Alle Publikationen
2017
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(2017): Social Conceptions of Moral Agency in Hegel and Sellars. In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2), S. 249-265. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2016.1276950
Abstract: This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer parallel resolutions of the Kantian paradox': the apparent problem that, in Kantian ethics, moral agents must both freely self-legislate the moral law unto themselves and stand in a dutiful relation to the moral law as a necessary function of practical reason. Drawing Hegel and Sellars together in this way casts new light on Sellars's understudied ethical theory and further evidences the contemporary relevance of Hegel's moral philosophy.
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(2017): Morality and the regulation of social behavior. Groups as moral anchors. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge (European monographs in social psychology)
Abstract: Morality indicates what is the ‘right’ and what is the ‘wrong’ way to behave. It is one of the most popular areas of research in contemporary social psychology, driven in part by recent political-economic crises and the behavioral patterns they exposed. In the past, work on morality tended to highlight individual concerns and moral principles, but more recently researchers have started to address the group context of moral behavior. In Morality and the Regulation of Social Behavior: Groups as Moral Anchors, Naomi Ellemers builds on her extensive research experience to draw together a wide range of insights and findings on morality. She offers an essential integrative summary of the social functions of moral phenomena, examines how social groups contribute to moral values, and explains how groups act as ‘moral anchors’.
Keywords: Gruppe, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Konventionen, Moral, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Psychologie, Sozialverhalten, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, Zwischenmenschliche Beziehung -
(2017): Kant, Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3), S. 285-305. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12242
Abstract: I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by the systematic attack on autonomy that occurs within oppressive social conditions. Insofar as Kant's negative duty of self-respect is unable to accommodate the ways immersion in oppressive social environments can warp an individual's understanding of what she is owed and capable of as a moral agent, it perpetuates the cruelty of unjust social systems in the guise of respecting individual autonomy. I conclude by considering Carol Hay's argument that those who are oppressed have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression, in order to explore how this limitation in how Kant conceives of the duty to respect the self may reach expression in contemporary ethical theory inspired by Kant.
Keywords: agency, Autonomie, Diskriminierung, Disziplin, Ethik, feminism, Feminismus, Gender, Handlungsmacht, Hay, Kant, Macht, Modelle/Theorien, Moral, moral agents, moralische Gesetze, moralisches Wissen, Moralphilosophie, oppressive social systems, Philosophie, Respekt, social systems, ethics, Three main normative ethic perspectives Kant, Utilitarismus virtue ethics, Unterdrückungssysteme -
(2017): Searching for Moral Dumbfounding. Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding. In: Collabra: Psychology 3 (1). DOI: 10.1525/collabra.79
Abstract: Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral psychology. The present research examines the reliability with which dumbfounding can be elicited, and aims to identify measureable indicators of dumbfounding. Study 1 aimed at establishing the effect that is reported in the literature. Participants read four scenarios and judged the actions described. An Interviewer challenged participants’ stated reasons for judgements. Dumbfounding was evoked, as measured by two indicators, admissions of not having reasons (17%), unsupported declarations (9%) with differences between scenarios. Study 2 measured dumbfounding as the selecting of an unsupported declaration as part of a computerised task. We observed high rates of dumbfounding across all scenarios. Studies 3a (college sample) and 3b (MTurk sample), addressing limitations in Study 2, replaced the unsupported declaration with an admission of having no reason, and included open-ended responses that were coded for unsupported declarations. As predicted, lower rates of dumbfounding were observed (3a 20%; 3b 16%; or 3a 32%; 3b 24% including unsupported declarations in open-ended responses). Two measures provided evidence for dumbfounding across three studies; rates varied with task type (interview/computer task), and with the particular measure being employed (admissions of not having reasons/unsupported declarations). Possible cognitive processes underlying dumbfounding and limitations of methodologies used are discussed as a means to account for this variability.
