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2016
Fiebich, Anika (2016): Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2), S. 161-184. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1261394

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people's behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people's behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.

Keywords: Angesicht, ASPERGER-SYNDROME, Autism spectrum disorder, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Blick, Disziplin, EYE GAZE, FALSE BELIEF, Interaction, Interaktion, JOINT ATTENTION, mental states, mental states reasoning, mentale Zustände, MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM, NORMAL-CHILDREN, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, OF-MIND DEVELOPMENT, OTHERS ACTIONS, Pathologie, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, Philosophie, pluralist theories, Psychologie, script, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, SPECTRUM DISORDERS
2001
Garfield, Jay L.; Peterson, Candida C.; Perry, Tricia (2001): Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and The Development of the Theory of Mind. In: Mind and Language 16 (5), S. 494-541. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00180

Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well is in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from Studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky.

Keywords: adequate social interaction, AUTISTIC-CHILD, Communication, DEAF-CHILDREN, DEFICIT, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, FALSE BELIEF, INDIVIDUALS, KNOWLEDGE, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Linguistik, MODULARITY, performance, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Social Skills, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, WILLIAMS-SYNDROME

2016

2001

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