlag . Online verfügbar unter https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1026/0033-3042/a000326 , zuletzt geprüft am 23.02.2018
Abstract: Outline of a Social Psychological Theory of Respect: Implications for Cooperation and Conflict in Pluralistic Societies Abstract. In this article, I outline a social psychological theory of respect with a particular emphasis on the importance of respect for social life in pluralistic societies. Building on social recognition approaches in social philosophy, I first elaborate on a conception of respect as equality recognition. Subsequently, I discuss empirical findings from our own program of research, which validate the proposed respect concept and illuminate important social consequences of respect (as well as of disrespect). I close with some considerations regarding the dynamics of respect and possible trajectories of politicized struggles for recognition in pluralistic societies.
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(2017): Bewertungsspiele. Von der Handlungs- zur Koordinationstheorie. In: KOLNER ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 69 (1), S. 1-26. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-016-0401-6
Abstract: Unsolved problems in the theory of action spread at the level of the coordination social activities. If action theories work with shortened "models of man" also the answers to questions about the possibility of social order, of hierarchie and of the cooperation on the market fall short of requirements. Goal attainment and social recognition are two widely disparate theoretical cornerstones on which hitherto separate theoretical buildings were raised. By contrast, a concept of the social game, which should be introduce here, connects the both moments: Games are goal-oriented interactions in which people recognize themselves mutually. The game player can recognize each other only in the sense that the game is normative regulated. The goal-orientation is thus normative broken. The social recognition is, however, relateled to and relativized by the game success. The theorem of the social game offers solutions to the problem of action coordination in the hierarchy and on the market.
2016
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(2016): What We Can Intend. Recognition and Collective Intentionality. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1), S. 5-26. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12162
Abstract: The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others' right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.
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(2016): Filiation, corps, sexe et genre dans le parcours ricoeurien de la reconnaissance-identité. In: Symposium 20 (2), S. 64-91. DOI: 10.5840/symposium201620218
Abstract: Dans Parcours de la reconnaissance, « se reconnaître dans le lignage » est conçu comme la première expérience de reconnaissance de soi paisible. Traitant de filiation, Ricoeur cite deux auteurs peu compatibles entre eux : Françoise Héritier et Pierre Legendre. Cet article élucide ce passage, montrant que ce double appel est motivé chez Ricoeur par un souci de voir l’« ordre des places » filiales rester intact. La référence à Héritier exprime un féminisme en germe chez Ricoeur, différencialiste, plaidant pour un binarisme des sexes sans hiérarchie. Quant à la référence à Legendre, elle sert de propédeutique à la phénoménologie ricoeurienne du don « sans prix », mais dénote aussi l’appréhension de Ricoeur quant à certaines demandes contemporaines de reconnaissance. Dans le parcours ricoeurien de la reconnaissance-identité, où « se reconnaître dans le lignage » paraît essentiel, trouve-t-on la place pour des personnes intersexuées, transsexuelles, transgenres ou issues de familles monoparentales, homoparentales, alloparentales? En plus de répondre à cette question, j’explique pourquoi Ricoeur rejette le lacanisme de Legendre, et comment il critiquerait le structuralisme d’Héritier s’il avait pris le temps de le faire.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Disziplin, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Ricoeur, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie -
(2016): Grounding the Postmodern Self. In: The Sociological Quarterly 35 (4), S. 685-703. DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1994.tb00423.x
Abstract: In postmodern discourse, self is displaced as a central presence in experience and reappropriated as yet another personal signifier. This paper describes key postmodern views, then reframes postmodern vocabulary in terms of interpretive practice. It argues that the postmodern framing of self is too abstract and that a distinctly modern discourse focused on the deprivatization of interpretive activity can account empirically for features of postmodern ''presence.'' Comparative ethnographic and narrative material is offered in illustration. We conclude by suggesting how self can be retrieved for classical sociological commentary and research.
