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  • 2017

  • Kupfer, Tom R.; Giner-Sorolla, Roger (2017): Communicating Moral Motives. The social signaling function of disgust.. In: Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (6), S. 632-640. DOI: 10.1177/1948550616679236

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616679236 

    Abstract: Disgust motivates pathogen avoidance, but it is unclear why it is also reported toward moral violations. Previous explanations have focused on identifying the type of violation specific to disgust. Here, we propose that people express disgust toward any type of moral violation in order to communicate particular motives. Unlike anger, which can be seen as self-interested, disgust communicates a more principled, moral motivation. Two experiments show that observers infer more moral motivation from an expression of disgust and more self-interested motivation from anger. Two further experiments testing participants’ own expression decisions demonstrate that disgust is chosen more to show moral concern and anger is chosen to protest harm to one’s self-interest. By shifting focus to the interpersonal effects of emotion expressions, these findings offer a new perspective for understanding the role of disgust in morality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights res erved) zitiert von: 7

  • 2016

  • Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara; Wilson, Paul A. (2016) : Physical and moral disgust in socially believable behaving systems in different cultures In: Esposito, Anna; Jain, Lakhmi C. (Hg.): Toward robotic socially believable behaving systems: Modeling emotions., Vol. I, 105: Cham: Springer International Publishing (Intelligent systems reference library; Vol 105; ISSN: 1868-4394 (Print), 1868-4408 (Electronic)), S. 105-132

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31056-5_7 

    Abstract: The aim of the present study is to use the GRID, online emotions sorting and corpus methodologies to illuminate different types of disgust that an emotion-sensitive socially interacting robot would need to encode and decode in order to competently produce and recognise these and other types of physical, moral and aesthetic types of complex emotions in social settings. We argue that emotions in general, and different types of disgust as an instance of these, differ with respect to the amount of cognitivegrounding they need in order to arise and social robots will successfully use such emotions provided they do not only recognise and produce physical, bodily manifestations of emotions, but also have access to large knowledge bases and are able to process situational context clues. The different types of disgust are identified and compared cross-culturally to provide an evaluation of their relative salience. The study also underscores the conceptual viewpoint of emotions as clusters of emotions rather than solitary, individual representations. We argue that such clustering should be at the heart of emotions modelling in social robots. In order to successfully use the emotion of disgust in their interactions with humans, robots need to be sensitive to possible within-culture and cross-culture differences pertaining to such emotions, exemplified by British English and Polish in the present study. Given the centrality of values to the emotion of disgust, robots need to have the capacity to update from a knowledge base and learn from the situational context the set of values for each significant human that they interact with. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)

  • 2013

  • Tobia, Kevin Patrick (2013): The effects of cleanliness and disgust on moral judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (4), S. 556-568. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.877386

    Abstract: Recent experimental studies in cognitive science report the influence of “disgust” and “cleanliness” manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust- and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views, I argue, are those that posit causal effects from a single common cognitive mechanism for both disgust and cleanliness.

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