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  • 2018

  • Lindström, Björn; Jangard, Simon; Selbing, Ida; Olsson, Andreas (2018): The role of a "common is moral" heuristic in the stability and change of moral norms. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 147 (2), S. 228-242. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000365

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28891657 

    Abstract: Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record zitiert von: 1

  • 2015

  • Colquitt, Jason A.; Zipay, Kate P. (2015): Justice, Fairness, and Employee Reactions. In: Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior 2 (1), S. 75-99. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111457

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111457 

    Abstract: Of all the issues that employees consider in organizational life, justice and fairness are among the most salient. Justice reflects the perceived adherence to rules that represent appropriateness in decision contexts (e.g., equity, consistency, respect, truthfulness). Fairness reflects a more global perception of appropriateness that lies downstream of justice. Our review integrates justice theories (fairness heuristic theory, the relational model, the group engagement model, fairness theory, deonance theory, uncertainty management theory) and broader theories (social exchange theory, affective events theory) to examine three questions: (a) Why do employees think about justice issues in the first place? (b) how do employees form fairness perceptions? and (c) how do employees react to those perceptions? We close by describing how justice and fairness can be managed in organizations, especially given new technological trends in how people work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 AP A, all rights reserved)

  • 2014

  • Streicher, Bernhard; Frey, Dieter (2014): Gerechtigkeitsurteile und Konflikte. Warum Menschen unfaire Informationen bevorzugen. In: Konfliktdynamik 3 (1), S. 8-17

    Abstract: Grunde fur die Bevorzugung unfairer Informationen in Konflikten werden reflektiert. Nach einem Einblick in Prozesse der fairessrelevanten Informationssuche in Konfliktsituationen werden basierend auf der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz und der Fairness-Heuristik-Theorie Bewertungsprozesse erlautert. Anhand empirischer Befunde wird die Praferenz von Informationen verdeutlicht, die eine unfaire Wahrnehmung unterstutzen. Als Ursache fur diese Praferenz wird die unterschiedliche Glaubwurdigkeit von als fair und als unfair wahrgenommenen Informationen diskutiert, aus der diefolgende Hypothese abgeleitet wird: Wahrend wahrgenommene Fairness als zweifelhaft beurtielt wird wird und somit eine vertiefende der Informationssuche hervorruft, wird Unfairnessempfinden als so uberzeugend wahrgenommen, dass es zur Bestatigung des ersten Eindrucks motiviert. Die Bedeutung dieser Prozesse fur die Vermittlung von positiven Fairnessinformationen in Konfliktsituationen und fur die Konfliktlosung wird verdeutlicht. Source: 978-3-642-19034-6

  • 2013

  • Hertwig, Ralph (2013): Simple heuristics in a social world. Social learning: A route to good cue orders. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press (Evolution and cognition)

    Abstract: Discusses how individuals learn good cue orders in social learning. The process of how people can learn this both individually and socially by exchanging information is outlined. It is hypothesized that information exchange can help boundedly rational individuals efficiently solve the problem of learning which cues are good by the use of various heuristics. Illustrative data from recent experimental research regarding both individuals and groups are discussed. Results showed that individual learning of cue orders was slower than when engaged socially with others, likely due to the participant's imitation of a group's most accurate member. In conclusion, it is argued that an integrative view of both individual and social learning is most relevant when studying the learning of good cue orders.

  • Polonioli, Andrea (2013): Blame It on the Norm. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2), S. 131-150. DOI: 10.1177/0048393113510468
  • 2005

  • Betsch, Tilmann (2005): Wie beeinflussen Routinen das Entscheidungsverhalten?. In: Psychologische Rundschau 56 (4), S. 261-270. DOI: 10.1026/0033-3042.56.4.261

    Abstract: Es wird ein Überblick über neuere Untersuchungen gegeben, die sich mit dem Einfluss von Routinen auf Entscheidungen befassen. Es zeigt sich, dass Routinen systematisch die Generierung von Alternativen, die Informationssuche, die Bewertung, die Wahl und schließlich die Implementierung des gewählten Verhaltens beeinflussen. Mit Blick auf die Befunde wird ein breites Rahmenmodell empfohlen, das das Lernen von Routinen als integralen Bestandteil von Entscheidung versteht. zitiert von 40

  • 2003

  • Mussweiler, Thomas; Ruter, Katja (2003): What friends are for! The use of routine standards in social comparison. In: Journal of personality and social psychology 85 (3), S. 467-481

    Abstract: Investigated the use of routine standards of social comparison in self-evaluation. Experiments 1-3 studied whether information about subjects' best friends is used as a routine standard and is therefore more accessible immediately after self-evaluative judgments. A lexical-decision task was performed by 36 college students in Experiment 1 after they had evaluated themselves or a well-known celebrity on several dimensions. Lexical decisions for the best friend's name (but not the name of a former friend) were facilitated after self-evaluation. Experiment 2 required 33 college students to evaluate a best friend or former friend immediately after self-evaluation on the same dimensions, and showed faster response times for friends compared to former friends. This response advantage resulted even in Experiment 3, where 58 college students rated their best friend on dimensions on which they considered themselves dissimilar. The role of an experimentally created routine standard was studied in Experiment 4: 28 college students received information about two fictitious persons either immediately before self-evaluations (routine standard) or in an isolated format (non-routine standard). Results showed an influence of the routine standard on self-evaluation. It is concluded that in self-evaluation, individuals activate information about persons they routinely compare themselves with. The use of routine standards in social comparison is considered an efficient strategy in self-evaluation. Moreover, implications for social comparison theory, the mechanisms of forming and using routine standards, as well as the limits or routine standard use are outlined. zitiert von 138

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