Keywords: A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding, Dominanz, Präzision und Argumentation, Erfüllen erwarteter Erwartungen, Erfüllen von erwarteten Erwartungen ohne geistige Eigenbeteiligung, erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen, Erwartungserfüllung, Moralphilosophie, Moralpsychologie, Normen, Psychologie, Werte -
(2017): The Rawlsian Critique of Utilitarianism. A Luhmannian Interpretation. In: Journal of Business Ethics 142 (1), S. 25-35. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2786-y
Abstract: The present paper builds on the Rawlsian critique of utilitarianism in order to identify the moral implications of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. While Luhmann aptly discerned the pervasive problems of the precarious system-environment relations throughout the modern society, he took moral communication to be person-centered and thus ill-equipped to deal with these problems. At the same time, the Rawlsian possibility of sacrificing fundamental liberties for the sake of economic gains not only exemplifies the Luhmannian precariousness of the relations of the economic system to its societal environment, but also shows this precariousness to be a moral problem. Thus, from the systems-theoretic perspective, the Rawlsian idea of justice denotes the moral dimension of the capacity of the societal environment to carry the economic system. More generally, the proposed complementarity between Rawls and Luhmann allows to see the precariousness of system-environment relations, for any type of social system, as a moral problem. Two implications follow. First, the morally problematic manifestations of the precarious system-environment relations are not limited to the Rawlsian case of the discrimination of the least advantaged groups but rather include a broad range of social costs and damaging effects of business on society and nature. Second, and related, the proposed systems-theoretic perspective explicates the moral value of sustainability of the economic as well as other social systems in their environment, societal and ecological alike.
Keywords: BUSINESS, business ethics, ethics, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP, Disziplin, Economic system, Ethik, Gesellschaftsprofit, John Rawls, Justice, Kosten-Nutzen, Luhmann, Moral, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Morals, Moraltheorie, Niklas Luhmann, Philosophie, Rawls, SOCIAL COSTS, social systems, Societal environment, SYSTEMS, Utilitarianism, Utilitarismus 2016
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(2016): The ethics of everyday life. Moral theology, social anthropology, and the imagination of the human. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press
Abstract: What should the opportunities and demands of my spouse’s work mean for me given the opportunities and demands of my own work? Should we move away from our extended family for a better job? Should we have children now? What kind of education do we owe our children? How do we balance the demands of our aging parents with the demands of our children? Do my spouse and my children really know how much I love them? How much should we be giving to the church and to this or that cause? Is it okay to drive this safer car and to drive it as much as I do given how much CO2 it emits? Should I really order a steak? I suspect that these are the sorts of moral questions that bedevil a majority of individuals most of the time—nothing glamorous, nothing exciting, only the warp and woof of our daily lives. We want to live faithfully and well, knowing that to live such a life will require a thousand little decisions that may have unintended ethical consequences. [End Page 379] The typical class in ethics, even Christian ethics or moral theology, and the typical anthology used in such a class follows a standard formula. The first part of the class/book is devoted to an examination of the major theories on offer and includes an account of deontological or nonconsequentialist theories (the nature of the act is what makes it wrong or right) with the greatest attention devoted to variations of Kantian ethics. It also includes various permutations of consequentialist or utilitarian ethics (do the greatest good, however that is understood, for the greatest number of people). This, in turn, is typically followed by an introduction to virtue ethics in some shape or form. After this groundwork is laid, students are then given the opportunity to sink their teeth into the juicy bits, namely the “application” of these theories and their guiding principles to a fairly standard set of moral problems, many of which are bioethical problems, including beginning of life issues such as cloning, in vitro fertilization and Assisted Reproductive Technologies, and abortion, and end of life issues such as euthanasia and physician assisted suicide. Other issues include the intentional taking of human life in war and capital punishment; hunger and poverty; and environmental responsibilities and animal welfare. Students who complete such a class may emerge relieved that morality, having so little to do with their daily lives, is not quite as demanding as they had feared. After all, how likely is it that they will come face to face with any of these hard moral problems, much less more than one? And if they should perchance encounter one of these problems, they need only to plug the moral principle into it. “Ethics is really pretty simple,” they may think. Michael Banner, Dean and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, is hardly the first to notice how distorting and unhelpful is the reduction of ethics to an attempted resolution of a hard moral problem. Moral quandaries are but a minor part of the moral life. Unlike earlier critics like Alasdair MacIntyre, who turned to Aristotle to forge a retrieval of an ethics of virtue as an alternative to an ethics of hard cases, Banner commends an “everyday ethics,” an ethics of the course of life (and says not a word about virtue). And where earlier critics, especially MacIntyre, find modern morality, both in theory and in practice, incoherent, Banner is dismissive only of the practices of most modern moral theorists (in particular, bioethicists), and not modern moral practices themselves. Indeed, moral theory should attend to moral phenomena. [End Page 380] Furthermore, because cultural anthropology (in Britain “social anthropology”) is the discipline in which moral phenomena is most closely examined and described, moral theology must partner with social anthropology. Moral theology will do its appropriate work only through its...
