Alle Publikationen
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2005
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(2005): Evolution of indirect reciprocity. In: Nature 437 (7063), S. 1291-1298. DOI: 10.1038/nature04131
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16251955 Abstract: Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.
Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Biologie, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Humans, Indirekte Reziprozität, Kooperation, Models, Biological, Morals, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Reziprozität, Soziale Angemessenheit, Trust, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 1998
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(1998): Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. In: Nature 393 (6685), S. 573-577. DOI: 10.1038/31225
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9634232 Abstract: Darwinian evolution has to provide an explanation for cooperative behaviour. Theories of cooperation are based on kin selection (dependent on genetic relatedness), group selection and reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated encounters between the same individuals allow for the return of an altruistic act by the recipient. Here we present a new theoretical framework, which is based on indirect reciprocity and does not require the same two individuals ever to meet again. Individual selection can nevertheless favour cooperative strategies directed towards recipients that have helped others in the past. Cooperation pays because it confers the image of a valuable community member to the cooperating individual. We present computer simulations and analytic models that specify the conditions required for evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity. We show that the probability of knowing the 'image' of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. We propose that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies.
Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Good manners, Helping Behavior, Humans, Indirect reciprocity model, Indirekte Reziprozität, Interaktion, Kooperation, Mutation, Reziprozität, Selection, Genetic, Soziale Angemessenheit, Spieltheorie
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