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2017
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(2017): Affective recognition and social freedom - the psychoanalytic and normative-reconstructive logics of grounding social critique in Axel Honneth’s work. In: Filozofija i drustvo 28 (3), S. 415-434. DOI: 10.2298/FID1703415E
Abstract: The task of this paper is the following: how should one explain and solve the theory- immanent tension in Honneth's recent works, i.e. the tension that reflects the difference between the concept of social freedom (a concept grounded in Hegel's social philosophy methodologically articulated through normative reconstruction) and the concept of 'affective recognition' (which has replaced the earlier normative concept) - in other words: is there a certain logically-factually grounded path from the question of subjective-individual recognition to the intersubjective recognition of free (legal) subjects in society? My thesis is the following: this supposed tension is a pseudo-tension. It loosens up - without completely resolving itself - as soon as we combine the two logics of grounding critique that we find in Honneth. However, unrelated to my claim about the pseudo-nature of the mentioned tension, the psychoanalytic mode of grounding critique is erroneous, since one cannot directly arrive at collective components of society starting from the empirical constellation of individual consciousnesses. The relation between subjective individuality and objective (intersubjective) generality is an objective contradiction (as opposed to a purely theoretical tension). If we still decide to pursue this path of grounding critique, we we inadvertently introduce a psychologistic approach into social theory. Such an approach can be found in Honneth's theory of intersubjective (normative) recognition as well.
2015
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(2015): Work, recognition and subjectivity. In: European Journal of Social Theory 19 (3), S. 340-354. DOI: 10.1177/1368431015594443
Abstract: Recently, following the social and subjective consequences of the neoliberal wave, there seems to be a renewed interest in work as occupying a central place in social and subjective life. For the first time in decades, both sociologists and critical theorists once more again regard work as a major constituent of the subject's identity and thus as an appropriate object of analysis for those engaged in critique of the social pathologies. The aim of this article is to present a succinct analysis of Axel Honneth's thoughts on the concept of work and to propose an approach granting it a more substantial role in social theory. To this end, this article will embark upon a reappraisal of the importance of the material and psychological dimensions of the subject's interactions in the world of work. It aims to demonstrate that the normative demands associated with these dimensions are, like the normative demands of recognition, immanent and universal. In other words, it will argue that the normative ideals related to individuals' bodily and psychic life (in the workplace and beyond) are not necessarily utopian in the negative sense (abstract and unrealistic). If this is indeed the case, theorists could take these normative demands for emancipation as a guide to analyzing the sociological, political and moral implications of the transition from the Fordist' to the post-Fordist' organization of labor.
2014
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(2014): Anerkennung, Subjektivität und Gesellschaftskritik. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (2), S. 239-259. DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2014-0019
2012
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(2012): Perspectives and ideologies. A pragmatic use for recognition theory. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 38 (2), S. 215-226. DOI: 10.1177/0191453711427260
Abstract: 'Recognition' is a normative concept denoting the ascription of positive status to a group or an individual by (an) other(s). In its larger meaning, it carries the implication that when a group or an individual can justifiably expect such a positive status-ascription, its denial (misrecognition) is unjustified and unethical. I discuss the role that the concept of recognition can play at the intersection of two philosophies, pragmatism and contemporary critical theory. My perspective is one that embraces the 'pragmatic turn' in critical theory and sees the possibility of reciprocal benefit for pragmatism in how critical theory handles issues of material culture, alienation and networks of power. I argue that a critical social theory incorporating pragmatist presuppositions ought to bring the concept of recognition to bear in how it isolates and treats the 'real interests' of groups and individuals who have suffered and continue to suffer from broad social ascriptions of negative status, or who, through lack of voice and access to the public sphere, remain paralysed to participation in a thriving liberal democracy. In doing so, I do not construe recognition primarily as 'positive tolerance' or understanding of cultural, ethnic, or gender identity, but as a minimally substantive tool for understanding, and potentially correcting, how misrecognition impacts the collective and individual agency of the historically oppressed.
