Alle Publikationen
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2014
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(2014): The DNA of Conventions. In: Law and Philosophy 33 (5), S. 535-571. DOI: 10.1007/s10982-013-9191-4
Abstract: This paper defends a moralized account of conventions, according to which conventional practices are necessarily normative reasons that are ultimately grounded on moral principles (such as fairness, respect or prevention of harm). It argues that a convention exists just in case the fact that others participate in some common practice as well as facts about their motivating reasons for doing so, justify conformity to that practice. The paper locates this moralized account within the relevant philosophical literature and argues that it does better than its rivals in explaining the presence of both motivating and normative reasons in our concept of convention.
2013
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(2013): Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omissions. In: The Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253), S. 716-739. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12067
Abstract: This article addresses the question of what history an obstacle that stands in the way of our performing a certain action (x) must have in order to render us socially unfree to x. The most promising view on this question is the moral responsibility view, according to which such an obstacle renders us socially unfree to x, if and only if another person is morally responsible for its existence. The main challenge of this view is to identify a serviceable test for establishing when someone is morally responsible for the existence of an obstacle. Numerous attempts to do so have been made over the years, but none of them proved to be successful. In my discussion of the moral responsibility view I will expose the failure of the most recent and powerful attempt to identify such a test. Then I will suggest a more plausible test and defend it from a few possible objections. Before discussing the moral responsibility view I will discuss its main rivals and show why it is superior to them in the first place.
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