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(2016): Hegel's social and political philosophy. Recent debates. In: Philosophy Compass 11 (12), S. 804-817. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12384
Abstract: This article discusses three topics that have been the subject of debate in recent scholarship on Hegel's social and political philosophy: first, the relevance of Hegel's systematic metaphysics for interpreting Hegel's social and political writings; second, the relation between recognition (Anerkennung), social institutions, and rational agency; and third, the connection between the constellation of institutions and norms that Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and Hegel's theory of freedom. This article provides a critical overview of the positions in these three debates. In the case of the first debate, I clarify the conceptual terrain by distinguishing between several kinds of systematicity that are at issue. In the case of the second debate, I argue that the views of two of the major participants, Axel Honneth and Robert Pippin, are in fact compatible. In the case of the third debate, I seek to clarify the connection in Hegel between two different ideas of freedom in ethical life, each of which has been emphasized by different interpreters of Hegel: the idea of freedom as non-alienation and the idea of freedom as social freedom. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which ethical life, for Hegel, enables the freedom of individuals.
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(2016): "Before you even know ..." - Big Data und die Erkennbarkeit des Selbst. In: IRIE - International Review of Information Ethics 24 (5), S. 44-54
Abstract: Der Big Data - Technologie wird das Potenzial zugeschrieben, durch Mustererkennung in aggregierten Daten Verhaltensweisen von Personen zu prognostizieren, noch bevor diese intendiert und reflektiert würden. Zumeist widmet sich die Big Data Debatte daher den Befürchtungen möglicher Einbußen von Privatheit und Freiheit. In unserem Beitrag wählen wir jedoch einen anderen Zugriff und fragen, inwiefern die Big Data Visionen das Selbstsein betreffen, also das Konzept davon, wer ich selbst eigentlich bin. Wenn Selbstsein, Martin Heidegger zufolge, eigentlich bedeutet, in kritischer Distanz zu vorgegebenen Möglichkeiten zu leben, stellt sich die Frage, welches Kriterium hier eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit gewährleistet: Wie kann ich wissen, echt ich selbst zu sein, ohne nur wiederum andere Üblichkeiten nachzuahmen? Wir fragen daher, ob die Big Data Technologie subjektive Verzerrungen und Täuschungen über das Selbst ausschalten könnte. Hierfür wird der Begriff „Selbstsein“ bei Heidegger erarbeitet. Dabei lässt sich allerdings zeigen, dass dieser letztlich ohne Trennschärfe bleibt, da die nur negative Charakterisierung von eigentlichem Selbstsein, Heidegger zufolge, echt oder unecht ausgestaltet sein kann – der aus der Möglichkeit echter oder unechter Selbsterzählung resultierende Relativismus wurde bisher nicht hinreichend beachtet. Big Data k ann zwar uneigentliche Erzählmuster vermeiden, nicht aber uneigentliches oder eigentliches Verhalten differenzieren; ob ich z.B. manches – unecht eigentlich – aus Trotz oder Kalkül gegen mein eigenes Selbstverständnis tat, bleibt verborgen. Fazit: Es muss entweder ein Kriterium für echtes Eigentlichsein entwickelt oder der Anspruch, darüber Auskunft zu geben, verworfen werden – bei Heidegger und Big Data. Verzichtet man jedoch auf die Idee einer (echten) Eigentlichkeit verzichtet man auf den Begriff des Sel bst.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Big Data, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Favoriten, Heidegger, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Realtechnik, Philosophie, recognition and self, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Selbst und Eigentlichkeit (Heidegger), Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Technik -
(2016): Hurt Feelings among New Acquaintances. Moderating Effects of Interpersonal Familiarity. In: Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 18 (3), S. 315-326. DOI: 10.1177/0265407501183001
Abstract: Previous research suggests that people's feelings are hurt more frequently by those whom they know well than by strangers and acquaintances, but these findings are based on retrospective accounts of hurtful events. This study examined the moderating effect of familiarity on hurt feelings among people who have recently become acquainted. Participants were led to experience either a relatively low or high degree of familiarity with a confederate. Afterwards, the confederate chose to listen either primarily to them or another participant as they talked about themselves. Results showed that participants were significantly more hurt when they were ignored by a confederate who barely knew them than by a confederate who was more familiar with them. Effects of being ignored showed a similar pattern on a measure of state self-esteem.