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(2016): Assessing the Moral Coherence and Moral Robustness of Social Systems. Proof of Concept for a Graphical Models Approach. In: Science and engineering ethics 22 (6), S. 1761-1779. DOI: 10.1007/s11948-015-9743-0
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26689413 Abstract: This paper presents a proof of concept for a graphical models approach to assessing the moral coherence and moral robustness of systems of social interactions. "Moral coherence" refers to the degree to which the rights and duties of agents within a system are effectively respected when agents in the system comply with the rights and duties that are recognized as in force for the relevant context of interaction. "Moral robustness" refers to the degree to which a system of social interaction is configured to ensure that the interests of agents are effectively respected even in the face of noncompliance. Using the case of conscientious objection of pharmacists to filling prescriptions for emergency contraception as an example, we illustrate how a graphical models approach can help stakeholders identify structural weaknesses in systems of social interaction and evaluate the relative merits of alternate organizational structures. By illustrating the merits of a graphical models approach we hope to spur further developments in this area.
Keywords: Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Graphic model concerning "moral robustness" and "moral coherence", graphical models approach, Human Rights, Humans, Kommunikations-/Interaktionsprinzipien, machine learning, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Theoretical, Moral, moral agents, moralische Gesetze, moralische Kohärenz, moralische Robustheit, Moralphilosophie, Morals, non/compliance, Philosophie, Respektieren und Erfüllen von Interessen von Agenten, Respektieren von Rechten und Pflichten von Agenten, Social Environment, social interaction, Social Responsibility, Moraltheorie, soziale Interaktion, Soziale Angemessenheit, strukturelle Schwächen in sozialen Systemen, Technikphilosophie, Überblick -
(2016): A Time-Lagged Study of the Relationship Between Big Five Personality and Ethical Ideology. In: Ethics & Behavior 26 (6), S. 488-506. DOI: 10.1080/10508422.2015.1055493
Abstract: Our objective is to examine the effects of Big Five personality traits on ethical ideologies using a time-lagged design of 406 employees of higher education institutions in Pakistan. Based on low/high idealism versus relativism, we investigate the conceptual linkage between each of the personality traits and moral philosophy. The results illustrate that extraversion and openness to experience believed on subjectivism moral philosophy, agreeableness believed on situationism, and neuroticism believed on absolutism moral philosophies. In addition, contentiousness believed on exceptionism moral philosophy. Furthermore, managerial implications and future research directions are suggested.
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(2016): Obligation and Impersonality. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (6), S. 604-623. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116649970
Abstract: Although sociologists conceive obligation as an objective force (the social) that compels individuals to act and think according to pre-defined norms of conduct and ways of reasoning, philosophers view it as an imperative that is met through the agent's deliberation. The aim of this article is to undermine the standard dichotomy between the deterministically sociological and the moral-philosophical views of obligation by way of contending that Wittgenstein's view on blind obedience (as analyzed by Meredith Williams) bears a conception of the social. I will then argue that Wittgenstein's notion of forms of life and the sociological notion of situation refer to the same encompassing phenomenon: obligation. I will finally claim that this phenomenon should be re-specified in terms of impersonality to devise a shared dynamic conception of obligation admitting that a plurality of contextual normative orders monitor collective and individual action in ordinary life.
