Alle Publikationen
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2009
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(2009): The social brain: neural basis of social knowledge. In: Annual review of psychology 60, S. 693-716. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163514
DOI: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2588649 Abstract: Social cognition in humans is distinguished by psychological processes that allow us to make inferences about what is going on inside other people-their intentions, feelings, and thoughts. Some of these processes likely account for aspects of human social behavior that are unique, such as our culture and civilization. Most schemes divide social information processing into those processes that are relatively automatic and driven by the stimuli, versus those that are more deliberative and controlled, and sensitive to context and strategy. These distinctions are reflected in the neural structures that underlie social cognition, where there is a recent wealth of data primarily from functional neuroimaging. Here I provide a broad survey of the key abilities, processes, and ways in which to relate these to data from cognitive neuroscience.
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(2009): Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?. In: Psychological Review 116 (4), S. 953-970. DOI: 10.1037/a0016923
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19839692 Abstract: The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. H. Onishi & R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, & D. Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behavior (e.g., J. Call & M. Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., I. A. Apperly, D. Samson, & G. W. Humphreys, 2009). The authors interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. They propose that the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans, this capacity persists in parallel with a later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory-of-mind abilities.
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(2009): Social competence and social skills training and intervention for children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. In: JOURNAL OF AUTISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 39 (9), S. 1268-1277. DOI: 10.1007/s10803-009-0741-4
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19365716 Abstract: This study examined the effectiveness of a 30 week social competence and social skills group intervention program with children, ages 7-11, diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Eighteen children with ASD were assessed with pretreatment and posttreatment measures on the Walker-McConnell Scale (WMS) and the MGH YouthCare Social Competence Development Scale. Each received the 30-week intervention program. For comparison, a matched sample of ten non-ASD children was also assessed, but received no treatment. The findings indicated that each ASD intervention group demonstrated significant gains on the WMS and significant improvement in the areas of anxiety management, joint attention, and flexibility/transitions. Results suggest that this approach can be effective in improving core social deficits in individuals with ASD.
Keywords: Anxiety, Attention, Autistic Disorder, Awareness, Behavior Therapy, Character development, Child, Communication, Diagnosis, Disziplin, Erziehung, Erziehungswissenschaften, Female, Follow-Up Studies, (Freiheit von) Ängsten, Group, Group Processes, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Kinder, Kognitive Skills, Male, Mensch mit Behinderung, Methods, Negotiating, Personal Construct Theory, Personality Assessment, Postkasten, Problem Solving, PSYCHOLOGY, Psychotherapie, Social Adjustment, Social Behavior, Social Cognition, social competence training, social competences, social learning, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialkompetenz, SV, Therapy -
(2009): Give a person power and he or she will show interpersonal sensitivity. The phenomenon and its why and when. In: Journal of personality and social psychology 97 (5), S. 835-850. DOI: 10.1037/a0016234
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19857005 Abstract: The goal of the present research was to investigate whether high or low power leads to more interpersonal sensitivity and what potentially mediates and moderates this effect. In Study 1, 76 participants in either a high- or low-power position interacted; in Study 2, 134 participants were implicitly primed with either high- or low-power or neutral words; and in Study 3, 96 participants were asked to remember a situation in which they felt high or low power (plus a control condition). In Study 4, 157 participants were told to identify with either an egoistic, empathic, or neutral leadership style. In all studies, interpersonal sensitivity, defined as correctly assessing other people, was then measured using different instruments in each study. Consistently, high power resulted in more interpersonal sensitivity than low power. Feeling respected and proud was partially responsible for this effect. Empathic power as a personality trait was related to more interpersonal sensitivity, and high-power individuals who adopted an empathic instead of an egoistic leadership style were more interpersonally sensitive. zitiert von 215
2008
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2007
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(2007): Language and theory of mind: meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding. In: CHILD DEVELOPMENT 78 (2), S. 622-646. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17381794 Abstract: Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the variability across studies--including aspect of language ability assessed, type of false-belief task used, and direction of effect. The results indicate a moderate to large effect size overall that remains significant when age is controlled. Receptive vocabulary measures had weaker relations than measures of general language. Stronger effects were found from earlier language to later false belief than the reverse. Significant differences were not found among types of false-belief task.
2006
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(2006): Knowing your place: Self-perceptions of status in face-to-face groups. In: Journal of personality and social psychology 91 (6), S. 1094-1110. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1094
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17144767 Abstract: Status is the prominence, respect, and influence individuals enjoy in the eyes of others. Theories of positive illusions suggest that individuals form overly positive perceptions of their status in face-to-face groups. In contrast, the authors argue that individuals' perceptions of their status are highly accurate--that is, they closely match the group's perception of their status--because forming overly positive status self-perceptions can damage individuals' acceptance in a group. Therefore, the authors further argue that individuals are likely to refrain from status self-enhancement to maintain their belongingness in a group. Support for their hypotheses was found in 2 studies of status in face-to-face groups, using a social relations model approach (D. A. Kenny & L. La Voie, 1984). Individuals showed high accuracy in perceiving their status and even erred on the side of being overly humble. Moreover, enhancement in status self-perceptions was associated with lower levels of social acceptance.
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(2006): Theory of mind--evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. In: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 30 (4), S. 437-455. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.08.001
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16239031 Abstract: The ability to infer other persons' mental states and emotions has been termed 'theory of mind'. It represents an evolved psychological capacity most highly developed in humans. The evolutionary origins of theory of mind can be traced back in extant non-human primates; theory of mind probably emerged as an adaptive response to increasingly complex primate social interaction. This sophisticated 'metacognitive' ability comes, however, at an evolutionary cost, reflected in a broad spectrum of psychopathological conditions. Extensive research into autistic spectrum disorders has revealed that theory of mind may be selectively impaired, leaving other cognitive faculties intact. Recent studies have shown that observed deficits in theory of mind task performance are part of a broad range of symptoms in schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, some forms of dementia, 'psychopathy' and in other psychiatric disorders. This article reviews the evolutionary psychology of theory of mind including its ontogeny and representation in the central nervous system, and studies of theory of mind in psychopathological conditions.
Keywords: Animals, Biological Evolution, Brain/physiology, Disziplin, Emotions/physiology, Gefühle, Good manners, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Mental Disorders/etiology, Mental Processes, mental states, Native Theorie, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Personal Construct Theory, Postkasten, Psychologie, Psychopathology, Reflexionen über MTR, Social Behavior, Social Mind, theory of mind, (Theory of mind), Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten
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