2015
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(2015): Work, recognition and subjectivity. In: European Journal of Social Theory 19 (3), S. 340-354. DOI: 10.1177/1368431015594443
Abstract: Recently, following the social and subjective consequences of the neoliberal wave, there seems to be a renewed interest in work as occupying a central place in social and subjective life. For the first time in decades, both sociologists and critical theorists once more again regard work as a major constituent of the subject's identity and thus as an appropriate object of analysis for those engaged in critique of the social pathologies. The aim of this article is to present a succinct analysis of Axel Honneth's thoughts on the concept of work and to propose an approach granting it a more substantial role in social theory. To this end, this article will embark upon a reappraisal of the importance of the material and psychological dimensions of the subject's interactions in the world of work. It aims to demonstrate that the normative demands associated with these dimensions are, like the normative demands of recognition, immanent and universal. In other words, it will argue that the normative ideals related to individuals' bodily and psychic life (in the workplace and beyond) are not necessarily utopian in the negative sense (abstract and unrealistic). If this is indeed the case, theorists could take these normative demands for emancipation as a guide to analyzing the sociological, political and moral implications of the transition from the Fordist' to the post-Fordist' organization of labor.
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Dahms, Harry F. (2015): Globalization, critique and social theory. Bingle, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited (Current perspectives in social theory$$vvolume 33)
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(2015): Hegelian recognition. In: Thesis Eleven 126 (1), S. 100-122. DOI: 10.1177/0725513614567342
Abstract: If we think of recognition as the practical relation consciously enacted by concerned individual subjects as social actors, which allows them to fulfil their intersubjectively valid social roles, this by no means exhausts the significance that recognition is accorded by Hegel. In fact the problem of recognition is central to the understanding and evaluation of Hegel's metaphysical system. Thus a close scrutiny of the presentation of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit and the interpretative difficulties it poses leads on to the question of the subject and Hegel's distinction between finite, accidental individuals and the true subject in his system: the concept of Spirit, understood not as a separate entity but as a system of relations, objectified in the historical forms of the Absolute Spirit. But what is the price of Hegel's metaphysics of subjectivity? Hegelian recognition signifies the recognition by individuals of recognition in its truth, that is, the self-recognition by finite individuals that they participate in Spirit as the true universal subject to the degree that they recognize their shared world of actions as the world of their own making. Modernity is therefore defined for Hegel as the recognition and realization of 'conscious freedom', whose telos lies in the actualization of universal reciprocal recognition that brings the unfreedom of history to an end. The idea of freedom and the thesis of the 'end of history' remain, however, the preserve of the thinking few. Hegelian recognition and with it Hegel's whole metaphysical system founders on the rock of finitude, on the unfreedom of finite human beings.
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(2015) : The Neo-Idealist Paradigm Shift in Contemporary Critical Theory In: Dahms, Harry F.: Globalization, critique and social theory: Bingle, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited (Current perspectives in social theory$$vvolume 33), S. 135-163
Abstract: Purpose - To defend the thesis that critical theory has become unable to call into question and challenge the main impulses of modern capitalist societies. The reason for this is that the capacities of language on the one hand and the hermeneutic processes that underlie the process of "recognition" are insufficient to counter the power of socialization to shape subjectivity and the cognitive and evaluative capacities of subjects. Methodology/approach - I provide a critical reading of the methodology of linguistic and recognitive theories of intersubjectivity by means of a theory of domination derived from Rousseau which shapes the cognitive and epistemic powers of subjects thereby weakening their capacity to be socialized via the media of language and social recognition. Findings - By divorcing our cognitive ideas about the social world from the social-ontological processes that shape and deform it under capitalism, this brand of critical theory succeeds in sealing off the mechanisms of social domination and power relations that were at the heart of the enterprise from its inception. Research limitations/implications - Critical theory must move toward a more comprehensive theory of the social totality in order for it to retain its critical character. Originality/value - The paper questions the main ideas held by the mainstream of critical theory such as its reliance on hermeneutic and linguistic forms of consciousness and social praxis as well as a theoretical reliance on pragmatic theories of mind and Mead's conception of socialization.