2015
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(2015): Adorno's View of Life. In: FRONTIERS OF PHILOSOPHY IN CHINA (10/3), S. 444-456
Abstract: The aim of this article is to reflect on the dialectic of the individual's life and death in terms of Adorno's moral philosophy, specifically through a thorough reading of his Negative Dialectics and other key works on the subject. I hold that there are two aspects of the dialectic of life within the context of Adorno's "nonidentity": one involves exploring the false identification, due to the reification of modern society, of the individual's life experience with her or his death experience, while the other involves preserving the dialectical and irreducible tension between the theoretical contemplation of life and of historical conditions, as well as specific social systems. Heidegger's ontological philosophy concerning Dasein and Kant's categorical imperative will also be discussed in order to fully understand Adorno's moral philosophy and his idea of nonidentity. From my point of view, Adorno's moral philosophy is the prime motivator of his unique concept of nonidentity, and has influenced contemporary political philosophical concepts such as biopolitics (cf. G. Agamben).
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(2015): THE DEPTH OF CIVILIZING FEATURES. NEGATIVE DIALECTICS BETWEEN POLITENESS AND MORALITY IN KANT’S ANTHROPOLOGY. In: ENDOXA-SERIES FILOSOFICAS (35), S. 119-138
Abstract: This paper tackles the contribution that the beautiful appearance of virtue, whose multiplicity of forms can be gathered under the generic name of decorum, offers to the civilizing process and also to the progressive moralization of mankind according to Kant’s Moral Anthropology. First, I will focus on the homiletic virtues analyzed in the Metaphysics of Morals, that is, loquacity, politeness, hospitality and indulgence, which bring about a trompe l’oeil inside the subject, always prone to selfishness and to the perversion of its practical drives. Secondly, I will analyze the relationship between these “supplements of virtue,” good social manners, and an undeniable anthropological fact, that is, the weakness of human nature and the need to use aesthetic crutches to get accustomed to acting in accordance with pure practical principles. Finally, I will cast light on the importance that parerga deserves according to Kant, who argues that these special virtues must be cultivated in the midst of social life, that is to say, always in contact with others. On the contrary, moral appearance produced by the individual subject ought to be banned unequivocally, because everyone must avoid falling into false illusions about the purity of her or his own intentions.
2014
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(2014): One Justice or Two?. A Model of Reconciliation of Normative Justice Theories and Empirical Research on Organizational Justice. In: Journal of Business Ethics 124 (3), S. 435-451. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-013-1881-1
Abstract: Management scholars and social scientists investigate dynamics of subjective fairness perceptions in the workplace under the umbrella term "organizational justice." Philosophers and ethicists, on the other hand, think of justice as a normative requirement in societal relationships with conflicting interests. Both ways of looking at justice have neither remained fully separated nor been clearly integrated. It seems that much could be gained and learned by more closely integrating the ethical and the empirical fields of justice. On the other hand, it may simply not be possible to bridge the divide between the subjective empirical and the normative prescriptive justice as both fields pose different questions and rely on different assumptions and methods. In this paper, we propose a "reconciliation" model, as a third way of considering justice in the workplace, taking into account normative and psychological issues pertaining to justice. Through applying a reconciliation model, we provide a new way of looking at the interconnections between justice philosophy and organizational justice that could advance future research in both fields. Our model also implies that justice researchers can and should be concerned with the moral implications of their own subject of research.
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(2014): The DNA of Conventions. In: Law and Philosophy 33 (5), S. 535-571. DOI: 10.1007/s10982-013-9191-4
Abstract: This paper defends a moralized account of conventions, according to which conventional practices are necessarily normative reasons that are ultimately grounded on moral principles (such as fairness, respect or prevention of harm). It argues that a convention exists just in case the fact that others participate in some common practice as well as facts about their motivating reasons for doing so, justify conformity to that practice. The paper locates this moralized account within the relevant philosophical literature and argues that it does better than its rivals in explaining the presence of both motivating and normative reasons in our concept of convention.
2013
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(2013): The moral behavior of ethics professors. Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior. In: Philosophical Psychology 27 (3), S. 293-327. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.727135
Abstract: Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, responsiveness to student emails, charitable giving, and honesty in responding to survey questionnaires. On some issues, we also had direct behavioral measures that we could compare with the self-reports. Ethicists expressed somewhat more stringent normative attitudes on some issues, such as vegetarianism and charitable donation. However, on no issue did ethicists show unequivocally better behavior than the two comparison groups. Our findings on attitude-behavior consistency were mixed: ethicists showed the strongest relationship between behavior and expressed moral attitude regarding voting but the weakest regarding charitable donation. We discuss implications for several models of the relationship between philosophical reflection and real-world moral behavior.
