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  • 2016

  • Hofkirchner, Wolfgang (2016): A Critical Social Systems View of the Internet. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4), S. 471-500. DOI: 10.1177/0048393107307664

    Abstract: The article discusses principles that form part of evolutionary systems thinking in social sciences and humanities. It is argued that introducing the concept of self-organization relates agency and structures in a way that makes it possible to take up certain features of Critical Theory by which it can meet the demands for a critical social science. These principles are applied to the question of whether there is convergence or divergence in and by means of the Internet. It will be clarified that the Internet is basically a social system and that it is a subsystem of the larger and overarching system of the whole society. It will be shown how the Internet can be perceived as a possible trigger for societal developments bringing about fundamental change in the nature of society. Thus the article cuts across philosophical, system theoretical, social theoretical, sociology of technology, and information society theory considerations.

  • Hofkirchner, Wolfgang (2016): A Critical Social Systems View of the Internet. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4), S. 471-500. DOI: 10.1177/0048393107307664
  • 2014

  • Urrestarazu, Hugo (2014): Social Autopoiesis?. In: CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONS (9/2), S. 153-166

    Abstract: In previous papers, I suggested six rules proposed by Varela, Maturana and Uribe as a validation test to assess the autopoietic nature of a complex dynamic system. Identifying possible non-biological autopoietic systems is harder than merely assessing self-organization, existence of embodied boundaries and some observable autonomous behavioural capabilities: any rigorous assessment should include a close observation of the "intra-boundaries" phenomenology in terms of components' self-production, their spatial distribution and the temporal occurrence of interaction events. >Problem . Under which physical and components' relational conditions can some social systems be properly considered as autopoietic unities compliant with the six rules? >Results . Dynamic systems can be classified according to "degrees of autonomous behaviour" that they may acquire as a result of the emergence of organizational closure (i.e., autonomy). Also, the different "degrees of attainable systemic autonomy" depend on the "degrees of autonomy" shown by a system's dynamic components. For human social systems, a necessary balance between individuals' autonomy and the heteronomous behaviour brought about on people by social norms (laws, culture, tradition or coercion) sets limits to the "degree of systemic autonomy" that human organizations may acquire. Therefore social systems, defined as dynamic systems composed of physical agents, could not attain the high "levels of systemic autonomy" ascribable to autopoietic systems without constraining the autonomy of agents to "levels" that are incompatible with spontaneous human behaviour. Also, social organizations seen as composed of physical agents interacting in physical space cannot be construed as autopoietic systems. Alternatively, if seen as composed of "process-like" entities, where agents participate as actors within processes, some social systems could be described as autopoietic wholes existing in the abstract space in which we distinguish interactions between processes, provided that we can assess compliance with the rules for some specific cases. >Implications . These conclusions contribute to the debate on the possible autopoietic nature of some human social systems and to grasping the opportunity to shift focus to the more interesting issue of the "degrees of systemic autonomy" that human organizations could acquire (if needed) without imposing unbearable limitations on the autonomy of human actors. Also, the conceptual framework of this explanatory approach could be used in practical terms to assist the development of new dynamic modelling languages capable of simulating social systems.

  • 2011

  • Andrighetto, Giulia; Villatoro, Daniel (2011): Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model. In: European Conference on Cognitive Science

    Abstract: As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, by punishment we refer to a practice that works only by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than mere punishment.

  • 2001

  • Tschacher, Wolfgang; Scheier, Christian (2001) : Embodied Cognitive Science: Concepts, Methods and Implications for Psychology In: Matthies, Michael; Malchow, Horst; Kriz, Jürgen (Hg.): Integrative Systems Approaches to Natural and Social Dynamics: Systems Science 2000: Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, S. 551-567. Online verfügbar unter https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56585-4_35, zuletzt geprüft am 03.08.2019

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56585-4_35 

    Abstract: Since the “cognitive shift” of psychology, a close association between psychology and the advances in computer technology and artificial intelligence research has evolved. According to the ‘computational’ symbol processing approach, cognition consists of a series of sequentially ordered processing stages. Between perception and action, input is processed by higher cognitive functions, such as categorization, memory, and planning. These cognitive functions are conceived as independent modules lacking a direct interface with the environment. This approach is criticized due to its inherent fundamental problems. Alternative research programs, such as embodied cognitive science, primarily address the issues of embodied cognition, i. e., cognition is viewed as originating from the interaction of body and environment. The methods of the corresponding “new AI” encompass robotics and the use of autonomous agents. It is investigated here which implications for psychology may arise. A theoretical conceptualization of autonomous agents based on dynamical systems theory and synergetics is outlined. Within this context, the cognitive system is conceived as a complex system comprising numerous sensorimotor loops; coherent and adaptive perception-action processes emerge from the influence of affordances. Examples cited from the field of applied psychology indicate that these perspectives lead to the formulation of new research questions and reinterpretation of empirical findings.

  • 1992

  • Ito, Keisuke; Gunji, Yukio-Pegio (1992): Self-organization toward criticality in the game of life. In: Biosystems 26 (3), S. 135-138. DOI: 10.1016/0303-2647(92)90072-7

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0303-2647(92)90072-7 

    Abstract: Life seems to be at the border between order and chaos. The Game of Life, which is a cellular automaton to mimic life, also lies at the transition between ordered and chaotic structures. Kauffman recently suggested that the organizations at the edge of chaos may be the characteristic target of selection for systems able to coordinate complex tasks and adapt. In this paper, we present the idea of perpetual disequilibration proposed by Gunji and others as a general principle governing self-organization of complex systems towards the critical state lying at the border of order and chaos. The rule for the Game of Life has the minimum degree of perpetual disequilibrium among 218 rules of the class to which it belongs.

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