Keywords: alienation and recognition, Anerkennung, Anerkennung als menschliche Grundkategorie, Disziplin, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Modelle/Theorien, Philosophie, Pragmatische Einbettung der Anerkennungstheorie, Pragmatismus, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie -
(2012): Being Oneself in Another. Recognition and the Culturalist Deformation of Identity. In: Inquiry 55 (2), S. 148-170. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2012.661579
Abstract: Nancy Fraser raises serious doubts about the critical potential of identity theories of recognition on the ground that they encourage the reduction of personal identity to cultural identity. Based on a comparative analysis of Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, this paper argues that Fraser's critique is justified with respect to some aspects of Taylor's theory of identity, but not with respect to his conception of recognition, or to Honneth's conception of both identity and recognition. Taylor's theory of identity recognition is vulnerable to Fraser's critique because under certain conditions of pathological socialization it cannot prevent the normative subordination of strong evaluation to whatever dominant goods are acquired through acculturation. Honneth's theory of identity recognition overcomes this normative weakness in three ways. First, Honneth differentiates between three types of self-relation that cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Second, he operates with a mixed, attributive-responsive model of recognition that normatively underwrites all these types of self-relation. Third, he makes the condition of reciprocity in recognition the criterion for successful self-realization that enables one to distinguish between misrecognition and non-normative experiences of human suffering
2009
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(2009): Labour, exchange and recognition. Marx contra Honneth. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 35 (8), S. 935-959. DOI: 10.1177/0191453709340637
Abstract: This article explores Marx's contention that the achievement of full personhood and, not just consequently, but simultaneously, of genuine intersubjectivity depends upon the attainment of recognition for one's place in the social division of labour, recognition which is systematically denied to some individuals and groups of individuals through the capitalist organization of production and exchange. This reading is then employed in a critique of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition which, it is argued, cannot account for the systematic obstacles faced by some struggles for recognition.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Disziplin, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Kampf um Anerkennung, Konstitution des Selbst, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Lebenswelt, Marx, Marxens Begriff(e) der Anerkennung, Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie 2007
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(2007): A Formal Recognition of Social Attachments. Expanding Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. In: Inquiry 50 (2), S. 180-205. DOI: 10.1080/00201740701239897
Abstract: Axel Honneth draws a distinction between three types of recognition: (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem. In his The Struggle for Recognition, the recognition of cultural particularity is situated in the third sphere. It will here be argued that the logic of recognition of cultural identity also demands a non-evaluative recognition, namely a respect for difference. Difference-respect is formal because it is a recognition of the value of a particular culture not 'for society" or "as such", but for the social group involved. Yet, although it is formal, difference-respect cannot be reduced to respect for personal autonomy and its preconditions, as Honneth wrongly suggests in Redistribution or Recognition? It is argued here that difference-respect is oriented towards another dimension of the person, namely social attachments. This kind of respect entails a separate register of formal recognition with a corresponding concept of personal identity and a parallel category of social disrespect. What morally justifies difference-respect from a recognition-theoretic approach is the practical relation-to-self that thus becomes possible, namely self-respect as a sense of belonging. The formal conception of the good life that Honneth articulates should include the insight that this sense of belonging is as much a necessary condition for the good life as is personal autonomy.
2005
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(2005): Verdinglichung. Eine anerkennungstheoretische Studie. 1. Aufl.. Frankfurt am Main: SuhrkampKeywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und soziale Konflikte/Transzendentaler Status von Anerkennung (Honneth), Begriff, Anerkennungstheorie, deutsche Community, Dewey, John, Disziplin, Favoriten, Heidegger, Martin <1889-1976>, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Lukács, Georg, Philosophie, Recogniton (Philosophy), reification, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Soziologie, Verdinglichung, Verdinglichung / Begriff
2002
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(2002): Anthropology, Social Theory, and Politics. Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 433-446. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947531
Abstract: This article presents and discusses. Axel Honneth's theory of recognition as a specific constellation, i.e. as a theoretical endeavour spanning over and interrelating positions in the fields of anthropology, social theory, and politics. As essential components in this constellation I discern an anthropology of recognition, a social philosophy of different forms of recognition, a morality of recognition, a theory of democratic ethical life as a social ideal, and a notion of political democracy as an ambitious reflexive form of social cooperation. A tentative attempt is also made to elucidate the motivational history that underlies and animates Honneth's theoretical endeavour and accounts for its specific `spirit'.
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(2002): Grounding Recognition. A Rejoinder to Critical Questions. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 499-519. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947577Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und soziale Konflikte/Transzendentaler Status von Anerkennung (Honneth), Disziplin, Erwiderung, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Modelle/Theorien, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie
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(2002): On the Genus and Species of Recognition. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 447-462. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947540
Abstract: This article makes several conceptual proposals for a closer analysis of recognition more or less in line with Axel Honneth's account of recognition: (1) a proposal as to the genus of recognitional attitude and recognition, (2) a sketch of an analytical scheme intended to be heuristically useful for analysing the different species of recognitional attitude and recognition, (3) some proposals as to the precise contents of self-conceptions involved in each species and subspecies of recognition, and (4) suggestions as to the relation of the species of recognitional attitude to social settings and concrete personal relationships as well as to the totalities of attitudes instantiated in these settings and relationships. A guiding idea is that the somewhat mechanistic Meadian vocabulary of 'urges' and `internalizations' of Honneth's original formulations should be replaced with formulations where recognition is consistently conceptualized as consisting of attitudes with propositional or judgmental content.
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(2002): Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique. In: Inquiry 45 (4), S. 479-498. DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947568
Abstract: Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique. It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched.
1996
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(1996): The struggle for recognition. The moral grammar of social conflicts. 1. publ. pbk. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press Cambridge
1994
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(1994): Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch-Verl.Keywords: Anerkennung, Anerkennung und soziale Konflikte/Transzendentaler Status von Anerkennung (Honneth), Begriff, Favoriten, Honneth, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Kampf um Anerkennung, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), lidos, Modelle/Theorien, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Konflikte, Sozialphilosophie
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