Keywords: Applied Ethics, Attitude-Behavior Consistency, Charity, Ethics, Experimental Philosophy, Moral Behavior, Moral Psychology, Vegetarianism, Voting, Ethik Professoren, Ethik, Ethische Überzeugungen, Fehlverhalten, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Performative Kraft von wertender Überzeugung?, Philosophical Psychology, Stehlen, Werte -
(2013): Social Freedom, Moral Responsibility, Actions and Omissions. In: The Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253), S. 716-739. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12067
Abstract: This article addresses the question of what history an obstacle that stands in the way of our performing a certain action (x) must have in order to render us socially unfree to x. The most promising view on this question is the moral responsibility view, according to which such an obstacle renders us socially unfree to x, if and only if another person is morally responsible for its existence. The main challenge of this view is to identify a serviceable test for establishing when someone is morally responsible for the existence of an obstacle. Numerous attempts to do so have been made over the years, but none of them proved to be successful. In my discussion of the moral responsibility view I will expose the failure of the most recent and powerful attempt to identify such a test. Then I will suggest a more plausible test and defend it from a few possible objections. Before discussing the moral responsibility view I will discuss its main rivals and show why it is superior to them in the first place.
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(2013): Pragmatism and moral progress. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 39 (8), S. 809-824. DOI: 10.1177/0191453713494967
Abstract: John Dewey developed a pragmatic theory of inquiry to provide intelligent methods for social progress. He believed that the logic and attitude of successful scientific inquiries, properly conceived, could be fruitfully applied to morals and politics. Unfortunately, his project has been poorly understood and his logic of inquiry neglected as a resource. Contemporary pragmatists, like Richard Rorty, for example, dismiss his emphasis on method and avoid judgments of moral progress that are in any way independent of the biases of particular cultures. In this article, I argue that Dewey's theory of inquiry indeed provides intelligent methods and intellectual criteria for engaging moral and political matters. Inquiry, as Dewey conceives it, issues in judgments that are increasingly objective, reliable and refined in application. These judgments are rooted in particular times and places, in actual "situations', but are not entirely hostage to specific cultures. I then apply Dewey's theory to two standard moral problems to demonstrate how it works. The conclusion is that Dewey's theory of inquiry gets it just right: it provides solid ground for criticism and moral progress while remaining acutely sensitive to cultural differences and changing circumstances.
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(2013): The effects of cleanliness and disgust on moral judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 28 (4), S. 556-568. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.877386
Abstract: Recent experimental studies in cognitive science report the influence of “disgust” and “cleanliness” manipulations on moral judgment, yet little attention has been given to interpreting these studies together or developing models of the causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment. I propose considerations for the causal modeling of these effects. The conclusions are not decisive in favor of one theory of disgust and cleanliness, but suggest several distinct causal roles of disgust- and cleanliness-type manipulations. The incorrect views, I argue, are those that posit causal effects from a single common cognitive mechanism for both disgust and cleanliness.
Keywords: Beeinflussung der Bewertung moralischer Urteile, Bewertung von sozialem Verhalten (/sozialer Angemessenheit), Cleanliness and disgust, Disgust, Ekel, Emotionaler Zustand, Models of causal influence of cleanliness and disgust manipulations on moral judgment, Moral, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Philosophical Psychology 2012
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(2012): Solidarity and Social Moral Rules. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5), S. 691-706. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9313-8
Abstract: The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren't these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we 'fetishize' or 'worship' if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.
