Alle Publikationen

  • Erweiterte Suche öffnen

Treffer: 7
  • <<
  • 1
  • 2017

  • Shirado, Hirokazu; Christakis, Nicholas A. (2017): Locally noisy autonomous agents improve global human coordination in network experiments. In: Nature 545 (7654), S. 370-374. DOI: 10.1038/nature22332

    DOI: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5912653 

    Abstract: Coordination in groups faces a sub-optimization problem and theory suggests that some randomness may help to achieve global optima. Here we performed experiments involving a networked colour coordination game in which groups of humans interacted with autonomous software agents (known as bots). Subjects (n = 4,000) were embedded in networks (n = 230) of 20 nodes, to which we sometimes added 3 bots. The bots were programmed with varying levels of behavioural randomness and different geodesic locations. We show that bots acting with small levels of random noise and placed in central locations meaningfully improve the collective performance of human groups, accelerating the median solution time by 55.6%. This is especially the case when the coordination problem is hard. Behavioural randomness worked not only by making the task of humans to whom the bots were connected easier, but also by affecting the gameplay of the humans among themselves and hence creating further cascades of benefit in global coordination in these heterogeneous systems.

  • Zhao, Kun; Ferguson, Eamonn; Smillie, Luke D. (2017): Individual Differences in Good Manners Rather Than Compassion Predict Fair Allocations of Wealth in the Dictator Game. In: Journal of personality 85 (2), S. 244-256. DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12237

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26691600 

    Abstract: One of the most common tools for studying pro-sociality is the dictator game, in which allocations to one's partner are often described in terms of altruism. However, the motivations driving these allocations may represent either emotional concern for others (compassion), adherence to social norms regarding fairness (politeness), or both. In this article, we apply personality psychology to the study of behavior in the dictator game, in which we examine the discriminant validity of distinct pro-social constructs from the Big Five and HEXACO models in relation to allocations of wealth. Across four studies (Study 1: N = 192; Study 2: N = 212; Study 3: N = 304; Study 4: N = 90) utilizing both hypothetical and incentivized designs, we found that the politeness-but not compassion-aspect of Big Five Agreeableness, as well as HEXACO Honesty-Humility, uniquely predicted dictator allocations within their respective personality models. These findings contribute to a growing literature indicating that the standard dictator game measures "good manners" or adherence to norms concerning fairness, rather than pure emotional concern or compassionate motives, and have important implications for how this paradigm is used and interpreted in psychological research.

  • 2013

  • Przepiorka, Wojtek; Diekmann, Andreas (2013): Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: A volunteer's dilemma. In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B 280 (1759). DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2013.0247

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.0247 

    Abstract: Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer's dilemma (VOD), where only one individual's action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.

  • 2011

  • Bolling, Danielle Z.; Pitskel, Naomi B.; Deen, Ben; Crowley, Michael J.; McPartland, James C.; Mayes, Linda C.; Pelphrey, Kevin A. (2011): Dissociable brain mechanisms for processing social exclusion and rule violation. In: NEUROIMAGE 54 (3), S. 2462-2471. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.049

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20974272 

    Abstract: Social exclusion inherently involves an element of expectancy violation, in that we expect other people to follow the unwritten rule to include us in social interactions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we employed a unique modification of an interactive virtual ball-tossing game called "Cyberball" (Williams et al., 2000) and a novel paradigm called "Cybershape," in which rules are broken in the absence of social exclusion, to dissociate brain regions that process social exclusion from rule violations more generally. Our Cyberball game employed an alternating block design and removed evoked responses to events when the participant was throwing the ball in inclusion to make this condition comparable to exclusion, where participants did not throw. With these modifications, we replicated prior findings of ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC), insula, and posterior cingulate cortex activity evoked by social exclusion relative to inclusion. We also identified exclusion-evoked activity in the hippocampi, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and left middle temporal gyrus. Comparing social exclusion and rule violation revealed a functional dissociation in the active neural systems as well as differential functional connectivity with vACC. Some overlap was observed in regions differentially modulated by social exclusion and rule violation, including the vACC and lateral parietal cortex. These overlapping brain regions showed different activation during social exclusion compared to rule violation, each relative to fair play. Comparing activation patterns to social exclusion and rule violation allowed for the dissociation of brain regions involved in the experience of exclusion versus expectancy violation. zitiert von 96

  • Wu, Yin; Leliveld, Marijke C.; Zhou, Xiaolin (2011): Social distance modulates recipient's fairness consideration in the dictator game. An ERP study. In: Biological psychology 88 (2-3), S. 253-262. DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2011.08.009

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21889968 

    Abstract: Previous research showed that social distance (e.g., being friends or strangers) influences people's fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear how social distance influences the recipient's evaluation of (un)fair behavior. In this study, we let people play a dictator game in which they received (un)fair offers from either friends or strangers while their brain potentials were recorded. Results showed that the medial frontal negativity (MFN), a component associated with the processing of expectancy violation, was more negative-going in response to unfair than to fair offers from friends whereas it did not show differential responses to offers from strangers. The P300 was more positive for fair than for unfair offers irrespective of friends or strangers making the offers. These results suggest that violation of social norms can be detected at an early stage of evaluative processing and that this detection can be modulated by social distance. zitiert von 66

  • 2010

  • Moretti, Laura; Di Pellegrino, Giuseppe (2010): Disgust selectively modulates reciprocal fairness in economic interactions. In: Emotion (Washington, D.C.) 10 (2), S. 169-180. DOI: 10.1037/a0017826

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20364893 

    Abstract: We report two studies aimed at investigating the effects of distinct negative emotions on pairwise economic interactions. In the ultimatum game, a proposer offers a division of a sum of money to a responder who decides whether to accept the split, or reject and leave both players with nothing. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether induced disgust, as compared to sadness and neutral emotion, specifically influences responders' decisions to reject unfair proposals. In Experiment 2, we assessed whether the effects of disgust were selectively related to social contexts by contrasting interactions with a human partner with those involving a computer. Results showed that relative to being in a sad or neutral mood, induced feelings of disgust significantly increased rejection rates of unfair offers. Moreover, we found that when the partner was not responsible for the fairness violation, such as in the computer-offer condition, the disgust induction failed to affect participants' choices. We conclude by focusing on the hypothesis that disgust and social norm violations may share common computational components, both at a psychological and a neural level.

  • 2004

  • Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs (2004): Social norms and human cooperation. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 8 (4), S. 185-190. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15050515 

    Abstract: The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-selfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human cooperation.

  • <<
  • 1