Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order. In: Sociological Theory 19 (3), S. 312-324. DOI: 10.1111/0735-2751.00143
Abstract: The article asserts that Goffman's concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is-in turn-predicated "on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints".
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Disziplin, Erwartungen, erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen, familiarity, Frame theory, Frameanalysis Rahmenanalyse Framing, Goffman, Interaktion, kollektive Intentionalität, Natur & Genese von Normen, Soziale Ordnung, Soziologie, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), Theory of interaction (Goffman), Vertrauen -
(2016): What We Can Intend. Recognition and Collective Intentionality. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1), S. 5-26. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12162
Abstract: The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others' right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality.
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(2016): We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2), S. 95-110. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672831 Abstract: The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”
2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2012
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(2012): One’s a Crowd?. On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4), S. 519-530. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112454335
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393112454335 Abstract: In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Durkheim, Game Theory, Gilbert, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, individualism, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, kollektive Intentionalität, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natur & Genese von Normen, Ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, Realtechnik, social psychology, Sociology, Technik, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 2009
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Schmid, Hans Bernhard; Schweikard, David P. (Hg.) (2009): Kollektive Intentionalität. Eine Debatte über die Grundlagen des Sozialen. 1. Aufl.. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft)
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