2014
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(2014): Spuren der Anerkennung. Studien zu einer sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftlichen Kategorie. Wiesbaden: Springer. Online verfügbar unter http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1731325
DOI: http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1731325 Abstract: Der Anerkennungsbegriff ist heute zum Schlusselbegriff der Ethik geworden und hat als ein solcher zunehmend auch im sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs an Bedeutung gewonnen. Dabei gilt Anerkennung vielfach als normative Richtschnur, mit der sich (padagogische) Beziehungen und Praxen bewerten lassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund unternimmt die Arbeit eine Spurensuche zur Anerkennungskategorie. Mittels Rekonstruktion verschiedener Anerkennungskonzepte werden Bedeutungsgehalte und Dimensionen der ?Anerkennung' herausgearbeitet und auf sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftliche Problemstellun
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Dahms, Harry F. (2014): Mediations of social life in the 21st century. First edition. Bingle, UK: Emerald Group Publishing (Current Perspectives in Social Theory)
Keywords: Anerkennung, Critical Theory of Technology, Emerald eBook Collection, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophy, recognition and subjectivity, Reflexionen über MTR, Research, Sammelband, social action, Social Change, social sciences, Sociology, Soziale Angemessenheit, Übersicht -
(2014): Kritik von Lebensformen. 1. Aufl., Orig.-Ausg. Berlin: SuhrkampKeywords: Anerkennung, Criticism (Philosophy), Disziplin, Ethik, Favoriten, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Kritik, Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaften / Philosophie, Lebensform, Modelle/Theorien, Moralkritik, Normen, Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Philosophy, Politik, Politische Ethik, social sciences, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Sozialphilosophie, Spielregeltheoretische Ansätze, Spielregeltheoretische Anstätze
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(2014) : Bringing the Critical Back in. Toward the Resurrection of the Frankfurt School In: Dahms, Harry F.: Mediations of social life in the 21st century, 32: First edition: Bingle, UK: Emerald Group Publishing (Current Perspectives in Social Theory), S. 195-227
Abstract: Purpose - To resurrect and renew the tradition of the early Frankfurt School, whose of Marxist-Hegelian dialectical approach to understanding the societal conditions of its emergence - post World War I Germany, the rise of fascism, New Deal politics, the defeat of fascism, and the subsequent rise of consumer society - remains relevant to studying present circumstances, stressing the cultural dimension of capitalism, the proliferation of alienation, ideology, and mass media, and, finally, the nature of the society-character/subjectivity nexus. Methodology - Employing a comparative historical approach to the study of alienation, ideology, and character, to articulate social-theoretical standards for critical social research today. Social implications - Global civilization faces an array of crises, beginning with economies whose lack of growth or stability the ability of a large segment of the world's population to obtain jobs conducive to a decent standard of life. With governments' inability to implement public policies to buffer instabilities, cultural values are in crisis as well. Findings - Reviving the framework of early Frankfurt School Critical Theory is necessary to promote a better world. Originality - Reconstructing key concerns of the Frankfurt School is conducive to critiquing this tradition's recent preoccupation with communication and recognition, and demonstrates how the first generation's legacy helps us understand contemporary social movements of the Right and the Left, in ways that are similar to the Weimar Republic in Germany. Both the Right and the Left being products of legitimation crises that trigger a desire for regressive or progressive social change - the Right would restore a mythical past, the Left would foster a new social order based on humanistic concerns.