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(2012): System der Ethik mit einem Umriss der Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre. 1. Aufl.. Paderborn: Salzwasser VerlagKeywords: Begriffsanalyse, Disziplin, Ethik, Höflichkeit, Klassiker, Moral, Moralphilosophie, Philosophie, Soziale Angemessenheit
2011
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(2011): Moral enhancement and pro-social behaviour. In: Journal of medical ethics 37 (3), S. 130-131. DOI: 10.1136/jme.2010.041434
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21325675 Abstract: Moral enhancement is a topic that has sparked much current interest in the world of bioethics. The possibility of making people ‘better,’ not just in the conventional enhancement sense of improving health and other desirable (and desired) qualities and capacities, but by making them somehow more moral, more decent, altogether better people, has attracted attention from both advocates1 2 and sceptics3 alike. The concept of moral enhancement, however, is fraught with difficult questions, theoretical and practical. What does it actually mean to be ‘more moral’? How would moral enhancement be defined and would it necessarily, as some have claimed, make the world a better or safer place? How would or could such enhancement be achieved safely and without undue constraint on personal liberty and autonomy? On this subject, a recent paper by Crockett et al4 investigating the effects of the neurotransmitter serotonin on moral decisionmaking provides an intriguing scientific basis for examining what might or might not constitute moral enhancement. The study involved treatment with citalopram, a drug that increases the action of serotonin in the brain, and subsequent analysis of participants' decisionmaking behaviour in two different situations involving moral dilemmas: the well known ‘Trolley Problem’5 and the ‘Ultimatum Game’.6 The researchers found that citalopram promoted what they call ‘prosocial behaviour’, increasing the participants' aversion to causing direct harm to others: in the first scenario, they were less likely to select the option that required killing one in order to save five, and in the secod, less likely to reject unfair offers at the expense of others.
Keywords: Bioethics,, chemisch / neurologisch / medikamentös / durch Substanzen, Disziplin, entscheiden, Humans, Moral, moral enhancement, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Morals, Philosophie, pro-social behaviour, Prosocial Behaviour, Serotonin, Serotonin/physiology, Social Behavior, Spieltheorie, Status / biologische Marker 2010
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(2010): Robot rights?. Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration. In: Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3), S. 209-221. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-010-9235-5
Abstract: Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes.
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(2010): Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good. The Social Aspect of Kant's Moral Philosophy. In: Kantian Review 15 (01), S. 1-36. DOI: 10.1017/S1369415400002351
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(2010): The moral foundations of social institutions. A philosophical study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: Theory -- A teleological account of institutions -- The moral foundations of institutions -- Individual autonomy : agency and structure -- Collective moral responsibility -- Institutional corruption -- Applications -- The professions -- Welfare institutions -- The university -- The police -- The business corporation -- Institutions and information and communication technology -- Government In this book, Seumas Miller examines the moral foundations of contemporary social institutions. Offering an original general theory of social institutions, he posits that all social institutions exist to realize various collective ends, indeed, to produce collective goods. He analyses key concepts such as collective responsibility and institutional corruption. Miller also provides distinctive special theories of particular institutions, including governments, welfare agencies, universities, police organizations, business corporations, and communications and information technology entities. These theories are philosophical and, thus, foundational and synoptic in character. They are normative accounts of a sampling of contemporary social institutions, not descriptive accounts of all social institutions, both past and present. Miller also addresses various ethical challenges confronting contemporary institutional designers and policymakers, including the renovation of the international financial system, the 'dumbing down' of the media, the challenge of world poverty, and human rights infringements by security agencies combating global terrorism
2009
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(2009): Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1), S. 77-96. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-008-9136-4
Abstract: The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814-834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt's research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no 'real' moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
Keywords: ASPERGER-SYNDROME, ATTITUDES, Automatic processing, AUTOMATICITY, BEHAVIOR, Empathy, Ethik, IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST, INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES, Meta-ethics, Moral, Moral agency, Moral intuitions, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Motivation, PREJUDICE, Psychologie, Reason-responding, Reason-tracking, STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION 2007
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(2007): A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding. Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (6), S. 731-748. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701694110
Abstract: Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call ‘moral dumbfounding’. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms of his ‘Rawlsian creature’ model of moral judgment. I show that Haidt and Hauser assume that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of features of a.) moral judgment that are b.) construed in terms of the intrinsic features of individuals. By contrast, I hypothesize that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of moral reasoning, more specifically in terms of the social dynamics of such reasoning. Finally, I argue that this hypothesis points towards an externalistic account of both moral reasoning and moral judgment.