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(2014): Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes. Hamburg: Meiner (Blaue Reihe). Online verfügbar unter http://www.meiner.de
Abstract: Der Gedanke der Anerkennung als Norm zwischenmenschlichen Verhaltens und Kriterium der Beurteilung von sozialen Lebensformen und Institutionen hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten weltweit eine bedeutende philosophische Karriere gehabt. Dabei hat die Rezeption des Deutschen Idealismus eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt. Das gilt auch für den amerikanischen Pragmatismus von Mead bis Taylor und Brandom oder den Existentialismus und die Phänomenologie in Frankreich von Kojève bis Ricoeur. Das Buch verfolgt die Entstehung von Hegels Philosophie des objektiven Geistes in der Jenaer Zeit, in der »Anerkennung« das organisierende Systemprinzip ist. Dabei werden zeitgenössische Theorien der Intersubjektivität (Sartre, Lacan) oder der gelungenen Sozialisation (Habermas, Dreitzel) als Maßstab sozialer Institutionen auf ihre Nähe zu Hegel hin untersucht. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf Hegels Methode, zum Verständnis und zur Kritik einer existierenden Gesellschaftsordnung auf die historische Genese von Normen und Institutionen zurückzugreifen. Ein solches genetisch-kritisches Verfahren scheint auch heute einem apriorisch-deduktiven überlegen (so auch M. Walzer oder R. Geuss). Hegel vermag das Potential seiner Theorie aber, wie auch anhand der Berliner Rechtsphilosophie gezeigt wird, aufgrund bestimmter metaphysischer Prämissen nur unvollkommen auszuschöpfen. Mit der internationalen Entwicklung der Anerkennungstheorie seit 1979 setzt sich die Einleitung dieser Neubearbeitung auseinander. Der Gedanke der Anerkennung als Norm zwischenmenschlichen Verhaltens und Kriterium der Beurteilung von sozialen Lebensformen und Institutionen hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten weltweit eine bedeutende philosophische Karriere gehabt. Dabei hat die Rezeption des Deutschen Idealismus eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt. Das gilt auch für den amerikanischen Pragmatismus von Mead bis Taylor und Brandom oder den Existentialismus und die Phänomenologie in Frankreich von Kojève bis Ricoeur. Das Buch verfolgt die Entstehung von Hegels Philosophie des objektiven Geistes in der Jenaer Zeit, in der »Anerkennung« das organisierende Systemprinzip ist. Dabei werden zeitgenössische Theorien der Intersubjektivität (Sartre, Lacan) oder der gelungenen Sozialisation (Habermas, Dreitzel) als Maßstab sozialer Institutionen auf ihre Nähe zu Hegel hin untersucht. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf Hegels Methode, zum Verständnis und zur Kritik einer existierenden Gesellschaftsordnung auf die historische Genese von Normen und Institutionen zurückzugreifen. Ein solches genetisch-kritisches Verfahren scheint auch heute einem apriorisch-deduktiven überlegen (so auch M. Walzer oder R. Geuss). Hegel vermag das Potential seiner Theorie aber, wie auch anhand der Berliner Rechtsphilosophie gezeigt wird, aufgrund bestimmter metaphysischer Prämissen nur unvollkommen auszuschöpfen. Mit der internationalen Entwicklung der Anerkennungstheorie seit 1979 setzt sich die Einleitung dieser Neubearbeitung auseinander.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Praktische Philosophie -
(2014): Anerkennung, Subjektivität und Gesellschaftskritik. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (2), S. 239-259. DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2014-0019
2013
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(2013): Intimacy and the Possibility for Self-Knowledge in Hegel's Dialectic of Recognition. In: Idealistic Studies 43 (3), S. 133-152. DOI: 10.5840/idstudies201411710
Abstract: Abstract The achievement of self-consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology hinges on establishing a relationship with another self-conscious being. How this is accomplished, and even that it is accomplished in Hegel's text, are topics of dispute and misunderstanding in the literature. I show how Hegel argues for this intersubjective origin of self-consciousness, first, by comparing Hegel's analysis of lord and bondsman to Sartre's analysis of intimacy. Second, I focus on two interpretive challenges. First, I argue that the staking of life comes from an other-oriented epistemological relation, and not simply from an immediate concern with dominating the other. Second, contrary to many interpretations which see the bondsman's development arising out of an isolated activity merely between himself and the products of his labor, I argue that the slave's ability to gain knowledge of himself as a self is only possible by establishing a relationship with the lord. This point is essential because, if readings of the bondsman's development as isolated from the lord are correct, then Hegel has in fact not succeeded in showing that self-consciousness only develops out of intersubjective recognition.